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This thesis is dedicated to Grandpa, who did not live to see his ‘two PhDs in a car’ 
theory proved wrong. 
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Abstract 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) is the preeminent international 
security institution spanning Europe and North America. This means that NATO’s 
engagement with UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and 
Security (WPS) is of particular salience to examine. NATO’s role as a ‘teaching 
machine’ sharing lessons on gender and UNSCR 1325, means the organisation 
represents a key site for the transfer of learning on the value of the WPS agenda. 
Despite this, and the wide range of literature examining the implementation of UNSCR 
1325, NATO’s implementation of the women, peace and security agenda remains 
under examined. This thesis contributes a feminist approach to theorising international 
security institutions, drawing upon an institutional approach to understand how 
NATO’s gendered organisational structure has contributed to shaping a particular 
understanding of UNSCR 1325. Notably, the WPS agenda has mapped onto NATO’s 
long existing concern with the status of women in the military, and UNSCR 1325 has 
come to be supported, in the military structure, by the existing gender machinery 
established to support this agenda. The thesis identifies the key actors and drivers 
involved in NATO’s adoption and implementation of UNSCR 1325. In particular, the 
central role of partner states has contributed to the framing of the WPS agenda as 
external to the Alliance, or within a silo, both practically and symbolically. This 
supports the argument that member and partner states have come to learn the value of 
UNSCR 1325 as a diplomatic tool and a means of providing influence 
incommensurate with status. It also challenges notions that NATO is an organisation 
whose agenda is dictated (solely) by the US. In addition to identifying femocrats 
operating within NATO, the thesis draws attention to the importance of leadership for 
driving the agenda, most significantly through the appointment of the NATO Secretary 
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General’s Special Representative on Women, Peace and Security in 2012. The thesis 
exposes the ‘added value’ of UNSCR 1325 not only for member states, but for NATO. 
This finds the Resolution valued as a tool to increase operational effectiveness, in part 
because its adoption was shaped by NATO’s involvement in Afghanistan. NATO’s 
implementation of UNSCR 1325 has also been utilised by as a public diplomacy tool 
by NATO, for example, utilising stories of Afghan military women as a ‘good news 
story’ about NATO’s involvement in Afghanistan. 
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Introduction: Feminist activism from the UN to the 
academy 
(1.0) Introduction 
This thesis examines UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (UNSCR 1325) on 
Women, Peace and Security (WPS) and its impact (through adoption and 
implementation) on complex international security institutions, specifically NATO. 
This institution is an important testing ground for the Resolution because of its part in 
shaping understandings of security and gender, through its role as a ‘teaching machine’ 
(Enloe, 1983). NATO is also the pre-eminent international security institution, 
spanning Europe, North America, and beyond, given the widening of NATO 
partnerships. Yet, despite this, NATO’s adoption and implementation of UNSCR 1325 
remains under examined. 
This thesis is conceived with a commitment to feminist praxis in mind. The main aim 
of this thesis is to explore the validity of claims that the adoption and implementation 
of UNSCR 1325 by NATO, a militarist institution, has undermined the efficacy of the 
Resolution as a transformative feminist achievement (Cockburn 2011).  In order to do 
so this thesis draws upon feminist security studies in order to expose the gendered 
implications of NATO’s engagement with UNSCR 1325 as of ‘added value’ to the 
Alliance in respect of operations and public diplomacy, and for member and partner 
states as a diplomatic tool to support influence incommensurate with status. This will 
include problematising the central involvement of NATO’s Public Diplomacy 
Division in supporting UNSCR 1325 as a ‘good news story’ for the Alliance. The 
thesis unpacks both the opportunities, and constraints, which arise when an 
international security institution, becomes involved in the implementation of global 
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gender norms and the impact this process has on the transformative potential of such 
norms. 
(1.1) Research questions 
The research puzzle underpinning this thesis is the apparent sudden adoption of 
UNSCR 1325 by NATO when there appeared no logical necessity to do so. Prior to 
the adoption of the NATO/EAPC Policy on UNSCR 1325 in 2007 NATO had not 
engaged with the Women, Peace and Security agenda. At this time the alliance was 
not alone among regional organisations in failing to engage with the agenda, moreover 
the feminist agenda underpinning the Resolution appeared to challenge NATO’s 
position as a militarist organisation. The resistance of feminist activists, who had been 
so key to the adoption of UNSCR 1325 and to lobbying for and supporting its 
implementation at national levels, to engage with an institution such as NATO served 
as a further barrier to NATO’s adoption of UNSCR 1325. There was no civil society 
impetus for NATO to adopt UNSCR 1325, evidenced by their resistance to 
acknowledge or engage with NATO when it did (Cockburn, 2007). Therefore, the 
reason behind NATO’s adoption of UNSCR 1325 is not immediately apparent as it 
deviates from other paths to the development of National Action Plans nor does the 
WPS agenda appear to align with NATO as a militarist institution.  
This project seeks to discover whether NATO’s engagement with the WPS agenda 
represents a transformative moment for NATO. The starting point for this is an 
interrogation of whether NATO, an organisation adept at political and military 
transformation in order to ensure its survival (Cornish, 2003), has been transformed 
by the adoption and implementation of UNSCR 1325 or whether the Resolution has 
been co-opted to support NATO’s existing trajectory as an institution. NATO’s 
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adoption of the Resolution came at a time when NATO had transformed well beyond 
its Cold War purpose, with less emphasis on territorial defence and more on out-of-
area crisis management, in addition to diplomatic engagement and partnership 
(Rynning 2014). The ISAF operation also contributed to positioning NATO as a global 
actor (Mattelaer 2011) As Webber, Hallams and Smith (2014: 773) contend, post-Cold 
War NATO is involved in an ongoing process of adaptation. For example, NATO’s 
2010 Strategic Concept confirmed NATO’s role as an actor less restrained by regional 
and military considerations and more globally and politically engaged (Ringsmose and 
Rynning, 2011: 7). Yet challenges to both NATO’s purpose, that is its activities, and 
function, or the assumptions underpinning NATO’s activities, remain (Webber, 
Hallams and Smith, 2014: 773). This leaves open the possibility that NATO’s adoption 
of UNSCR 1325 could also represent another transformative moment for the Alliance, 
conversely NATO’s engagement with the Resolution could simply align with the 
institution’s existing trajectory as an international security institution. Interrogating 
these aspects contributes to unpacking the research puzzle of NATO’s apparent 
suddent adoption of UNSCR 1325. 
In order to interrogate this puzzle, an understanding of the particular nature of UNSCR 
1325 is necessary, which can contribute to explaining how NATO as a militartist 
organisation came to adopt a ‘feminist’ agenda. This builds upon Shepherd's (2009) 
analysis of the construction of international security within the discourse of UNSCR 
1325 and Mcleod’s (2012) conception of UNSCR 1325 as a ‘travelling concept’ with 
a utility to a range of actors and settings beyond that envisaged in the text of the 
Resolution. This leaves open the possibility that NATO’s interpretation of UNSCR 
1325 has shaped the Resolution itself.  
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In order to interrogate this research puzzle, I address one primary research question 
and three sub-questions pertaining to the adoption and implementation of UNSCR 
1325 by NATO. These research questions will address the research puzzle and 
contribute to understandings of the opportunities for – and hindrances to - 
transformative change within international security institutions. The primary research 
question is as follows:  
1. Does the adoption of UNSCR 1325 represent a transformative moment in the 
evolution of NATO as an organisation and its approach to peace and security? 
In order to unpack this research puzzle a number of related questions emerge: 
1.1. Who are the key institutional actors and drivers that facilitate the 
implementation of UNSCR 1325 by NATO? 
This question is addressed through an interrogation of the role of NATO member and 
partner states (in Chapter Five), in addition to the role of femocrats (Chapter Three 
and Four) and leadership on the issue from the NATO Secretary General and NATO 
Secretary General’s Special Representative on Women, Peace and Security (in 
Chapter Six). It finds, that UNSCR 1325 serves as a ‘diplomatic tool’ for member and 
partner states to use to advance their own agendas incommensurate with their status. 
In addition, Chapter Seven identifies the central role assigned to NATO’s Public 
Diplomacy Division in the implementation of UNSCR 1325 and this contributes to the 
argument that the Resolution proves to be of ‘added value’ to the Alliance as a public 
diplomacy tool, rather than to support the transformation of the organisation. 
1.2. What is NATO’s interpretation of the value of UNSCR 1325 and what does 
this tell us about the transformative potential of the Resolution? 
17 
 
In addressing this question, the thesis unpacks the value placed upon UNSCR 1325 by 
NATO as an organisation as of ‘added value’ to the Alliance in respect of operations 
(Chapter Five), the status of women in NATO militaries (Chapter Three) and as a 
public diplomacy tool (Chapter Seven). This indicates that far from challenging 
NATO’s core values, UNSCR 1325 has been framed as a compatible with them, 
bringing into question the transformative potential of UNSCR 1325 on international 
security institutions. 
1.3. What has been the impact of NATO’s adoption of UNSCR 1325 on the 
Resolution itself?  
This question contributes to addressing whether NATO’s role as a ‘teaching machine’ 
has supported a particular value being placed upon UNSCR 1325 by member and 
partner states, thus shaping the normative concerns underpinning the Resolution. 
Chapter Five discusses how the role of the Nordic states, in particular Sweden (a 
NATO partner) has contributed to a particular understanding of UNSCR 1325 as of 
‘added value’ for operations. Sweden’s role in hosting the Nordic Centre for Gender 
in Military Operations (NCGM), NATO’s ‘Department Head’ for gender training, has 
contributed to the proliferation of this understanding of UNSCR 1325 across NATO 
member states, limiting the transformative aspirations underpinning the WPS agenda 
(discussed in Chapter One). Moreover, as Chapter Six discusses, the provision of 
Gender Advisors as Voluntary National Contributions (VNCs), many from partner 
states, means that it is not just NATO members which are learning the ‘added value’ 
of UNSCR 1325.  
Addressing these supporting questions will contribute to the primary purpose of this 
thesis, to examine whether NATO’s adoption and implementation of UNSCR 1325 
18 
 
represents a transformative moment for NATO as an organisation and NATO’s 
approach to peace and security. It should also be noted, that the time-frame examined 
in this thesis is limited to the period from the NATO Chicago Summit in 2012 to the 
NATO Wales Summit in 2014. This time-period was chosen because it coincides with 
a period of significant momentum behind UNSCR 1325 at NATO, supported by the 
appointment of the first NATO Secretary General’s Special Representative on 
Women, Peace and Security and as such warrants examination on its own.  
This research project is informed by a feminist methodology and underpinned by a 
commitment to reflexivity, feminist ethics and feminist praxis. This is particularly 
important when seeking to unpack the values that define the operational and strategic 
objectives of international security institutions, such as NATO. In order to unpack the 
complex web of political and strategic forces, this thesis draws upon both content 
analysis and elite interviews. The thesis will explore key policy documents and 
statements produced by the organisation. The analysis of the content and discourses 
entrenched in these documents will produce a map of NATO’s values and approach to 
UNSCR 1325. The data gathered through content analysis is triangulated with elite 
interviews, conducted with NATO Officials involved in the implementation of 
UNSCR 1325. 
As a result, the thesis draws upon both primary and secondary sources to examine 
NATO’s adoption and implementation of UNSCR 1325. Although much of the 
information can be found in open sources, including scholarly work and NATO 
documentation, closed sources offer a necessary addition. Therefore, consideration is 
given to the discussions, which occurred behind closed doors in order to understand 
NATO’s implementation of UNSCR 1325 as fully as possible. Interviews were 
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conducted with 21 officials working for, or at NATO and based in Belgium or the 
USA. The interviews took place over a six-month period between February 2014 and 
August 2014. All of the interviews were conducted on condition of anonymity. For 
this reason, no distinction is made in the thesis between individuals employed directly 
by NATO or by member or partner states. 
 
(1.2) Conceptualising feminist activism in feminist security 
studies 
This thesis is situated within feminist security studies, primarily because it builds upon 
and contributes to the work of these scholars to examine the adoption and 
implementation of UNSCR 1325. The thesis is also underpinned by a commitment to 
feminist praxis and as such is situated as a form of feminist activism, exposing the 
ways in which NATO has engaged with the WPS agenda. Feminist activism has had 
a long preoccupation with the military and the impact of militarisation on our everyday 
lived experiences. In particular, grassroots feminist activism across the globe has 
formed a crucial part of this challenge. Despite its association with white Western 
feminists, as Basu (2013: 1) acknowledges, much of the action was (and is) ‘spear-
headed by, among others, third world, black, and queer feminists’ (Basu, 2013:1). 
Another site for feminist organising and activism on militarism has been the UN. The 
emergence of an international feminist movement coincided with the UN Decade for 
Women from 1975 to 1985, a decade, which saw the adoption of the Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in 1979. 
Each of the four UN World Conferences for Women, held between 1975 and 1995, 
incorporated a challenge to militarism and militarist practices in their outcome 
documents. In addition, the Fourth UN World Conference on Women in Beijing and 
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shadow conference played a crucial role in supporting the emergence of a transnational 
feminist movement uniting the agenda of disparate feminist groups across the globe 
(True, 2003:377).  
Feminist activism continues to play a key role in challenging dominant approaches to 
peace and security today, challenging Shea’s assertion the peace movements faded 
away ‘remarkably quickly’ (Shea: 15) following the deployment of cruise missiles in 
the UK, Germany and Italy in 1983. Shea (2010: 15) seems to overlook the continuing 
place of feminist activism both through peace protests and in other forms. For 
example, the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) have 
played a central role in both the peace movement and feminist activism. They spear-
headed the ‘No-to-NATO’ campaign (WILPF 2013) and also participate in the NGO 
Working Group on Women, Peace and Security, which had a vital role in the adoption 
of UNSCR 1325 by the Security Council (Otto, 2007:117). There is, therefore, 
evidence of a feminist activist presence within international security working to 
challenge dominant conceptions of peace and security. 
The place of feminist activism has transformed beyond anti-war and anti-nuclear 
action (although this continues to play a valuable role). In addition to the UN 
conceived of more broadly, feminists have begun to engage with and work through 
formal organisational structures, for example, the UN Security Council. This 
contributed to the adoption of UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security in 2000. 
The Resolution was ground-breaking, both because of the role of transnational 
feminist activists in supporting its adoption and because it was the first time the 
Security Council had discussed the place of women in international security. It called 
for the protection of women during conflict and the participation of women in 
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peacebuilding. UNSCR 1325 and the seven follow Resolutions composing the women, 
peace and security agenda have been much critiqued (cf. Tryggestad, 2009; 
Puechguirbal, 2010; Shepherd, 2008; Cook, 2009; Otto, 2010:107). However, the 
adoption of the Resolution by a growing number of states and international 
organisations warrants feminist interrogation. 
In academia, feminist security studies has an ingrained association with the activist’s 
challenge to militarising practices (Wibben 2011). For example, feminist activism has 
influenced certain scholars to engage in feminist security studies (Shepherd, 2010); 
while others have crossed the line between the academy and activism throughout their 
career (notably Cynthia Cockburn); and feminist activists have crossed into academia 
(such as Felicity Hill). The two camps are not mutually exclusive, rather they should 
be seen as working towards the same normative agenda, underpinned by a 
commitment to feminist praxis. This includes challenging state centric approaches to 
peace and security and supporting the transformation of gender relations, which 
underpin ‘hegemonic masculinity’ (Connell, 2005). The inevitable osmosis between 
activism and the academy, and the commitment of feminist security studies to feminist 
praxis, means that feminist security studies can be conceived of as a form of feminist 
activism.  
International security institutions are defined as international organisations whose 
primary concern is with peace and security issues, whether this particular organisation 
is subsumed under a larger international organisation or stands alone. Institutions in 
this context are narrowed to strictly those with a physical organisation, in line with the 
limits set by Kronsell and Svedberg’s (2012:211) analysis. This includes for example 
NATO, OSCE, the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy and the UN Security 
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Council. A considerable amount of feminist literature has examined the role of security 
institutions in their various manifestations including: women and the military (Enloe, 
1989); women in the military  (MacKenzie, 2009; Mcbride & Wibben, 2012; Mathers, 
2013) and peacebuilding organisations  (Duncanson, 2009; Tryggestad, 2010). So far, 
feminist analysis of security institutions at the international level has been limited. In 
this respect, Kronsell’s (2012; 2015) pioneering work on the EU security and defence 
policy is opening a new field of research. 
To date, feminist analysis of international security institutions remains 
underdeveloped. This is in part a result of the nature of feminist security studies as a 
project, underpinned by a commitment to transformative praxis. As a consequence, 
feminist security scholars have focused on giving a voice to those who are 
marginalised (largely, but not exclusively women) within  international security and 
whose marginalisation supports and perpetuates ‘masculinist power relations’ 
(Hoogensen and Stuvoy, 2006:211) both within International Relations as a discipline 
and international relations in practice. However, the adoption and implementation of 
global gender norms, including UNSCR 1325, by international security institutions 
necessitates feminist engagement in order to expose the opportunities – and hindrances 
– to the pursuit of feminist agendas within militarist organisations. 
(1.3) Thesis structure 
The introduction to the thesis has outlined the nature of the research puzzle and the 
research questions which will be used to address it in the body of the thesis. It has 
conceptualised the feminist activism underpinning feminist security studies, situating 
this project within it. The introduction now turns to outlining the structure of the thesis 
through the seven Chapters and how these Chapters contribute to addressing the 
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research questions. This will lead onto a discussion of the contribution this thesis 
makes to knowledge, primarily through building upon Enloe’s (1983) conception of 
NATO as a ‘teaching machine’ in respect of gender. In addition to contributing an 
understanding of the implications for the WPS agenda of an international security 
institution engaging with it; conceptualising NATO’s role as a gender actor; and a 
study of the way in which gender is integrated into policy and decision making 
processes in international institutions. 
Following this, the introduction will turn to examine UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace 
and Security, contextualising its adoption against the decades of feminist organising 
at the UN, before examining the role of critical actors, including a number of member 
states and the NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security, which 
contributed to realising the Resolution. This contributes to understanding the 
compromises necessary to feminist agendas when pursued through resistant 
organisations. Moreover, it provides a context against which a discussion of the 
strengths and weaknesses of UNSCR 1325 is set. This section then looks back at 
fifteen years of the women, peace and security agenda. First, it details the widening, 
broadening and narrowing of the agenda through the adoption of seven follow-up 
resolutions. Then reflecting on the Global Study on UNSCR 1325, supported by UN 
Women. Finally, the Chapter concludes by examining the adoption of National Action 
Plans (NAPs) and their concentration in European and Western states, rather than 
conflict affected countries. This finds that there is a tendency for NAPs to be externally 
facing, limiting their potential to transform the approach of states to international 
peace and security. This discussion provides the context against which NATO’s 
adoption and implementation of UNSCR 1325 should be understood.  
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The title of this thesis hangs NATO’s adoption and implementation of UNSCR 1325 
upon silences and silos. Silences are identified in what NATO does not mention or 
omits from policy and rhetoric on 1325. Silos are understood as both pertaining to the 
isolation of policy on women, peace and security from the mainstream NATO agenda 
but also the military understanding of silos as a chamber in which a guided missile is 
kept ready for firing (Cohn 1987). This is relevant because, as this thesis identifies, 
UNSCR 1325 has provided a salient diplomatic tool for NATO to use to deepen 
relations with partner states, in addition to serving as a ‘good news’ story for the 
Alliance. 
The thesis is structured in two parts. Section one, outlines a feminist approach to 
security in three chapters. The first Chapter in this section, Chapter Two, reviews the 
literature on feminist security studies, detailing the emergence of feminist approaches 
to security before examining the conceptualisation of feminist security studies as a 
project over the last decade, with a commitment to feminist emancipatory praxis. This 
includes consideration of the place of feminist approaches in the context of (critical) 
security studies, concluding that feminist scholars should be cautious of engaging with 
a body of work that has consistently silenced feminist contributions to understanding 
security. Instead, feminist engagement with (critical) security studies should be on our 
own terms and on the condition that it contributes to feminist security studies.  
Chapter Three introduces the theoretical framework underpinning the analysis. This 
introduces a feminist approach to theorising NATO, drawing on, and expanding 
Enloe’s (1983) conception of NATO as a ‘teaching machine’ in respect of gender and 
the status of women in NATO forces, to include NATO’s political structure and 
UNSCR 1325. To do so, the Chapter examines NATO as an organisation, including 
25 
 
discussion of how NATO has developed beyond the provisions of the North Atlantic 
Treaty and NATO’s adeptness at transformation. The Chapter then outlines the 
gendered nature of NATO as an organisation, with women underrepresented in 
decision-making role and men overrepresented. It then turns to contextualise NATO’s 
adoption of UNSCR 1325 against the decades of feminist organising within NATO to 
support the role of women in NATO militaries, beginning in the 1960s with an 
initiative by senior female military officers. The creation of formal gender machinery 
in the form of the Committee on Women in NATO Forces (CWINF), which would 
become the NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives (NCGP) demonstrates that it 
is possible to advance feminist agendas within resistant organisations. Moreover, this 
contributes to explaining the central role of the NCGP in NATO’s implementation of 
UNSCR 1325 and the value placed on UNSCR 1325 by NATO as a tool to support its 
existing concern with the status of women in the military. Finally, the Chapter 
discusses the increasing role of NATO partners, which is important to understand, 
given their central role in NATO’s adoption and implementation of UNSCR 1325. 
This Chapter underscores the necessity of including a gendered understanding of 
institutional structures and politics in the analysis of international security institutions. 
 
The final Chapter in Section One, Chapter Four, outlines the feminist methodology 
underpinning this research project. Chapter Four begins by situating feminist 
methodology in two senses. First as problem driven, rather than a means to test a 
specific method and with feminist epistemology recognising that knowledge is co-
constituted. The Chapter then outlines the methods used in this research, which are 
elite interviews and content analysis. In doing so, it contributes a feminist approach to 
conducting elite interviews, understanding them as a genre, rather than a category of 
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research. A feminist approach to content analysis is also outlined, drawing attention 
to its use for exploratory and explanatory research. 
Section Two of the thesis examines NATO’s adoption and implementation of the 
women, peace and security agenda, through three chapters. The first examines 
NATO’s adoption of UNSCR 1325 and the emergence of WPS as part of a counter-
discourse supported, in part, by an informal group of supportive member and partner 
states, known as the ‘friends of 1325’. In doing so, NATO’s adoption of UNSCR 1325 
in 2007 is presented as far from a fait accompli. The section outlines the specific role 
of NATO partners, including Austria, Sweden and Finland, before detailing the roles 
of NATO member states who have proved supportive, specifically, the Netherlands, 
Norway and the UK. 
Chapter Five then examines how NATO’s adoption of UNSCR 1325 has framed the 
Resolution as of ‘added value’ to the Alliance, rather than a core part of its identify as 
an international security institution. This has resulted from the association of the WPS 
agenda with NATO’s pre-existing concern with the status of women in NATO forces. 
In addition, to the focus on the value of UNSCR 1325 as a tool to increase operational 
effectiveness, mapping on to the Nordic states understanding of the WPS as of ‘added 
value’ to operations and reflecting the involvement of Sweden in contributing to the 
military command on UNSCR 1325. The Chapter then examines the provisions of 
NATO policy on UNSCR 1325. This includes the NATO/EAPC Policy on UNSCR 
1325 adopted in 2007 (and subsequently revised in 2011 and 2014), in partnership 
with the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and associated military command, 
Bi-Strategic Command 40-1 adopted in 2009 (and revised in 2012). This extended 
NATO’s adoption of UNSCR 1325 to NATO’s military structures and is applicable to 
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all states serving in NATO-led operations and missions. The first publicly released 
NATO/EAPC Action Plan on UNSCR 1325 is also interrogated. Finally, Chapter Five 
draws upon content analysis of these key policy documents to outline the gender 
essentialisms, which underpin NATO’s understanding of UNSCR 1325 and 
undermine the transformative potential of NATO’s adoption of UNSCR 1325. 
Chapter Six turns to examine NATO’s implementation of UNSCR 1325, first, charting 
the progress made on the WPS agenda at NATO Summits from Bucharest in 2008, 
where it was first mentioned, to Wales in 2014, where UNSCR 1325 featured on the 
formal agenda for the first time. This draws attention to the role of UNSCR 1325 as a 
diplomatic tool for member states, such as the UK, who as host of the Wales Summit 
used this as a platform for their Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict Initiative and 
thus elevated WPS, even if this was largely superficial. The Chapter then turns to 
examine the role of UNSCR 1325 in NATO’s relations with partners beyond EAPC 
and across the globe, detailing how it has become in one sense a diplomatic tool to 
bring together a disparate and diverging security community and provides ‘added 
value’ for NATO. The section concludes by examining one specific means in which 
NATO employs UNSCR 1325 as a diplomatic tool and which represents an extension 
of NATO’s role as a ‘teaching machine’. Detailing how the Science for Peace and 
Security programme, which provides funding for a NATO member and partner to host 
an event or conduct research on a particular topic, has expanded to cover UNSCR 
1325 indicating that the WPS agenda is one which can foster cooperation with NATO 
partners. 
The final Chapter in Section Two, examines in greater detail the significant role 
provided for NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division in the NATO/EAPC Policy on 
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UNSCR 1325 and considers the implications of this. It does so, first by outlining the 
distinct, but mutually reinforcing, concepts of public diplomacy and strategic 
communication and their importance to NATO and NATO’s continued centrality as 
an actor in international security. Chapter Seven then outlines the structural constraints 
on NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division, including that it is underfunded and under-
resourced. This provides context to the central role given to the Public Diplomacy 
Division in the NATO/EAPC Policy on UNSCR 1325 and is indicative of the limited 
(rather than transformative) way the WPS agenda has been implemented in relation to 
public diplomacy. The final section of this Chapter examines the integration of 
UNSCR 1325 into the Public Diplomacy Division’s award winning web-documentary, 
Return to Hope released in 2014 to coincide with the drawdown of NATO-led ISAF 
forces from Afghanistan. First, contextualising this analysis against the continued 
instrumentalisation of Afghan women to support Western intervention. Then turning 
to interrogate the intended purpose and audience of Return to Hope, finding that the 
documentary serves as a means for NATO to sell a ‘good news story’ about NATO’s 
intervention in Afghanistan. Against this, the implementation of UNSCR 1325 in 
Return to Hope is interrogated and found to be flawed in a number of respects. 
Primarily, because where Afghan women are featured as a topic, they are silenced and 
denied a voice. In addition, it is a left to a Swedish Ambassador (a NATO partner), to 
outline NATO’s commitment to supporting Afghan women, making NATO’s 
commitment to UNSCR 1325 ring hollow and situating the WPS agenda as something 
external to the Alliance. 
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(1.4) Contribution to knowledge 
The primary contribution of this thesis is to update Enloe’s (1983) conception of 
NATO as a ‘teaching machine’ in respect of gender, to include NATO’s adoption of 
UNSCR 1325 and expand this framework to include NATO’s political structure and 
partnerships. In order to do so, the thesis draws upon an institutional approach, in 
particular, organisation theory as a way of understanding how (voluntary) regulations 
shape values and actions of organisations and how organisations adapt to new values. 
By employing organisational theory, it will be possible to gain an understanding of 
how the implementation of the UNSCR 1325 and the process of adaption within the 
organisation shape the interpretation of the original document in (unexpected) ways. 
And how this may result in ultimately challenging the original values and aspirations 
underpinning UNSCR 1325. 
In addition to this top level contribution to knowledge, the thesis makes three further 
supporting contributions. First, it builds on the extensive feminist security studies 
literature to contribute and understanding of the implications for the WPS agenda 
when an international security institution seeks to engage with it. This is important 
because despite the extensive body of feminist security studies work on the WPS 
agenda, which has examined UNSCR 1325 at the UN, the national and local level, 
NATO’s implementation of the Resolution has been under examined. This has left 
feminist security studies ill equipped to engage critically with the UN Women 
commissioned Global Study on UNSCR 1325, which found NATO’s appointment of 
a Special Representative on Women, Peace and Security an example of best practice 
at the regional level (Coomaraswamy 2015: 260). This lack of engagement by feminist 
scholars with NATO can in part be explained by the grounding of Feminist IR in 
pacifism, which has meant feminist IR scholars, such as Cockburn (2011), perceive 
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the only outcome of NATO’s adoption of UNSCR 1325 to be co-option and fail to 
account for the possibility of other outcomes. This omission is significant because, as 
this thesis identifies, NATO’s role as a ‘teaching machine’ sharing lessons on best 
practice in respect of gender and UNSCR 1325 has meant the Alliance has had a 
critical role in shaping member (and partner) states understanding of the value of 
UNSCR 1325 as of ‘added value’ in respect of operational effectiveness but also as a 
diplomatic tool.  
Second, this thesis conceptualises NATO’s role as a gender actor in international 
relations, drawing attention to the decades of organising by military women and 
outlining the centrality of gender policy machinery in both NATO's military and 
political structures. This is important because NATO studies has failed to 
conceptualise NATO as a gendered institution with a concern for the status of women 
in NATO forces stemming back to the 1960s. Nor has this body of work considered 
the impact of the subsequent establishment of gender policy machinery in NATO’s 
military structure in 1997 through the office to support the Committee on Women in 
NATO Forces, and political structure in 2012 with the appointment of the NATO 
Secretary General’s Special Representative on Women, Peace and Security. As a 
result, NATO studies has failed to engage substantively with NATO’s adoption of 
UNSCR 1325 and consider the implications of this for the shape of the Alliance. In so 
doing, NATO scholars have overlooked the central role of partner states, including 
Austria and Sweden, in supporting the Alliance’s adoption of UNSCR 1325 and 
subsequent implementation. 
Finally, it contributes a study on the way in which gender is integrated into complex 
decision and policy making processes by international security institutions. Outlining 
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not just the role of femocrats, but of member and partner states, including Austria and 
Sweden. It details how the informal working group at NATO, the ‘friends of 1325’ 
has provided an important platform from which to support the implementation of the 
WPS agenda. This, however, is not to discount the contribution of individuals within 
NATO, in particular those who worked to establish NATO’s gender machinery within 
the military structure. This thesis demonstrates that the Committee on Women in 
NATO Forces (later the NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives) provided a means 
for NATO to map UNSCR 1325 onto its pre-existing concern with the status of women 
in NATO forces. NATO’s adoption of UNSCR 1325 can thus be seen as a culmination 
of decades of feminist organising within NATO but nevertheless has relied upon 
member states support.  
(1.5) Women, Peace and Security: Making the Agenda a 
Reality 
The introduction now turns to examine the development of the Women, Peace and 
Security (WPS) agenda, encapsulated in UN Security Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 and 
the seven follow-up Resolutions. In doing so it provides the context from which to 
understand the significance of NATO’s adoption and implementation of UNSCR 
1325. The first section examines UNSCR 1325 itself, situating the Resolution against 
the backdrop of decades of feminist organising at the UN. The next section then turns 
to look at the institutional dynamics of the Security Council and the critical actors 
(member states and the NGO Working Group on WPS) who contributed to the 
realisation of the Resolution. The section then turns to examine whether UNSCR 1325 
was a ‘trick or a treat’ (Tryggestad 2009), concluding that the (necessary) 
compromises made to the feminist agenda have limited the transformative potential of 
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the WPS agenda. This discussion is important because of the implications when 
international security institutions, such as NATO, engage with the WPS agenda.  
The next section reflects on fifteen years of the WPS agenda, first, examining the 
seven follow-up Resolutions and their contribution to widening, broadening and 
deepening the agenda. Then examining the implementation of UNSCR 1325 at the 
UN, and in particular, reviews the findings of the Global Study on UNSCR 1325 
produced by UN Women. Finally, the section concludes by looking at the adoption of 
National Action Plans (NAPs) on UNSCR 1325, focusing in particular on the role of 
civil society in supporting NAPs and holding states accountable for their 
implementation of UNSCR 1325.  
 
(1.5.1) Superpower politics: Making room for gender on the agenda 
On the 31st October 2000 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1325 on 
women, peace and security. The Resolution was ground-breaking for a number of 
reasons, but primary among these was the fact that this was the first time the Security 
Council had dedicated a full session to debate the experience of women in conflict and 
post-conflict situations. UNSCR 1325 takes a ‘holistic approach’ to women, peace and 
security through incorporating participation, protection and prevention (Cook 2009a). 
The adoption of UNSCR 1325 broke a barrier between the traditionally perceived soft 
issue of women’s right and hard security (Tryggestad 2009: 541). The provisions of 
UNSCR 1325 can be categorised into four pillars: 1. Women’s representation in 
decision-making; 2. Protection from violence during and post-conflict; 3. Preventative 
strategies for violence against women and girls; and 4. Promotion of measures to 
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mainstream gender in relief and recovery. These provisions were subsequently 
reinforced by seven further resolutions (UNSCR 1820, UNSCR 1888, UNSCR 1889, 
UNSCR 1960, UNSCR 2106, UNSCR 2122 and UNSCR 2242) between 2008 and 
2015, which should be read as an extension of the umbrella of resolutions on women, 
peace and security stemming from UNSCR 1325 (see Table 1).  
The internal politics of the UN were pivotal to the adoption of UNSCR 1325, however, 
as Tryggestad (2009:542) notes, it is important to remember that the UNSCR 1325 
‘was not adopted in a vacuum’ isolated from external developments in international 
relations. The end of the Cold War changed the nature of conflict and this had 
consequences for the very definition of security, allowing space for the emergence of 
gender onto the Security Council’s agenda (Tryggestad 2009: 543). UNSCR 1325 is 
classified as a ‘thematic resolution’, rather than one focused on a specific conflict. 
This type of resolution would have been unthinkable during the Cold War but gained 
traction in the late 1990s and early 2000s (Tryggestad 2009: 543). It is therefore salient 
to consider the wider global political landscape against which UNSCR 1325 was 
adopted. 
During the Cold War, superpower politics shaped feminist advocacy at the UN and 
contributed to isolating the issue of violence against women from the international 
agenda (Harrington, 2011). The Cold War contributed to the isolation of US women’s 
groups from more radical (and socialist) groups around the globe but also in the US. 
In addition, the granting of ‘consultative status’ to NGOs in 1946, giving them access 
to UN debates and meetings, led to the emergence of NGOs whose specific purpose 
was to intervene at the UN and as a result they were themselves subject to intervention 
by the two superpowers (Harrington, 2011:561). For example, the communist 
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Women’s International Democratic Federation (WIDF) was supported by the Soviet 
Union to gain consultative status at the UN and then used as vehicle to promote Soviet 
propaganda (Weigand, 2002:49). The place of women’s status on the UN agenda 
continued to be framed as an East/West dichotomy. For example, the 1975 UN World 
Conference on Women, held in Mexico, was marked by a tension between the Soviets 
who wanted to include a wide range of issues to debate, including capitalism, and the 
US who wanted to limit discussion to women’s legal equality (Ghodsee cited in 
Harrington, 2011:563). Neither the US nor the Soviet Union used women’s issues to 
criticise the other and this is particularly visible in relation to their respective 
interventions in Afghanistan in the 1980s. For example, the US did not draw out the 
hypocrisy of the Soviet Union purporting to protect Afghan women, while the Red 
Army used prostitutes and perpetrated sexual violence. Likewise, the Soviet Union 
(and UN NGOs) did not point out that the US, in supporting the Afghan Mujahedeen, 
was supporting a patriarchal regime pitted against one advancing women’s rights 
(Moghadam cited in Harrington 2011: 563). 
Against this context, the emergence of the US as a global champion of women’s rights 
at the end of the Cold War appears perplexing given their record on women’s rights. 
A number of scholars have sought to explain this shift. Joachim (2003:259) has argued 
that this was a result of domestic feminist lobbying and the alignment with the Clinton 
administration’s world views. Harrington (2011: 563), however, argues that the end 
of the Cold War and the emergence of the US as the global hegemon, which involved 
framing democratisation as a security issue, offers a more nuanced understanding of 
the appearance of violence against women on the global agenda with the US as 
champion. The framing of democratisation as a security issue resulted from the 
emergence of a ‘new wars’ doctrine ‘which pits alliances of democratic state and non-
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state actors against militia that control populations through rape and other forms of 
bodily atrocity’ (Harrington, 2011: 566). In the US, the passing of the Victims of 
Trafficking and Violence Protection Act in 2000 resulted in the State Department 
monitoring the trafficking of women globally (Harrington, 2011: 567). This 
monitoring, Harrington (2011: 567) argued, ‘contributes to a hegemonic conflation of 
women’s equality with ‘Western’ (or Northern) civilization, and women’s oppression 
with an undeveloped ‘rest’, obscuring ‘Western’ agency in both male privilege and 
violence against women’. 
UNSCR 1325 represents an important development in widening the international 
conceptualisation of security however, many of the issues encapsulated in UNSCR 
1325 were new for the Security Council but had previously been discussed and agreed 
upon by governments in the UN Conferences for Women. The ‘ideas and ideals about 
gender, violence and security that were represented in the resolution’ can be traced 
back to those embodied in the institutions which helped shape it (Shepherd, 2010:146). 
Shepherd divides these institutions into three groups: ‘UNSC Resolutions, 
international conventions and declarations; statements, statutes and Reports’ 
(Shepherd, 2009: 109). One of the earliest significant developments came with the 
establishment of the Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) in 1946. This paved 
the way for the development of women’s rights as an issue the UN would take 
seriously. It was under the auspices of the CSW that the series of international 
women’s conferences were organised from 1975 to 1995, with the UN Decade for 
Women taking place from 1975-1985 (Tryggestad 2009: 545). 
The first UN World Conference on Women was held in Mexico City in 1975. It led to 
the establishment of the UN Development Fund for Women and the UN International 
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Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women, with the aim of 
promoting women’s participation (Civil-Military Cooperation Centre of Excellence, 
2013: 28). The 1980 World Conference for Women and the Nairobi World Conference 
on Women (1985) went considerably further than UNSCR 1325 on peace and security 
issues because it took place against the backdrop of the Cold War (Enloe in Hill, Cohn, 
and Enloe, 2004: 2). Indeed, as a result of strong advocacy from women’s 
organisations, the 1975, 1980, 1985 and 1995 World Conferences on Women all 
mentioned disarmament and macro security issues (Cohn, Hill and Ruddick, 2005: 
12). The most notable of these was the Nairobi conference’s Looking Forward 
Strategies for the Advancement of Women. This stressed concerns that women are 
excluded from political processes dealing with peace and conflict and that as a group 
they are particularly vulnerable in conflict (United Nations 1985). The most significant 
precedence over UNSCR 1325 was the Report’s call for governments to instigate all 
appropriate measures to provide women with an equal opportunity to enter the 
diplomatic service and represent their country at all levels (United Nations 1985). The 
strong advocacy of women’s organisations at the UN World Conferences for Women 
ensured that they acknowledged a link between gender and weapons issues (Cohn, 
Hill and Ruddick, 2005: 12) 
Although ‘women and peace’ appeared as items on the agendas of the World 
Conferences for Women held between 1975-1985, it was not until the Fourth World 
Conference for Women held in Beijing in 1995 that ‘women and armed conflict’ was 
made a priority area (Tryggestad 2009: 545). Beijing brought together the largest 
number of NGO delegates at a UN conference to that date and they engaged in 
extensive lobbying of conference delegates. As a result the Beijing conference is 
acknowledged as an important precursor to UNSCR 1325 (Tryggestad 2009:545). 
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Outside of the confines of Security Council politics, the Beijing Platform for Action 
went considerably further than UNSCR 1325 and called for a reduction in ‘excessive 
military expenditure’ (United Nations, 1995: point 13). It also stressed the importance 
of non-violent forms of conflict resolution and on fostering a culture of peace, in 
contrast, neither of these goals are mentioned in UNSCR 1325 and represent a 
significant silence (Otto 2010:107). The Beijing Platform for Action may not be 
legally binding but it does have normative traction (Shepherd, 2014:5). 
Outside of the World Conferences for Women, there are a number of other significant 
developments to note relating to women and conflict. During the UN Decade for 
Women, the General Assembly adopted the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in 1979. This called for women’s 
participation in peace because peace requires ‘the full participation of both men and 
women in society’ (United Nations 1979). The call for women’s participation because 
it is an issue of equality, rather than because of an essentialised notion of what women 
bring to the table, was also found in the 1982 UN General Assembly Declaration on 
the Participation of Women in Promoting International Peace and Co-operation, 
which not only called for the participation of women at all level of peace-making but 
outlined practical measures to support the achievement of this goal (Otto, 2007:134). 
In placing UNSCR 1325 within this wider context it is possible to draw attention to 
the disjuncture between discussions of the wider international community on peace 
and security and those taking place at the Security Council. This demonstrates that 
UNSCR 1325 should not be understood as an isolated event but as a culmination of 
feminist efforts (and compromises) both inside and outside the UN over the previous 
decades to put gender on the agenda. In so doing, this draws attention to the 
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momentous achievement the adoption of UNSCR 1325 would come to represent and 
its status as a symbolic act. 
(1.5.2) Realising a ‘feminist achievement’ through the UN Security Council 
UN Security Council Resolution 1325 was adopted by the Security Council on the 31st 
of October 2000. The realisation of the Resolution was premised on the efforts of a 
number of critical actors in key advocacy roles, including the NGO Working Group 
on Women, Peace and Security and relied upon the support of ‘a lucky coincidence’ 
of supportive Security Council members (Otto, 2010:100). These included Namibia 
Bangladesh, Jamaica, Canada, the Netherlands, and the UK. For example, during 
Bangladesh’s presidency of the Security Council the first ever statement to mark 
International Women’s Day was released in March 2000 (Tryggestad, 2009: 547). In 
addition, Namibia’s role in initiating the open debate on WPS proved crucial and built 
upon the country’s previous support of WPS. In May 2000, Namibia had hosted a 
workshop at which the findings from a study on UN peacekeeping and gender 
mainstreaming were presented. The resulting Windhoek Declaration and Namibia 
Plan of Action on ‘Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective in Multidimensional Peace 
Support Operations’, formed part of the formal discussions in the Security Council in 
the run up to the adoption of UNSCR 1325 and proved pivotal for advancing women’s 
rights in security (Tryggestad, 2009: 547). Canada’s support for the Resolution was 
also key, and it was a Canadian initiative which launched the ‘Friends of 1325’ 
initiative (Tryggestad 2009: 547). The ‘Friends of 1325’1 are a group of states 
                                                
1 Membership of the Friends of 1325 includes: Australia, Bangladesh, Cameroon, 
Canada, Chile, Colombia, Croatia, Finland, Germany, Guinea, Jamaica, Japan, South 
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advocating for, and monitoring the implementation of UNSCR 1325 at the UN (Hill, 
2005: 4). The group have a good working relationship with NGOs, particularly the 
NGO Working Group on WPS and members have supported a significant number of 
activities organised by NGOs in New York and invited the NGO Working Group on 
WPS to observe its meetings (Tryggestad 2009:547). The role of permanent and non-
permanent Security Council members was therefore crucial to the realisation of 
UNSCR 1325. 
In addition to Security Council members, the NGO Working Group on Women, Peace 
and Security had a critical role in the adoption of UNSCR 1325. The extensive 
involvement of feminists within the NGO Working Group on WPS and inside the UN, 
along with the wider political context in which the Resolution sits led to its ratification 
being portrayed as a ‘feminist achievement’ (Cockburn, 2011). The decision to form 
the NGO Working Group would not have been possible without previous feminist 
activism at the UN and the idea first emerged informally in 1998 at a meeting of the 
UN Commission on the Status of Women examining the Beijing Platform for Action 
Chapter on women and armed conflict (Muna and Hill, 2004:131). Much of the 
groundwork for the Resolution - including lobbying, drafting and redrafting of the text 
- was the result of the efforts of the NGO Working Group who built on the experience 
                                                
Korea, Liechtenstein, Mexico, Namibia, Holland, New Zealand, Norway, the 
Philippines, Singapore, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Tanzania, the United 
Kingdom and the United States (Villellas 2010:19). The Friends of 1325 are distinct 
from the informal group of states, referred to also as the ‘friends of 1325’, operating 
at NATO in support of UNSCR 1325 (see discussion in Chapter Five). 
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of decades of feminist activism within the UN and successes including CEDAW and 
the UN Conferences for Women held every five years from 1975 to 1995 (Cohn, 
Kinsella and Gibbings, 2004: 130; Shepherd 2008: 386). 
In order to realise UNSCR 1325 and in its continued effort to advocate for the 
implementation of the WPS agenda, the NGO Working Group on WPS has had to 
learn the language, operating practices and peculiarities of the UN and in particular 
the Security Council. Through strategically framing their issues, transnational 
advocacy networks ensure that the issue stays on the international agenda. This could, 
for example, involve aligning with existing institutional frameworks or policies to 
facilitate an intervention on the issue (True, 2008: 7). The importance of staying in 
line with existing institutional framework in order to remain ‘trusted’ partners is 
highlighted by the case of two Iraqi women invited by the NGO Working Group to 
address UN. In 2003, Amal Al-Khedairy and Nermin Al-Mufti addressed the UN2 on 
the situation in Iraq and in doing so disrupted the established UN discourse on WPS 
(Gibbings, 2011: 524). These two women challenged the accepted protocol that NGOs 
should not question the motives of Security Council members by speaking out against 
what they perceived to be the imperialist intervention in Iraq. In addition, they did not 
conform to the discourse of women as peacemakers, nor did they acknowledge the UN 
role in the reconstruction in Iraq as would be expected. As Gibbings (2011: 524) 
observes: 
‘Al-Khedairy and Al-Mufti’s performance illustrated that powerful norms exist 
around the Women, Peace and Security agenda, and that certain performances 
                                                
2 They were denied permission to address the Security Council directly as this was perceived 
as too controversial at the time (Gibbings, 2011: 524). 
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could be anticipated and expected, while others were discouraged. Those who 
did not meet these expectations caused embarrassment and discomfort.’  
This example draws attention to the challenge for ‘insider’ groups of remaining both 
critical of established UN practices while not jeopardising their favoured status within 
the UN system.  
The challenge for feminists operating within resistant institutional structures 
(including femocrats and the NGO Working Group) to support transformative agendas 
are clear. They have also been subject of significant criticism from some feminists on 
the outside. For example, Harrington (2011: 559) has criticised transnational feminist 
networks operating within the UN as being representative of (only) elite women’s 
politics. A wider critique of feminist ‘insiders’ finds that ‘feminist achievements have 
become sufficiently institutionalized to warrant our describing them and the advocacy 
networks that produced them [as] Governance Feminism’ (Kotiswaran, Halley, 
Shamir and Thomas, 2006: 336). Otto (2010: 113), however, argues that the term 
‘Governance Feminism’ is a misreading of their power, which ultimately is reliant ‘on 
the dynamism, persistence and creativity of movements for change outside 
international institutions’. This supports True’s (2008) contention that the ability of 
transnational advocacy networks to instigate change within international organisations 
is premised on their ability to mobilise alliances with insiders and outsiders. Rather 
than co-opting the feminist agenda, transnational feminist advocacy networks 
contribute towards democratising international organisations. They do so through 
increasing transparency; creating dialogue with a diverse range of women’s groups 
otherwise out of reach of the IO; by engaging and contesting dominant discourses; 
through increasing awareness of the lack of diversity in IOs; assist IOs in meeting their 
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current objectives in the most effective ways; and finally, through monitoring the 
implementation of policy (True, 2008: 7). In the case of UNSCR 1325 the 
transnational feminist advocacy network has increased the transparency of the UN 
Security Council, for example, by inviting individuals, such as the two Iraqi women 
discussed above, to address the UN who they would not otherwise have heard from.   
 
(1.5.3) ‘Trick or Treat?’: The strengths and weaknesses of UNSCR 1325 
The adoption of UNSCR 1325 on 31st October 2000, or Halloween, led some to 
question whether the Resolution was indeed a ‘trick or a treat’ (Tryggestad 2009)? 
Inevitably, the passage of the Resolution through the Security Council necessitated a 
number of concessions and compromises to the transformative feminist agenda which 
underpinned it. Nevertheless, the adoption of the Resolution was a relatively radical 
act for the Security Council and by no means should its transformative potential be 
written off. In order to support this argument, this part of the Chapter examines the 
strengths and weaknesses of the Resolution. 
The primary strength of UNSCR 1325 is the significant normative power it carries, 
even if the legal status of UNSCR 1325 is contested. For example, many NGOs cite 
Article 25 of the UN charter as evidence of the binding nature of UNSCR 1325, while 
diplomats have resisted acknowledging the Resolution as legally binding (and in 
practice states do not treat UN Security Council Resolutions as binding) (Tryggestad 
2009: 544). It is however, interesting to note that NATO policy on UNSCR 1325 
recognises the legal status of UNSCR 1325 (NATO 2011c: 4.1.3). The Resolution was 
also adopted under Chapter VI (non-coercive measures), rather than Chapter VII 
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(coercive measures) and as such carries a normative imperative intended to influence 
state behaviour (Tryggestad, 2009: 544). This is reinforced by the unanimous support 
for the Resolution from the Security Council when it was adopted. It is likely that 
Security Council members did not envisage that the momentum behind UNSCR 1325 
would be kept alive by ‘women’s groups in civil society, government, and the UN 
system’ (Anderlini quoted in Tryggestad, 2009: 544). The result is that the WPS 
agenda has become a normative agenda ‘that is increasingly difficult for member states 
to shun’ (Tryggestad, 2009: 542). This has resulted in a recent ‘boom’ in the adoption 
of National Actions Plans (NAPs) on UNSCR 1325 (see discussion below), even if 
the implementation of these NAPs remains an ongoing challenge, the WPS agenda is 
here to stay. 
Another strength of UNSCR 1325 is that it acknowledges the sexist culture of 
peacekeeping operations – through calling for women’s participation and 
acknowledging the disproportionate impact of conflict on women - as a ‘technically 
manageable problem’ and has created a process for the UN to address the issue in 
consultation with women’s NGOs (Harrington, 2011: 569). Crucially, this does not 
undermine existing peacekeeping and democracy building efforts linked to the ‘new 
wars’ doctrine, but rather facilitates further efforts to implement the Resolution 
(Harrington, 2011:5 69). Despite this being a strength of the Resolution, the inclusion 
of women as participants in peace negotiations and peace keeping operations is the 
area where the WPS agenda has made the least progress (Miller, Pournik, and Swaine, 
2014:4). Rather, the evolution of the WPS agenda has reinforced the emphasis on 
sexual violence in conflict, at the expense of women’s participation, with four of the 
seven follow up resolutions to UNSCR 1325 focused on sexual violence (see Table 
1). This demonstrates the political expediency of advocating for the protection of 
44 
 
women, and indicates the challenge to realising the transformative feminist 
underpinning to the WPS agenda. 
UNSCR 1325 also embodies a number of weaknesses. Primary among these is the 
language of the Resolution, which is relatively weak (Tryggestad 2009: 544). For 
example, the inclusion of ‘urges’, ‘encourages’ and ‘calls’, rather than stronger 
language demanding action from states. The WPS agenda remains separate from other 
UN frameworks which could mitigate the weakness in the language. As Shepherd 
(2014: 5) highlights, the integration of parallel frameworks, including CEDAW and 
the UN Secretary General’s Seven-Point Action Plan for Gender-responsive Peace-
building, is a key challenge to the advancement of the WPS agenda.  
The passage of UNSCR 1325 through the Security Council removed the political and 
radical feminist understanding of gender and reproduced it in a non-challenging way 
for mainstream practices. The language within UNSCR 1325 consistently associates 
gender with women and the effect of this is reinforced with both terms used 
interchangeably (Puechguirbal, 2010: 184). UNSCR 1325 calls for gender 
mainstreaming, yet the Resolution makes no mention of men and mentions women 34 
times (United Nations Security Council 2000). In this context gender mainstreaming 
can be perceived as only applicable to the concerns of women. The result is that gender 
has been transformed into a ‘safe idea’ for policy makers through the language of 
UNSCR 1325 and resulting UN documents and has left behind its radical potential to 
produce change (Puechguirbal, 2010:184). For example, in Serbia, McLeod (2011: 
600) found that a conception of gender as synonymous women has provided a ‘useful 
interpretation of gender security for some actors’ with negative impact. The 
compromises made to ensure the Security Council adopted UNSCR 1325 have 
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inevitable led to significant weaknesses in the language of the Resolution, most 
pertinently in relation to gender. 
The gendering of roles within UNSCR 1325 has resulted, as Butler (2006:3) describes, 
in ‘the feminist subject… [being] discursively constituted by the very political system 
that is supposed to facilitate its emancipation’. The two contrasting conceptions of 
women presented in UNSCR 1325 create a false dichotomy between ‘women as 
victims’ and ‘women as agents of change’. On the one hand UNSCR 1325 presents 
women as victims of conflict identifying the ‘particular’ and ‘special needs’ of women 
in conflict situations, making reference to the protection of women five times. The 
Resolution, in contrast, also frames women as agents, ‘stressing the importance of 
their equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and 
promotion of peace and security’ (United Nations Security Council, 2000). Cohn, 
Kinsella and Gibbings (2004: 139) argue that UNSCR 1325 is able to acknowledge 
the disproportionate impact of war on women, while still ‘making women’s agency 
vibrantly visible’. The reality is more complex, as Shepherd (2008: 383) argues, with 
women required to inhabit ‘somewhat schizophrenically’ the role of victim, while 
simultaneously working to transform their situation and being representative of all 
other women. The agent/victim  dichotomy removes from the equation the ability of 
women who are victims of sexual violence in conflict to also embody an identity as an 
agent of change (Otto, 2010: 117). The false dichotomy of victim-agency ‘obscures 
the fact that the issues of participation and violence are inextricably linked’ (Cook 
2009: 126). That is sexual violence is also a ‘cause and consequence of low levels of 
women’s participation in all decision-making’ (Cook 2009: 126). 
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An additional criticism of UNSCR 1325 is its silence on the issue of disarmament. In 
a break from the discussion at the UN World Conference for Women (discussed 
above), UNSCR 1325 makes no mention of disarmament and this silence represents a 
disjuncture with the established goals of the women’s peace movements. As Otto 
(2010:107) argues, ‘this omission leaves the Council’s ‘hard’ Chapter VII 
enforcement power insulated from the (feminising) influence of [UNSC]R1325’. 
Cockburn (2011: 6) maintains that the weaknesses in the language of UNSCR 1325 
leave it susceptible to being co-opted by militarism. This is particularly striking given 
the central role of women’s activists in supporting the Resolution, with disarmament 
having been of central importance to the women’s peace movement since the 1915 
Hague Congress (Otto, 2004:12). In order to understand these weaknesses, it is 
necessary to unpack the constraints which limited the feminist agenda.  It is evident 
that from the outset considerable compromises were necessary to foster the cohesion 
of the NGO Working Group, who were essentially a disparate group of actors broadly 
concerned with women and war and who saw the UN as an important arena for action 
(Cohn, 2011:12). The majority of the members of the NGO Working Group did not 
define themselves as ‘feminist’ or ‘anti-war’ action (Cohn, 2011:12), and this is 
evidence that compromises had to be made to the feminist agenda before it even 
reached the Security Council. A number of the groups making up the NGO Working 
Group viewed discussion of the arms trade or militarism as off limits because they 
found the subject ‘too political’ (Cohn, 2011:12). Moreover, the Women’s 
International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) muted their discourse on the 
link between gender and militarism in supporting UNSCR 1325 (Cockburn 2007). 
This goes some way to explaining the noticeable absence from UNSCR 1325 of the 
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Security Council’s own responsibilities under the UN Charter to establish arms 
regulations systems (Otto, 2004:12). 
UNSCR 1325 has been much criticised for its lack of provisions on implementation, 
but as McLeod (2012:145) argues, this is also one of UNSCR 1325’s strengths because 
it enables the Resolution to be implemented in response to local contexts, rather than 
as a top down imposition. On the downside, this flexibility opens up the possibility for 
UNSCR 1325 to be co-opted to support agendas not intended by the transnational 
feminists who were instrumental in providing the impetus for the Resolution. In this 
sense UNSCR 1325 is ‘simultaneously an empowering and problematic document’ 
(McLeod, 2012:147). 
Despite the ground-breaking nature of the Resolution, the (necessary) compromises 
made to the feminist agenda mean that UNSCR 1325 embodies a number of 
weaknesses, which limit its potential to be used to achieve transformative change in 
peace and security. Its adoption raised as many questions about the role of women and 
gender in conflict as it sought to address. The result is that over fifteen years on from 
the adoption of UNSCR 1325 by the Security Council, significant obstacles remain to 
its effective implementation.  
 
(1.5.4) Fifteen years on: milestones, missions and missed opportunities 
Over fifteen years on from the ground-breaking adoption of UNSCR 1325, substantial 
progress has been made in advancing the WPS agenda, including through the adoption 
of seven follow-up resolutions. There also remain significant challenges, primarily 
moving from rhetorical commitment (evidenced through the adoption of seven follow-
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up resolutions) to concrete action to implement the WPS agenda. It is, however, clear 
that feminist activists, working within the UN and beyond, continue to have a key role 
to play in keeping the transformative potential of the WPS agenda alive. There are 
however tensions on how the WPS agenda can be progressed further. This section 
reviews these issues and reflects on the progress made, and the future path of the 
Women, Peace and Security agenda. 
The advancement of the WPS agenda has not been one of linear progression since 
2000. Following the adoption of UNSCR 1325, seven further resolutions were adopted 
between 2008 and 2015 (see Table 1). These form the umbrella of resolutions 
composing the UN framework on women, peace and security and are referred to by 
extension of reference to UNSCR 1325. This section will examine the passage of these 
resolutions by the Security Council and review their content in order to argue that the 
WPS agenda continues to rely upon the support of the NGO Working Group on 
Women, Peace and Security to ensure the WPS agenda – taken as a whole - is not 
widened and broadened to an extent that it becomes meaningless. 
Table 1 
 
The passage of the WPS resolutions through the Security Council has differed. 
UNSCR 1325 was ground breaking in that it was an initiative initiated and supported 
by feminists. In contrast UNSCR 1820 was initiated by the US State Department and 
UN Security Council Resolutions on Women, Peace and Security
UNSCR 1325 1820 1888 1889 1960 2106 2122 2242
Year 2000 2008 2009 2009 2010 2013 2013 2015
Focus WP SGBV SGBV WP SGBV SGBV WP WP and CVE
Proposer Namibia USA USA Vietnam USA UK Azerbaikan Spain
Month October June September October December June October October
Sexual and gender based violence in conflict (SGBV)
Women's participation (WP)
Countering violent extremism (CVE)
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designed to complement the Bush Administration’s anti-trafficking agenda (Otto 
2010:109). However, the draft resolution was leaked to feminist NGOs who sought to 
respond critically in attempt to tone down the focus on women as powerless and 
vulnerable victims (Otto, 2010: 109). Unsurprisingly, UNSCR 1820 received a mixed 
reception from scholars and activists, while some welcomed it as a long overdue 
admission that sexual violence is an issue the Security Council should take into 
account, others criticised it for reducing the broad scope of UNSCR 1325 to the issue 
of women as victims of war (Otto, 2010: 101). For others, the focus of UNSCR 1820 
on sexual violence in conflict at the expense of acknowledging the importance of 
women’s participation threatened the ‘holistic approach’ of the WPS agenda and is 
difficult to describe as feminist (Cook, 2009a). There is a danger that in fetishising 
sexual violence in war, violence against women in peacetime become normalised and 
further, that sensationalising sexual violence in war may reinforce the beliefs which 
make rape a powerful weapon of war (Cook, 2009: 129, Meger, 2016). It is also 
necessary to question the idea that experiencing sexual violence in conflict is the very 
worst thing that can happen to a woman and is unrecoverable from because this 
reinforces the notion that raping a woman in war is equivalent to ‘raping a nation’, 
with women seen as a resource, and closes down avenues to ending the violence 
(Cook, 2009: 129). While these criticisms stand, it should ne noted that without the 
intervention from feminist NGOs in critiquing the draft of the text, the Resolution 
could have been far more damaging for the transformative potential of the WPS 
agenda (Otto, 2010: 109).   
The third WPS Resolution, UNSCR 1888 adopted in 2009, also addressed the issue of 
sexual violence in conflict and was sponsored by the US, but this time the Obama 
administration who sought to break from the Bush legacy (Otto, 2010: 110). It made 
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a significant departure from UNSCR 1820 by treating the issue of SGBV in conflict 
as one of structural inequality, not women’s inherent vulnerability (Otto 2010:103). 
Five days after the adoption of UNSCR 1888, Vietnam sponsored the adoption of 
UNSCR 1889. The fourth WPS Resolution returned the focus of the WPS agenda to 
women’s participation, reinforcing and strengthening the provisions of UNSCR 1325 
with measures to address women’s structural inequalities. UNSCR 1889 joined 
UNSCR 1325 in introducing new language acknowledging women as agents and 
displacing representations of women as victims (Otto, 2010: 103).  
In 2010, the adoption of UNSCR 1960 created a set of institutional tools to combat 
impunity and steps towards the prevention and protection from sexual violence in 
conflict. Two further WPS resolutions were passed by the Security Council in 2013: 
UNSCR 2016; and UNSCR 2122. UNSCR 2106, adopted in June, was proposed by 
the UK as part of their Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict Initiative (PSVI) and 
became the fourth resolution to focus on sexual and gender based violence in conflict. 
As a result there was a concern that the WPS agenda had narrowed to focus on sexual 
violence in conflict at the expense of women’s participation (Krause and Enloe, 2015: 
3 29). The adoption of UNSCR 2122 in 2013, which acknowledged the salient role 
women do and should play in contributing towards sustainable peace, was therefore 
significant because it represented the return of the WPS agenda to its wider and more 
comprehensive origins (Björkdahl and Mannergren Selimovic, 2015: 20). The 
Resolution also embodies the strongest language on women’s agency of all the WPS 
Resolutions (Miller, Pournik, and Swaine, 2014: 51). The next WPS Resolution, 
UNSCR 2122’s focus on monitoring the implementation of the WPS agenda through 
increased briefings to the Security Council from various UN entities, represented a 
radical departure from previous WPS Resolutions (Shepherd, 2014: 22). The 
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Resolution called on member states, regional actors and UN entities to review their 
existing implementation of the WPS agenda and revise existing targets in preparation 
for the High-Level Review mandated by the Resolution in 2015. In addition, the 
Secretary General commissioned a Global Study led by Radhika Coomaraswamy, 
former Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed 
Conflict and former Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women. The study was 
intended to review the progress made towards achieving the goals set out in the WPS 
Resolutions and to outline a global policy agenda to inform WPS efforts going forward  
(UN Women 2014a). 
Fifteen years on from the adoption of UNSCR 1325, Spain sponsored the adoption of 
a further resolution, UNSCR 2242. This resolution is the most recent in the WPS 
framework and the main focus is a call for WPS to be a cross-cutting issue within the 
Countering Violence Extremism (CVE) agenda. This is a departure from the 
recommendations of the Global Study on UNSCR 1325, which recommended that 
CVE be separated from women’s rights, noting that the instrumental use of women’s 
rights can be harmful in fragile situations (Wright, 2015). More positively, as Wright 
(2015) notes, UNSCR 2242 does call for research into the impact of CVE on women’s 
rights. In addition to CVE, UNSCR 2242 makes a number of other contributions to 
the WPS agenda. These include the creation of an Informal Expert Group on Women, 
Peace and Security at the UN Security Council (a recommendation of the Global 
Study) and a call for WPS to be incorporated into all country-specific situations on the 
Security Council’s agenda.  
The eight WPS resolutions, which make-up the WPS agenda each have their own 
strengths and weaknesses, but it clear that the the greater engagement there was with 
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the NGO Working Group, the better the outcomes in terms of aligning with feminist 
goals. The continued feminist engagement with the resolutions is evidenced in the 
strengthening of the feminist content in the WPS resolutions. The adoption of the WPS 
resolutions has had a number of positive effects, including challenging the Security 
Council’s conservative approach to gender (Otto, 2010: 98). The WPS agenda 
embodied in the resolutions has created a ‘snowball effect’ on institutional activity 
backed by the power of the Security Council (Otto, 2010: 103). Many parts of the UN 
structure have become involved in the implementation of the WPS agenda, for 
example, the Inter-Agency Network on Women and Gender Equality (IANWGE) 
established a Task Force on Women, Peace and Security to coordinate the 
mainstreaming of WPS into the UN bureaucracy (Otto, 2010: 103). 
 
(1.5.5) The UN and the Global Study on UNSCR 1325 
At the UN, the WPS resolutions have supported the continued relationship between 
feminist activists and the Security Council through the informal (but confidential) 
Arria-Formula meetings, thematic open debates on the anniversary of the adoption of 
UNSCR 1325 and ad hoc roundtables (Otto, 2010:104). This has enabled the NGO 
Working Group on WPS to continue to lobby the Security Council to implement the 
Resolution and has kept the transformative potential of the WPS agenda alive. For 
example, as discussed above, feminist involvement served to water down some of the 
more problematic elements in the draft of UNSCR 1820 brought to the Security 
Council by the Bush administration. 
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The establishment of UN Women in 2011, brought the WPS agenda into its remit. In 
2013, the Security Council commissioned UN Women to conduct a global study on 
the implementation of UNSCR 1325 in UNSCR 2122. The fifteenth anniversary of 
UNSCR 1325 saw the much anticipated publication of the Global Study on UNSCR 
1325. It was hoped that the Global Study would strike a balance between the issue of 
sexual violence in conflict, which has come to dominate the interest of member states 
and therefore the WPS agenda, and the issue of women’s participation which should 
be at the ‘heart of the agenda’ (Miller, Pournik, and Swaine, 2014: 50-51). In essence, 
realising women’s agency is a key part of any aspiration to prevent sexual violence in 
conflict and there is a danger that in focusing on the narrower agenda of preventing 
sexual violence in conflict in a silo, that this relationship will be overlooked. The 
Global Study does live up to this aspiration in calling for any WPS initiative to be 
conducted on the understanding that UNSCR 1325 was conceived to promote 
women’s rights in conflict (Coomaraswamy, 2015: 15). Indeed, the Global Study is 
comprehensive and far reaching, embodying much of the transformative aspirations 
underpinning the initial move to support the adoption of UNSCR 1325. It emphasises 
the need for conflict resolution through non-violence means, and stresses that conflict 
prevention must be the priority over the greater use of force (Coomaraswamy, 2015: 
15).  
The Global Study is limited in that it can only make recommendations, which can be 
overlooked by the UN Security Council and national governments. A number of these 
recommendations were ignored in the latest WPS Resolution, UNSCR 2242. For 
example, the Global Study cautions against attempts to ‘securitize’ issues and the use 
of women as instruments in military strategy (Coomaraswamy, 2015: 15). Moreover, 
Coomaraswamy argues that the issue of women’s rights should not be conflated with 
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counter-terrorism efforts because these rights are part of the ‘checks and balances’ 
within a governance system and to do so would compromise their value 
(Coomaraswamy, 2015: 230). 
In addition to calling for the High-Level Review on UNSCR 1325 (which the Global 
Study was intended to feed into), UNSCR 2122 recommended that the Security 
Council discuss the possibility of the creation of the position of a Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General on Women, Peace and Security, which would 
complement the work of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) 
on Sexual Violence in Conflict. Shepherd (2014: 2) has argued that the creation of this 
post would help to facilitate cross-UN action on the WPS agenda with UN Women 
support and member states have begun initial discussion on the idea (UN Women, 
2014: 281). However, incorporating an understanding of the UN as an organisation 
suggests the SRSG may not have the intended benefits for the WPS agenda. These 
reservations are outlined in the UN Women commissioned Global Study on the 
Implementation of UNSCR 1325 (2014: 281-2) and while the Global Study agrees 
with Shepherd (2014:2) that the SRSG would fulfil the need for leadership on WPS, 
the report argues against the creation of the position for four salient reasons. Their first 
point is that a SRSG does not fit with the WPS mandate because the current SRSG 
posts are for compliance and accountability mandates which require ‘naming and 
shaming’ of perpetrators. Second, that the creation of a SRSG would risk narrowing 
the WPS agenda to those countries on the Council’s agenda posing a threat to 
international peace and security. This would exclude a significant proportion of UN 
membership and would undermine the prevention and post-conflict peacebuilding 
pillars. Third, an SRSG on WPS would divert institutional resources and create 
institutional reporting tensions. Finally, the positon would split the WPS agenda 
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between protection and participation and undermine the comprehensive 
implementation of the two strands (UN Women, 2014: 282). In taking into account 
the institutional makeup of the UN, the Global Study does recommend an alternative 
to an SRSG, which would fulfil the need of leadership on WPS. This would be the 
creation of an Assistant Secretary General position within UN Women, including a 
dedicated budget and mandate to drive the implementation of the recommendations of 
the Global Study (UN Women, 2014: 281). 
 
(1.5.6) Accountability? National Action Plans (NAPs) and civil society 
scrutiny 
At the National level, a growing number of states have adopted National Actions Plans 
(NAPs) outlining their implementation plan for UNSCR 1325. It should be noted that 
the adoption of a NAP does not necessarily mean that a state is actively implementing 
UNSCR 1325, but rather the adoption of a NAP should be understood as the means 
through which states translate their rhetorical commitment into a plan of action. NAPs 
are particularly important for the implementation of UNSCR 1325 because the 
Resolution fails to provide specific guidelines for its implementation. As McLeod 
(2012: 145) argues, this is also one of the Resolution’s strengths, with this flexibility 
allowing for the Resolution to be implemented in response to the localised context. 
NAPs therefore outline the state’s own understanding of the ‘women, peace and 
security’ agenda and provide an important mechanism for governments to be held to 
account for their actions on WPS (Villellas, 2010: 19).  
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The uptake of National Action Plans (NAPs) was initially slow, with just 16 NAPs 
produced by 2009 (UN Secretary-General, 2009). In 2005, Denmark became the first 
state to adopt a NAP, followed in 2006 by the UK, Sweden and Norway 
(PeaceWomen, 2015). That it was the Nordic states who were among the first to adopt 
NAPs is unsurprising given that the Nordic states have proved themselves particularly 
active in the promotion of women’s participation in international peace and security, 
as a result of the co-constitutive relationship between domestic and international 
commitments (Bergman Rosamond, 2014: 25).  
To date, just 57 states have produced NAPs on UNSCR 1325 (or 30% of the 193 UN 
member states), of these almost half are from European states and only a minority 
from conflict affected states (PeaceWomen, 2015). One major criticism of UNSCR 
1325 and related resolutions is that they have presented an additional tool for the UN 
Security Council to use to reinforce the supremacy of its member states, specifically 
providing legitimacy for Western intervention in the name of Women, Peace and 
Security (Aroussi, 2011: 589). The preponderance of NAPs from Western states do 
little to disarm this criticism, many are outward facing and fail to reflect on how 
UNSCR 1325 should be implemented at home. The UK, for example, has been a 
prominent advocate of UNSCR 1325 in their development work in the global south 
but has resisted engaging UNSCR 1325 in peacebuilding work at home. The UK’s 
NAP excludes Northern Ireland and instead focuses on implementation in police and 
military aspects of international peacekeeping (Hoewer, 2013: 453). It is the use of 
UNSCR 1325 as a foreign policy tool, which has led a number of G77 states to criticise 
and resist the implementation of UNSCR 1325 ‘because they perceive it as being 
representative of a larger package of liberal ideas’ (Tryggestad, 2009: 549). 
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A lack of a NAP does not necessarily equate to a lack of commitment to implement 
UNSCR 1325. For example, only 59% of the members of the ‘Friends of 1325’ at the 
UN have developed NAPs (see Table 2). In the same way the adoption of a NAP is 
not the same as implementing UNSCR 1325. Rather, a NAP is one way through which 
a state can demonstrate a commitment to UNSCR 1325 and follows on from the 
President of the Security Council’s call in 2005 for states to develop NAPs (United 
Nations Security Council, 2005). It is also not necessarily the best way to implement 
the Women, Peace and Security agenda and the concept of NAPs has been subject to 
increasing critique (Basini and Ryan, 2016; Barrow, 2009: 67). 
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Table 2  
 
The translation of NAP commitments into tangible progress has proved more difficult. 
For example, Björkdahl and Mannergren Selimovic's (2015: 15) critical reading of the 
Rwandan and Bosnian NAPs exposes an awareness of the absence of women in 
decision-making positions but both NAPs lack an understanding of how to increase 
women’s participation in an authentic way. Another key hindrance to realising the 
implementations of NAPs is that many do not include the provision of a dedicated 
Friends of 1325 at the UN NAP
Australia Yes
Bangladesh No
Cameroon No
Canada Yes
Chile Yes
Colombia No
Croatia Yes
Finland Yes
Germany Yes
Guinea Yes
Jamaica No
Japan Yes
South Korea No
Liechtenstein No
Mexico No
Namibia No
Holland Yes
New Zealand Yes
Norway Yes
The Phillipines Yes
Singapore No
South Africa No
Sweden Yes
Switzerland Yes
Tanzania No
UK Yes
USA Yes
NAP adoption by 'Friends of 1325' at the UN
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budget. For example, a study by the European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO) 
of the implementation of UNSCR 1325 in Europe found this was a recurring issues 
among European states (EPLO, 2013). 
The call for the development of NAPs by the President of the Security Council in 2005 
identified civil society actors as important agents for the implementation of UNSCR 
1325 (United Nations Security Council ,2005). This is supported by the findings of 
the European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO) (2013:1) study of European 
NAPs, which found that those developed in consultation with civil society stood a 
better chance of being implemented. This is because civil society was able to provide 
independent, critical analysis of the NAP process and was likely to have broader 
concerns that the state. Nevertheless, the involvement of civil society varies widely 
between NAPs, with some civil society organisations having been instrumental in both 
lobbying for, drafting and monitoring the implementation of the NAP, while in other 
states civil society has had little or no involvement. For example, WILPF-US was 
instrumental in advocating for a US NAP and was consulted during the drafting of the 
NAP (WILPF US, 2011). In the UK, the first NAP adopted in 2006, was done so 
without civil society consultation, however, subsequent UK National Action Plan 
(NAP) consultations have had a high level of engagement from civil society, primarily 
through the umbrella organisation, Gender Action in Peace and Security (GAPS) 
(EPLO, 2013; Foreign and Commowealth Office, 2014). The launch of the Preventing 
Sexual Violence in Conflict Initiative (PSVI) by the UK in 2012 also demonstrates a 
high level of formal commitment to the WPS agenda, though it is too early to say if it 
will have the desired effect in the long run.  
60 
 
Other states have also engaged civil society in their implementation of UNSCR 1325. 
Sweden was one of the first states to adopt a NAP 1325 in 2006 (subsequently revised 
in 2009) and the Swedish NAP is one of the few NAPs to specifically mention working 
with civil society actors (Miller, Pournik, and Swaine, 2014).  Australia, in contrast, 
only adopted a NAP 12 years after UNSCR 1325 (PeaceWomen 2015). This makes 
Australia a useful point of comparison, as it is often portrayed as a laggard in the area 
of WPS and has struggled to move from rhetoric to commitment (Shepherd and True, 
2014). Nevertheless the Australian government actively sought civil society 
engagement during the development of the NAP, in particular from WILPF and 
UNIFEM Australia and a key strategy of the NAP is communication with civil society. 
However, since the adoption of the NAP most government departments have not 
sought to share information with civil society (Lee-Koo, 2014). Finally, the US NAP, 
adopted in 2011, provides a strong role for civil society in monitoring and evaluation 
and makes for an interesting case study because of the split in transnational advocacy 
between the UN in New York and the site of governance in Washington.  
On the surface engagement between the UN, national governments and civil society 
can be seen to provide a positive step towards widening participation in peace 
processes and an opportunity for NGOs to work towards mitigating the weaknesses 
within the text through consultation on the implementation of the Resolution. 
However, engagement with civil society can also be problematic and there remain 
significant challenges to facilitating a mutually beneficial relationship between 
women’s groups and security institutions at the state or international level. First, it is 
governments that dictate the terms of the relationship (Hill, 2005: 28); second, ‘NGO-
ized women’s groups’ often fail to mobilise grassroots women (Pratt and Richter-
devroe, 2011: 498); and third, civil society can become implementers of NAPs, filling 
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gaps in provision states cannot address, rather than holding them to account and 
providing scrutiny (Björkdahl and Mannergren Selimovic, 2015: 17). Civil society 
undoubtedly has a role in holding actors to account for their implementation of 
UNSCR 1325, however, there is a danger that civil society can be co-opted to support 
the state or international organisation’s agenda, rather than critically engaging with 
them. 
Nevertheless, it must also be noted that the emergence of an international women’s 
network transcendent of national boundaries has put pressure on the UN to be 
accountable to its commitments and for member states to do the same (Otto, 
2010:104). This network has also facilitated the implementation of UNSCR 1325 at 
the local level. for example, through the WILPF’s PeaceWomen project. The 
PeaceWomen website acts as a vital resource on UNSCR 1325, collating all NAPs and 
has sought to translate the Resolution into over 100 languages (PeaceWomen, 2013). 
This has enabled local women’s groups to use the Resolution as leverage to claim their 
place at the negotiating table in the face of macro-level institutional resistance (Otto, 
2004; Binder, Lukas, and Schweiger, 2008). UNSCR 1325 may not have been 
designed as an organising tool for grassroots women’s movements (Cohn, 2004) but 
initiatives such as the PeaceWomen project have helped the Resolution become a 
powerful advocacy tool for women’s organisations. 
At the local level, women’s groups have used the resolutions to hold governments to 
account and to gain official support for their initiatives (McLeod, 2012). For example, 
Iraqi women have used UNSCR 1325 to push for women’s involvement in 
reconciliation processes, however, ‘the limited awareness amongst decision makers 
(men and women), and especially women, about 1325 has had a negative impact on 
62 
 
peace building in Iraq’ (Abbas quoted in Pratt, 2011:613). In addition, in the occupied 
Palestinian territories, Farr (2011:550) finds women’s groups do have the capacity to 
build awareness of UNSCR 1325 but that these efforts have not resulted in tangible 
results. Moreover, many Palestinians are distrustful of the UN and by extension wary 
of investing in UNSCR 1325 as a means to achieve justice (Pratt and Richter-Devroe, 
2011: 497). The NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security encountered 
similar resistance to UNSCR 1325 among two Iraqi women it invited in 2003 to 
address the Security Council (Gibbings, 2011:522). 
 
(1.5.7) Conclusion 
This section has introduced UNSCR 1325 and the women, peace and security agenda, 
this is important because it will lead onto the discussion of NATO’s adoption of 
UNSCR 1325 and contextualise the feminist critique of this development. First, 
contextualising the ground-breaking nature of the Security Council adoption of 
UNSCR 1325 in 2000, against the backdrop of decades of feminist activism and 
organising at the UN more broadly. For example, through the four UN Conferences 
on Women held from 1975 to 1995. These helped equip feminist activists with the 
skills and know how to operate effectively within resistant institutional structures. 
The section then outlined the key actors, including member states and the NGO 
Working Group on WPS, whose efforts and knowledge were critical to the realisation 
of the Resolution. In doing so it outlined how it was necessary for actors, such as the 
NGO Working Group, to assimilate to an extent with the Security Council’s practices 
in order to gain traction for their own agenda. Finally, this section outlined the 
63 
 
strengths and weakness to the WPS agenda, a result of the compromises necessary for 
the Security Council to adopt the Resolution. This found that the weaknesses, 
particularly in respect of language and gender essentialisms, continue to pose a 
challenge for realising the transformative potential of the Resolution, particularly 
when adopted by international security institutions. 
In reflecting on fifteen years of the WPS agenda it was possible to outline the 
contribute the seven follow-up resolutions make to widening, broadening and 
deepening the WPS agenda. Their passage through the Security Council also revealed 
the broader politics underpinning each resolution, with states increasingly marking the 
anniversary of the adoption of UNSCR 1325 by proposing new WPS resolutions. 
There also remains a tension between the participation and protection agendas. 
However, it is notable that the greater the involvement of the NGO Working Group 
on WPS with the production of the resolution, the stronger the final outcome was. The 
most recent, and controversial, development has been the incorporation of CVE into 
the WPS agenda. The section then examined the WPS agenda at the UN, focusing on 
the publication of the UN Women supported Global Study on UNSCR 1325 in 2015. 
This comprehensive study sought to refocus efforts to implement UNSCR 1325 on the 
prevention pillar. It also critiqued calls for a Special Representative on WPS at the 
UN, and in doing drew attention to the importance of understanding institutional 
structures when seeking to advance an agenda. 
Finally, the section examined the implementation of UNSCR 1325, in particular the 
increasing adoption of NAPs by member states. NAPs were found not necessarily to 
correlate with implementation but offered one way in which civil society actors could 
hold governments to account. It was also noted that the nature of civil society 
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engagement with states on UNSCR 1325 was far from idea, with states dictating the 
terms of the relationship. A further issue identified was that the concentration of NAPs 
in European and non-conflict affected countries, in addition to the external facing 
nature of many NAPs, led to UNSCR 1325 being perceived as legitimising tool for a 
liberal peacebuilding. This part of the introduction has therefore contributed an 
understanding of not only the strengths and weaknesses underpinning UNSCR 1325 
but the politics. This will contribute to contextualising NATO’s adoption of UNSCR 
1325 in 2007 and the value placed upon the Resolution as of ‘added value’ to the 
Alliance, within a wider international context as discussed in Chapters Five and Six. 
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SECTION ONE: Feminists approach security  
The past, present and future of feminist security studies 
(2.0) Introduction 
This thesis draws on feminist security studies because it examines the implementation 
of UNSCR 1325 by NATO, an international security institution. The main of this 
Chapter, therefore, is to outline the feminist security studies framework. In the first 
section the emergence of feminist security studies will be outlined in order to situate 
the contribution of this thesis within this tradition. This will include defining what 
constitutes feminist security studies work, concluding that feminist security studies is 
an inclusive loose grouping of scholars who may or may not identify with the wider 
discipline of IR but whose research examines the intersection of gender and security 
and draws links between the individual (or community), the national and the global 
level. This section underscores the importance of the feminist security studies 
commitment to a specific feminist emancipatory praxis. In doing so, it is first 
necessary to outline why a feminist approach was chosen and not one from the broader 
school of (critical) security studies, specifically the Welsh School’s conception of 
security as emancipation. The section will then outline the core tenets of a feminist 
understanding of emancipation.  
The second section in this Chapter will outline the necessity for feminist analysis of 
international security institutions, such as NATO. In doing so the section will draw 
out some of the key concerns for feminist scholars. To do so it will draw upon feminist 
organisational theory in order to unpack the gendered dynamics of institutions as 
organisations. The section will argue that incorporating an understanding of how the 
functioning of international security institutions is gendered is essential for 
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understanding the potential for transformative change within such resistant 
institutions. In this respect, the section outlines the hindrances to – and opportunities 
for – transformative change through the pursuit of a feminist agenda within 
international security institutions. This will contextualise the theoretical framework 
outlined in Chapter Three. 
 
(2.1) Feminist Security Studies 
This section outlines the emergence of the feminist approach to studying security over 
the last few decades, and its relatively recent conceptualisation as feminist security 
studies. In doing so it outlines the shape of the project and the importance of the 
ongoing conversation among feminist security studies scholars, committed to 
reflexivity, on its very shape and scope, which contributes to making it an inclusive, 
rather than exclusive project. The section goes onto outline the value of the Welsh 
School’s conception of security as emancipation when it is used to supplement 
feminist work on emancipatory praxis, rather than feminism being subsumed under 
this umbrella. The section concludes by outlining why feminist security studies must 
remain a separate and distinct project from (critical) security studies. 
 
(2.1.1) The emergence of a feminist approach to studying security 
The feminist challenge to the study of international relations, and in particular the 
study of war, has been ongoing for decades and has its roots in peace research in the 
1960s, where feminists began to incorporate power into their analysis (Wibben, 2010: 
4). In the late 1980s/early 1990s feminists began to explicitly frame their analysis in 
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terms of ‘security’ and as a challenge to the traditional conception of security  
(Wibben, 2010: 4). In the traditional view of security, military force is seen as the 
primary means of securing the core values of the state: which are sovereignty and 
territory. However, security defined purely in militarist terms presents a ‘false image 
of reality’ (Hudson, 2009: 55). Feminist security scholars seek not only to challenge 
the state centric focus of security, but to reclaim it from its militarist co-optation (Basu, 
2013: 2). 
The work of Enloe (1983, 1989), Elshtain (1987) and Tickner (1992) built on the 
decades of feminist theorising of security and sought to challenge traditional 
conceptions of security within International Relations. It is important to note that these 
scholars took a critical approach to security long before the emergence of the (critical) 
security studies schools. They asked ‘just who is being secured by security policies?’ 
(Blanchard, 2003: 1290) and contributed to a feminist transformation of the 
conceptualisation of security. Elshtain (1987: 245) critiqued the authoritative 
discourse of traditional approaches to security as ‘cool, objective, scientific, and 
overwhelmingly male’ drawing attention to how this had allowed policy makers to 
separate themselves from the reality of their decisions and the impact they had on 
human life. Enloe (1989: 195) showed us that incorporating a gender analysis into a 
critical conceptualisation of security demonstrates that the ‘personal is international’. 
Tickner (1992) challenged the narrow conception of security as state security and 
widened it to include individual and group security, while arguing that security was 
about all forms of violence; including structural violence and violence against the 
environment.  
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It is important to note that although Enloe, Elshtain and Tickner are scholars drawn 
from the discipline of International Relations (broadly defined), this does not mean 
that feminist security studies is confined to a disciplinary silo. Many scholars engaged 
in work on feminist security would not identify themselves as IR scholars or, even if 
they do, as explicitly ‘doing’ feminist security studies. For example, Cynthia Enloe, 
who would identify as an IR scholar, has expressed hesitation over whether her work 
is ‘feminist security studies’, speaking at the International Feminist Journal of Politics 
conference in 2014, she is quoted as saying ‘I study militarism... or actually 
militarization mostly, but I am wondering if I do #FemSecSt? [sic]’ (Wibben 2014).  
In defining feminist security studies it is necessary to think beyond disciplinary silos 
and to apply the label loosely. This is because much feminist work (even within IR) 
draws across disciplines, including but not limited to history, military sociology and 
peace studies, with the multidisciplinary nature of feminist work one of its core 
strengths. This is necessitated by the shared starting point of much feminist work, that 
the ‘personal is political, is international’ (Enloe, 1989). This not only requires 
feminist scholars to look beyond the constructs of disciplinary boundaries but it 
necessitates a challenge to the ‘boundaries within which the discipline of International 
Relations has sought to confine it’ (Weber, 1994: 338). However, this is also a 
challenge to the cost and long-term viability of feminist informed research because 
career advancement is predicated upon contributions within disciplinary confines. 
The contribution of feminist security studies to our understanding of international 
relations stems from Enloe’s premise that the ‘personal is international’ (Enloe, 1989: 
195). This requires feminist security studies scholars ‘to illuminate the complex 
interrelationship of local, national and global scales implicated in the study of security 
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concerns’ (Shepherd, 2013: 17). Feminist security studies scholars may take different 
approaches but are united in viewing international relations through ‘gender lenses’ 
and share a normative concern that international politics is gender-hierarchical. The 
underlying commitment to feminist praxis means a concern not just with exposing 
how international politics functions, but in challenging the existing system, ultimately 
with the aim of provoking transformative change. However, the diversity of feminist 
approaches and the praxis underpinning feminist work has led to its dismissal by 
mainstream IR scholars (Wibben, 2004). 
 
(2.1.2) Feminist security studies: conceptualising the project 
Since the 1980s, the ‘second generation’ of feminist security studies scholars have 
built on this political project, expanding our understanding of security. These scholars 
were the first to identify themselves explicitly as doing feminist security studies. 
Sjoberg (2015: 410) was among the first to use the term and did so with the explicit 
intention of bringing feminist work to the attention of security studies scholars.  
Wibben (2010) sought to actively use the label to work towards an opening of security 
studies to allow feminist approaches to be taken seriously. In framing feminist work 
on war and peace, as security studies, Wibben (2010: 6) hoped to overcome the 
dismissing of feminist contributions as irrelevant to security studies.  
One way in which feminist security studies has been made visible is through special 
issues, these have contributed symbolic value and have become part of what ‘creates, 
performs, and constitutes Feminist Security Studies’ (Sjoberg, 2011a: 603). The 
Politics & Gender Critical Perspectives section ‘The State of Feminist Security 
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Studies: A Conversation’ convened by. Lobasz and Sjoberg (2011) sought to 
conceptualise feminist security studies as a political project and followed on from a 
roundtable at the International Studies Association annual convention held in New 
Orleans in 2009. 
The publication acted as an introduction and reflection upon each contributing 
scholar’s personal journey to feminist security studies and the value of this journey to 
their understanding of international security. In the section, Tickner (1992) celebrates 
the emergence of feminist security studies for the challenge it has posed to the 
epistemological assumptions of traditional approaches to security and for widening 
the research agenda to include insecurity (Tickner, 1992: 581). Hudson (2011), in line 
with the reflexivity which underpins feminist approaches, reflects upon her own 
journey to feminist security studies. It was not until the birth of Hudson’s own 
daughter and her engagement with the work of Tickner, Ruddick, Enloe and others 
that she began to question traditional understandings of security (Hudson, 2011: 588). 
Wilcox (2011: 597) argues that in incorporating an understanding of the sexed body 
(as opposed to subject) into our understanding of security, feminist security studies 
has sought to demonstrate that bodies are constituted by practices of international 
security. Wibben's (2011: 591) contribution is to question the claim that there are many 
feminisms, instead arguing that feminism should emerge in ‘response to a particular 
political moment, a particular economic, social, and symbolic order’ and in close 
collaboration with feminist activism.  
The publication, as Sjoberg (2011a) expected, raised as many questions as it answered. 
This particular approach to feminist security studies was critiqued in a special issue of 
International Studies Perspectives. The contributions to this second collection 
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critiqued the Politics & Gender collection for being too limited. For example, 
Hudson’s focus on inclusivity did not seem to permeate the original contributions that 
are largely produced by American scholars, thus contributing to the construction of 
feminist security studies ‘in the image of White Western feminity’ (Shepherd, 2013b: 
3). Further, considerable silencing is evident in the collection, for example, with the 
exception of Wibben (2011)3 none of the scholars have reflected on their citational 
politics and in failing to do so have constructed feminist security studies as an 
exclusive US based project (Parashar, 2013: 3).  
In addition, the Politics & Gender collection overlooked the contribution of the 
European traditions of (critical) security studies. This, as Parashar (2013: 2) notes, is 
particularly surprising given that these approaches are engaged in ‘some of the most 
exciting and theoretically engaging work on security’. The citational politics and 
silencing of other critical approaches to security, contributes to Parashar’s (2013: 3) 
concern that feminist security studies scholars (as reflected in the Politics & Gender 
Critical Perspectives section) have become only comfortable ‘in scholarly spaces 
inhabited by the familiar and the like-minded’ and that this has come at the cost of 
understanding and incorporating feminists from all positions. Shepherd challenges the 
Critical Perspectives section by stressing the necessity that in feminist research ‘we 
remain attentive to the question of who gets to be part of the conversation’ (Shepherd, 
2013b: 2). As D’Costa and Lee-Koo (2013: 4) stress, feminist informed research must 
remember that ‘voice, location, and conversations matter’. 
                                                
3 Wibben (as noted by (Parashar, 2013: 3)) cites Under Western Eyes by Chandra Mohanty, 
along with Anthony Burke, Lene Hansen, Vivienne Jabri, and Maria Stern. 
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Both special issues have played a symbolic part in the conceptualisation of the feminist 
security studies project through bringing visibility to feminist security studies work. 
However, as Hudson (2011:589) attests feminist security studies should: ‘not do unto 
others what has been done unto them in the past. Do not exclude, do not refuse to 
engage, do not define the boundaries of feminist security studies and say who is “in” 
and who is “out”’. The criticisms levied at the Politics & Gender (2011) Critical 
Perspectives section are that it sought to create an exclusive feminist security studies 
project primarily because the contributors to the issue were all US based scholars. Yet, 
this does not mean they have not and that they will not engage with future 
contributions to feminist security studies. Indeed, it is testament to the engaging nature 
of feminist informed scholarship that this special issue sparked a rebuttal in the form 
of a Forum section in International Studies Perspectives. The response was framed 
not as part of a debate but as part of ‘continuing the conversation’ (Shepherd, 2013b), 
thus widening the borders of feminist security studies and engaging in reflexivity on 
behalf of the project as a whole. Reflexivity is after all a core and defining component 
of feminist informed research and as Cohn argues we have a ‘responsibility - to be 
reflexive about the questions, parameters, and goals of the field’ (2011: 583). 
In defining the field of ‘feminist security studies’, it is important that this is not done 
in an exclusive and exclusionary manner, rather, the starting point should be in 
recognising feminist security studies ‘as a diverse field of knowledge’ (Teaiwa & 
Slatter, 2013:2). For example, as Teaiwa and Slatter (2013:2) highlight given the work 
of Pacific feminists on security issues over the last 40 years there would be grounds 
for establishing a Pacific feminist security studies camp, yet they remain marginalised 
from what they see as the mainstream of feminist security studies. This critique of 
73 
 
feminist security studies as creating an ‘exclusive project’ should be reflected upon by 
feminist scholars engaged in researching security.  
 
(2.1.3) Feminist security studies: the role of feminist informed emancipatory 
praxis 
Feminism(s) have long been underpinned by a central commitment to emancipatory 
praxis, however far they diverge or disagree on other issues (Wibben, 2011:591). 
Emancipatory security offers a valuable theoretical framework for feminist scholars 
to utilise because it takes the starting point of security as the individual. The work of 
the Welsh School has much in common with feminist emancipatory praxis, which 
underpins feminist security studies, in particular Booth’s (1991) conception of security 
as emancipation. According to Booth security - defined as the absence from threats -, 
and emancipation - defined as the freeing of people -, are ‘two sides of the same coin’ 
(Booth, 1991: 319). The challenge to the positivist state centric view of security comes 
in viewing emancipation as a prerequisite of security and as praxis, rather than 
emancipation as strengthening the agency of individuals whose security is governed 
by the state (Basu, 2011: 101).  
Although the Welsh School’s conception of emancipatory security provides a useful 
conception, feminists must be cautious not to be subsumed under this umbrella. This 
is because the Welsh School has not sought to engage with the long history of feminist 
theorising on emancipatory praxis and there is no guarantee that they would commit 
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themselves to feminist praxis4. Moreover, (critical) security studies more broadly is 
‘additive rather than subversive’ in the changes it proposes (Wibben, 2010:80). This 
makes a feminist approach to emancipation significantly different from the Welsh 
School in as far as feminist emancipation must be envisaged as ‘context-specific, 
realizable, and flexible’, as well as contingent on transforming oppressive power 
structures (Basu, 2013: 2). Feminists must go further than a challenge to the 
mainstream paradigm of ‘national security’ and must look to reclaim the very concept 
of security. As Basu (2013: 2) argues, before security was co-opted to define 
masculine state centred aggression, it was (and remains) in common use to describe a 
‘sense of well-being’ and as such is congruent. This supports the work of  
Constantinou (2000) who rethought the way security is constituted through an 
examination of silenced security narratives. In doing so, Constantinou (2000: 303) 
challenges the notion that security requires protection, that security primarily involves 
an external dimension (above a spiritual one) and that security can be achieved through 
– and is the reserve of – a regime of power. 
Feminists diverge on whether this commitment to emancipatory praxis is directed at 
International Relations as a discipline and/or at realising transformative change in the 
real world. For some scholars, including Cohn (2011), their motivation stems from 
problematising real world problems first, rather than becoming preoccupied with 
changing International Relations as a discipline, whether that is challenging the 
mainstream or seeking inclusion of feminist approaches within critical approaches to 
the discipline. However, given that International Relations is co-constitutive of 
                                                
4 The notable exceptions who have sought to incorporate a gender perspective are Basu (2011), 
Nunes (2012), Booth (2007). 
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international relations and vice versa, a commitment to transforming real world power 
relations necessitates a challenge to the disciplinary understanding of security, even if 
this is not our principal preoccupation or motivation as scholars. This means that 
feminist security studies must be understood as a project in its own right, not one 
subsumed under another critical approach, however, this does mean that feminist 
scholars should dismiss the contributions of critical approaches, rather it is necessary 
to engage with them on our own terms in order to avoid recreating an exclusive and 
limiting conversation to the detriment of a feminist understanding of security (Sjoberg, 
2011b: 121). 
Basu (2011) has sought to engage with the Welsh school and their commitment to 
security as emancipation on select terms. Basu (2011:101) finds that feminist 
approaches are compatible with the Welsh School’s commitment to emancipation as 
the normative framework in which security should be situated. However, writing in 
the same edited collection as Basu, Sjoberg (2011b: 117) critiques the Welsh School’s 
focus on the individual as the primary referent point, for Sjoberg this implies 
separation from others, which feminist theory has demonstrated is not always the case. 
In response, Basu (2011) draws on Steans' (2006: 76) account of security, which draws 
on non-Western traditions viewing the individual as part of the ‘social whole’. This 
underscores the importance when engaging across approaches that, as Sjoberg (2011b: 
121) cautions, any feminist partnership should be ‘careful and transfer knowledge’ 
rather than be subsumed by it. 
The shift to the study of Feminist Security in feminist security studies, makes it distinct 
from critical security scholars’ attempts to engage with an emancipatory agenda and 
the individual. Feminist ethics necessitates scholars to be reflexive of the process and 
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outcomes of their research. As both Hudson (2005: 161) and Sjoberg (2011: 119) 
caution, the discourse of emancipation does not mean immunity from universalising 
tendencies. Feminist scholars must therefore heed post-colonial scholars warning and 
ensure they do not speak for others and remain resolutely anti-imperialist (Wibben, 
2011). However, it is important to stress that a focus on the individual does not by 
extension imply that all are equally vulnerable (Steans, 2006: 76) and this requires 
feminist scholars to look at the gendered individual while also acknowledging the 
intersection of identities. 
Feminist security studies has emerged on the margins of International Relations but 
has drawn upon and incorporates scholars across disciplinary silos. The location of 
feminist security studies on the margins does have the benefit of providing a 
‘panoramic view and offer[s] a strategic location with which to reach a number of 
different disciplines and sites of thought’ (D’Costa and Lee-Koo, 2013: 3). Whilst, 
caution should quite rightfully be employed when engaging with other critical 
approaches, but to ignore the contribution that emancipatory praxis can make to 
feminist theorising on security in case it is not reciprocated seems imprudent. 
 
(2.1.4) Irreconcilable? Critical approaches and feminist security studies 
Beyond the Welsh School, feminist engagement with (critical) security studies 
remains a highly contested issue, and while there is some overlap with feminist 
approaches, little dialogue between the two has emerged. Critical security scholars 
challenge the traditional ahistorical understanding of security as national security, with 
the state monopoly over the use of force as the source of security. It emerged as a 
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challenge to the traditional conceptualisation of security incorporating a broad, 
expanding and evolving church including the Copenhagen School, the Welsh School 
and Human Security. These approaches are united in their critique of the realist 
conception of international politics, seeing security as something broader than just 
hard power. Critical security scholars have examined how security is done and what 
security does. They challenge the realist conception of security as a response to an 
apparently self-evident threat and the role of security studies as ‘the provider of expert 
knowledge to tackle threats ‘out there in the real world’ (Nunes, 2012: 346). They do 
this by conceiving of security as a politicising process both in itself and in the theory 
attributed to understanding security. However, as Wibben (2010: 38) notes, traditional 
and (critical) security studies – despite the introduction of a variety of meanings - share 
a common assumption ‘that meanings are clearly identifiable and a hierarchy of 
meanings can be established’. In this sense and for the purpose of this critique, both 
traditional and critical approaches to security constitute the mainstream of the 
discipline, given that neither challenge the notion that security is identifiable. 
To date there has been little engagement between critical security scholars and those 
engaged in the feminist security studies project (and vice versa). The decades of 
feminist theorising of issues of security have largely been ignored by (critical) security 
scholars (Wibben, 2010: 7). And while mainstream scholars may be resistant to 
feminist approaches, they are rarely well informed about them (Peterson, 2004: 43). 
The position of feminist approaches on the margins, of the margins of security studies, 
leads Laura Sjoberg (2011b) to caution that feminists should ask what (critical) 
security studies can add to the feminist project, and not vice-versa (Sjoberg, 2011b: 
121). Indeed, calls for feminist scholars to add their insights to (critical) security 
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studies are problematic because this entails doing so on the terms of the dominant 
discourse (Harding, 1986; Wibben, 2010).  
On the surface Human Security appears to have some synergy with feminist security 
studies, for example it takes non-hegemonic constructions of power as the starting 
point and accounts for the role of individuals as actors. However, Human Security 
scholars have also marginalised gender because although security is taken to the level 
of the individual, it is conceived as ungendered (Hoogensen and Stuvoy, 2006: 19). 
This approach therefore leaves no room for understanding the link between gender 
and individual experiences of security. In order to conceptualise security as gender-
sensitive a link must be made between men and women’s everyday lived experience 
and the wider setting of regional and global politics (Hudson, 2005: 164). Gender is 
crucial to the effective use of Human Security as a framework because of the existence 
of societal inequalities, caused by gender hierarchies, which exacerbate women’s 
insecurities (Tickner, 1999: 42). Yet, approaches to Human Security have ignored 
gender and feminist contributions. For example, Shepherd’s (2012) critique of the 
2012 Human Security Report highlighted how easily decades of feminist research on 
security can be ignored to the detriment of further work.  
Feminist security studies scholars also have difficulty reconciling their transformative 
agenda, which seeks to widen the very notion of security, with the Copenhagen school 
(Hudson, 2005: 160). This is because in applying feminist ethics, the division between 
international and social security proves problematic. For the Copenhagen School, 
gender is categorised as a variable, a social security issue, which concerns individual 
rather than collective security. The result is that although the Copenhagen School has 
added gender to its analysis, it has failed to engage with the complexity of this norm 
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at a theoretical level (Hudson, 2005: 160). This has left gender unchallenged as a 
variable rather than social structure that frames the very notion of security. Most 
concerning for feminist ethics is the Copenhagen School’s grounding of security 
problems within speech acts, which serves to exacerbate silences within our own 
understanding of security and presumes ‘the existence of a situation in which speech 
is indeed possible’ (Hansen, 2000: 285). As such, it works counter to feminist security 
studies’ commitment to identifying and giving voice to silences in our understanding 
of security. 
 
(2.2) Feminists Theorise International Security Institutions 
The development of a feminist approach to theorising international security 
institutions is crucial, with mainstream attention already turned to such organisations 
it is time that feminists contributed to this discussion and sought to provide a 
conceptual and inclusive theoretical framework for doing so. This is not only because 
these institutions continue to play a central role in international security, but because 
they are implementing global gender norms, including UNSCR 1325, and this process 
warrants feminist scrutiny, particularly given the very real danger of co-option. This 
has become all the more salient as mainstream scholars begin to examine the 
implementation of global gender norms by international security institutions.  For 
example, with the case of NATO, certain scholars have come to examine the 
Alliance’s adoption of UNSCR 1325 not because of a ‘feminist curiosity’ (Enloe, 
2004) but because of an interest in NATO (cf. Wagnsson, 2011; Hardt, 2016). There 
is a danger that these scholars will overlook the substantial body of feminist work on 
the WPS agenda. Moreover, even if this has led some to approach NATO and UNSCR 
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1325 from a feminist perspective to useful affect (Prescott, 2013a), they remain non-
feminist scholars because feminism has not been integrated in their wider research 
interests and as such these insights remain somewhat superficial.  
Feminist security studies scholars have made a conscious move to address the inherent 
imbalance within conventional understandings of security, particularly the 
preoccupation with national security. The focus on the gendered individual is a 
political move aimed at addressing the imbalance in our collective knowledge of what 
constitutes security. In this sense the work of feminist security scholars has been 
successful in addressing a core silence in the discipline and challenging the notion of 
what security is. However, this only provides half the picture and excludes an 
understanding of how the institutions, which impact upon individuals’ security 
operate. Far from limiting the emancipatory feminist praxis, in exposing how 
international security institutions function to exercise power over the marginalised, it 
is possible to create a better understanding of how transformative change - in line with 
feminist praxis – of these institutions can be realised. The extensive feminist theorising 
on both organisations and institutions incorporating this understanding can be applied 
to examining how security institutions operate. Feminist attention must be given to the 
silenced and the marginalised groups and individuals who have been largely ignored 
by mainstream IR scholars. However, this does not mean that the elite should be 
removed from feminist analysis because to do so would create a silence within feminist 
approaches to IR and only present an understanding of half of the picture. 
To date feminist security studies scholars’ attention has largely been focused away 
from studying the ‘powerful’ as part of a political challenge to mainstream IR’s 
preoccupation with doing so (Enloe, 1996). However, this relies upon a premise that 
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silencing and marginalisation is a natural process and overlooks the complex 
(Wallander, 2000: 714) and often contradictory nature (Bessis, 2004: 643) of 
international security institutions. Further, the adoption of UN Security Council 
Resolution 1325 in 2000 and the implementation of this potentially emancipatory 
agenda at the national, regional and local warrants examination (Otto, 2004: 3). In 
order to realise this emancipatory potential, feminists - and as Cohn (2011) argues - 
particularly those located at the epicentre of the exercise of military, political and 
economic power in Europe and the US, have a responsibility to engage in ‘studying 
up’ (Nader, 1972). That means asking questions about ‘how and why masculinist 
institutions at the heart of this exercise of power function’ (Cohn, 2011: 585) and 
interrogating their adoption of emancipatory agendas. In order to challenge these sites 
of power, feminist security studies must theorise those with access to power and 
incorporate an understanding of the setting in which the practices take place - as well 
as the practice itself. This is essential for realising feminist praxis. For example, Basu 
(2011: 110) argued that it is not enough to understand and draw attention to the flow 
of power because changing the status quo may just replace one dominant with another. 
Transformative praxis must therefore challenge the very production of power and its 
nature as a dominating practice. 
(2.2.1) Theorising a feminist approach to international security institutions 
In ‘studying up’ this thesis exposes NATO’s role in shaping global gender norms and 
highlights the importance of feminist IR scholars engaging in such work. The 
reluctance and resistance of feminist IR scholars to interrogate the role of international 
security institutions leaves a key silence in feminist approaches to IR. This is not to 
say that feminists have not sought to engage with institutions beyond the confines of 
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IR, with feminist institutionalism making an important contribution in this respect. 
This thesis therefore contributes to ongoing debates about institutional change within 
feminist institutionalist approaches. Feminist institutionalism emerged as a challenge 
to other institutionalist approaches which had failed to account for the influence of 
gender norms and practices on institutions. The starting point for feminist 
institutionalism is an acknowledgement that all institutions are gendered, whether 
perceived to be or not and that this has both intended and unintended consequences 
(Chappell and Waylen 2013: 612).  As such, feminist institutionalism provides a 
valuable framework for interrogating policy areas portrayed as ‘gender neutral’, 
including security and defence. Institutional approaches contribute insight into the role 
of actors, culture and structures in shaping policies and policy outcome (Gains and 
Lowndes 2014). Institutions are gendered in the way they include, or exclude, gender 
from policy processes and this contributes to the way in which power is structured and 
normalised (Mackay, Kenny and Chappell, 2010: 582). 
The focus of feminist institutionalism is broad and wide reaching. It includes analysis 
of both informal and formal institutions. The contribution of feminist institutionalism 
is to provide a means of mapping the way in which gender is included or excluded and 
framed within policy making processes. The focus of feminist institutionalist analysis, 
has to date, been focused on state structures, with the exception of extensive work on 
the EU as a policy-making (see inter alia Guerrina, Allwood and Macrae, 2013; 
Debusscher 2014; Stratigaki 2004; Lombardo and Verloo 2009) and Chappell’s  
(2010) work on the International Criminal Court. This work has made a valuable 
contribution to understanding gender equality policies in the realm of employment and 
political participation. However, the area of security and defence and the role of 
international security institutions remains under examined. This provides an important 
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area for analysis given that these institutions are deeply gendered (Kronsell 2012; 
Kronsell 2015) and are engaging with global gender norms, including UNSCR 1325. 
Intergovernmental organisations such as NATO pose a particular challenge for 
feminist institutionalism. The complexity of NATO’s dual military-political structure 
means that parallel gender machinery, although often complementary, has emerged 
within the organisation. The use of an institutionalist framework needs to be sensitive 
to this organisational peculariaties and the different way in which the political and 
military structures operate.  
A feminist institutionalist approach necessitates an understanding of the social 
practices and structural hierarchies against which gender norms are integrated into 
policies. In order to do so it is essential to understand the interactions between different 
(gender) actors, in addition to structure and agency. This is because gendered subjects 
operate within gendered institutions, which are influenced by the vision of ‘gendered 
institutional architects’ (Mackay, Kenny and Chappell, 2010: 583). It is therefore 
necessary to pay attention to both processes and career structures (Mackay, Kenny and 
Chappell, 2010: 583) and women’s policy agencies (Lombardo and Meier, 2009).  
It is necessary to take account of both informal and formal institutions and the 
interaction between the two in order to comprehend the gendered nature of 
international security institutions. Chappell and Waylen (2013), for example, 
challenge new institutional approaches to take account of how informal and formal 
institutions interact and the influence of gender norms and practices on this process. 
This draws attention to the importance of gender analysis for understanding 
organisational change. In doing so, it is important not to privilege the formal 
structures, including rules, because doing so results in a narrow conception of what an 
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institution is (Mackay, Kenny and Chappell. 2010: 576). Conversely, while there are 
situations in which informal institutions emerge without interaction with a formal 
institution, the interaction between informal and formal institutions, or the ‘rules-in-
form’ and ‘rules-in-use’ is key to understanding how an institution functions (Leach 
and Lowndes 2007). Informal institutions are understood as networks, informal rules 
and the differing ethos between different parts of the bureaucracy (Waylen, 2014: 2). 
This interaction is particularly important to take into account when understanding 
militarist institutions such as NATO because, as Leach and Lowndes (2007: 186) note, 
informal rules can modify changes (or advancements) in the formal structures, leading 
entrenched practices in place and power relationships unchallenged.  
Kronsell’s (2011) engagement with international security institutions is pioneering in 
feminist security studies. Kronsell (2011) looks to the margins of these institutions and 
has drawn upon feminist standpoint theory to theorise opportunities for change. 
Feminist standpoint theory’s political project draws attention to marginalised groups 
and makes the ‘“normal” exotic by explicitly connecting everyday life with analysis 
of gendered social structures’ (Kronsell, 2011: 293). She argued that elite women are 
in a unique position to perceive gendered practices within institutions, while privileged 
men are blinded to these same practices because they do not face the same ‘struggle’. 
In this sense it provides a valuable contribution to the overarching feminist agenda to 
transform gendered power relations. However, such an approach is underpinned by a 
number of challenging assumptions which make it difficult to reconcile standpoint 
theory with a commitment to feminist emancipatory praxis. First, standpoint theory 
entails approaching the study of a gendered institution with a preconceived idea on 
how the gendering process takes place. This is limiting given that what we do know 
about the gendering process suggests that they are complex and contradictory 
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(Zalewski, 2006: 52). Second, the presumption of standpoint theory is that the 
minority of women in these organisations hold the key to transformative change and 
even if they do (or one of their number does), they do this from a position as a minority 
and therefore the odds that they can bring about such change are slim. Third, it 
homogenises the experience of elite women, starting with a presumption that all elite 
women are in a position to perceive gendered practices and fails to acknowledge that 
not only can women be complicit in these gendered practices but to some extent are 
given they occupy positions of within these institutions. Finally, ignoring the 
experiences of men presumes that men are unaware of the gendered practices they are 
implicit in and is based on an implicit assumption that men are a homogenous group 
embodying power, without providing evidence that this is the case. 
The inclusion of men in the research on international security institutions is important 
for realising feminist emancipatory praxis. In doing so these men may become aware 
of the gendered practices which they are complicit in (and which may even affect 
them) and may then seek to challenge these as allies. Studying men (in addition to 
women) within institutions of hegemonic masculinity is challenging but this is not to 
say that it should not be done. Moreover, feminists are uniquely positioned and 
equipped to do so. Feminist ethics provide feminist researchers with a unique set of 
concerns which sets feminist research apart and provides the tools for approaching 
such a project. Indeed, with mainstream attention on these hegemonic institutions it is 
time that feminists contributed to this discussion and sought to provide a conceptual 
and inclusive theoretical framework for how we study security institutions. 
Studying international security institutions does not have to come at the expense of 
understanding how the ‘personal is international’ (Enloe, 1989: 195). Rather, a 
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feminist approach must entail an interrogation of how the gender dynamics within 
these institutions serve to sustain and reinforce hegemonic masculinity. There has 
already been extensive feminist theorising of organisations within organisational 
studies. The seminal work of Kanter (1977) and Acker  (1991) exposed the gendered 
nature of the organisational structure and the reproduction of gendered inequalities 
within organisations. Kanter’s (1977) analysis of the organisational structure 
contributed a valuable insight into the location of men and women within large 
industrial corporations. She identified that women in minority positions among men 
were likely to become ‘tokens’, perceived of as representative of all women (1977:  
382).  
The concept of tokenism was Kanter’s seminal contribution to our understanding of 
women in organisations.  Kanter’s (1977a) work and subsequent studies demonstrated 
that the increased visibility of tokens had negative consequences for women ‘through 
performance pressures, heightened career barriers and the creation of a hostile working 
environment, as well as through strong social constraints on behaviours in social 
interaction (Lewis and Simpson, 2012). Tokenism continues to inform work on 
women in organisations but the analytical potential of Kanter’s understanding is 
limited by her liberal feminist framework and focus on the organisational structure, at 
the expense of theorising how gendered inequalities are reproduced. Acker (1991), for 
example, points out that Kanter’s approach implicitly places gender as separable from 
the structure. This does not explain the difference between white male advancement 
in a female dominated workplaces, in contrast to women’s disadvantage in the position 
of ‘token’ in male dominated workplaces (1991: 50). In order to address this, Lewis 
and Simpson (2012) revisit Kanter’s approach and move beyond the liberal feminist 
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positioning to include (in)visibility and power in their conceptual framework for 
women within organisations. 
Acker has built on the work of Kanter to theorise how organisations reproduce and 
legitimise gendered inequalities to become ‘inequality regimes’ (2006). Acker’s work 
draws upon Connell’s (2005: 839) concept of hegemonic masculinity to provide an 
account of how power is exercised through the institutionalisation of gendered 
inequalities. Acker (1990: 146-147) argued that central to the functioning of 
‘inequality regimes’ are five processes. First, is the division of labour along gender 
lines in terms of both roles and physical space; Second, is the construction of symbols 
and signs that reinforce (or even contradict) this gendered division, including the 
image/idea of the successful leader. Third, is the interaction between men and women, 
which serves to re-enact patterns of dominance and submission and fourth, these 
gendered processes are assimilated by individuals to produce gendered components of 
their behaviour, including through choice of “appropriate” clothing. Acker’s fourth 
point is significant because the realisation of individual identity along gendered lines 
informs how individuals perform their roles in the workplace. The final component of 
the ‘inequality regime’ is the role of organizational logic, with an appearance of gender 
neutrality belying the continued reproduction of the gendered substructure (Acker, 
1990).  
In order to understand the gendered nature of organisational structures, as Acker 
prioritises, it is necessary to identify the silences that serve to reproduce them. As 
Hearn and Parkin (2001: xi)  argue silences ‘may mean the absence of noise and be 
part of the plight of the oppressed but can also be part of the domination, as in 
managerial silences to requests to be heard and demands for change’. The focus on the 
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reproduction of organizational structures through silences can come into tension in 
with certain forms of social constructivism, such as the Copenhagen School, when the 
focus is on discourse as talk, speech and text (Hearn and Parkin, 2001: xi). Reducing 
discourse to what is visible overlooks the role of silences in constructing organizations 
and ‘organizations persist through unspoken forces’. (Hearn and Parkin, 2001: xi) 
The absence of women from leadership roles within organisations is attributed in 
organisational literature to the existence of a glass ceiling. The glass ceiling operates 
through subtle processes to provide an additional seemingly impenetrable barrier for 
women who seek upper management and leadership positions and by its elusive nature 
makes is difficult to challenge (Ryan and Haslam, 2005: 81). Yet, despite the existence 
of the glass ceiling women who do reach leadership positions in both organizations 
and politics are not necessarily exceptional.  This is a result of what Haslam and Ryan 
(2008: 433) have termed the ‘glass cliff’, which finds women more likely to be found 
in leadership roles during times of crisis when change is a necessity.  A laboratory 
study conducted by Haslam and Ryan (2008) found that the glass cliff emerged in the 
fictious organisations and across a cross-section of participants. They found 
participants more likely to promote women to leadership roles in times of crisis, 
indicating a link between candidate performance and gender (Haslam and Ryan, 2008: 
433). This also made the individual’s position more vulnerable given that the women 
were leading an organisation in a precarious state. 
The visibility of women in leadership positions (as an exception) means that they face 
a difficult balancing act between the masculine attributes, which allow them to carry 
out their role and the feminine ones they are expected to embody. There remains a 
disjuncture between how women are perceived performing leadership roles and the 
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expectation of how they should act as a woman (Heilman et al., 2004: 417). For 
example, ambition is read differently on men and women because gender norms are 
more than just descriptive, they are prescriptive denoting how men and women should 
behave in given situations (Heilman et al., 2004: 416). Successful ambitious women 
can be cast as antithetical to the traditional conception of how a woman should act and 
perceived as more than just non-communal but hostile in their dealing with others 
(Heilman et al., 2004: 417). However, displays of ambition need not hinder a woman’s 
career prospects, it is the manner in which this ambition is expressed, which has the 
most significant impact. For example, Larimer, Hannagan, and Smith's (2007: 60) 
study demonstrates that when women’s ambition is combined with communal 
qualities it is unlikely to be viewed negatively. The implication of these studies is that 
women within international security institutions, particularly in leadership roles, are 
navigating a particularly complex set of gendered expectations before they even start 
delivering on their role. 
 
(2.2.2) Hindrances to change: organisational co-option of the feminist 
agenda 
The adoption and implementation of global gender norms – including UNSCR 1325 - 
by international security institutions, necessitates an examination of why organisations 
adopt policies that appear to run counter to their organisational agenda and the process 
of co-optation. This is particularly important given that feminist security rhetoric is 
vulnerable to co-optation by governments and international institutions. Feminists 
should therefore be vigilant to the co-optation of the language of feminism by states 
and international institutions globally because ‘they can also selectively use it to 
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promote their own agenda irrespective of the consequences for women’s lives’ 
(D’Costa and Lee-Koo, 2013: 2).  Co-optation is defined as ‘a practice that absorbs 
the meanings of the original concepts to fit into the prevailing political priorities’ (von 
der Lippe, 2012: 19). On one level co-optation occurs when these original concepts 
interact with hegemonic strategic policy priorities and objectives, particularly military 
ones, and their transformative praxis is neutralised (von der Lippe, 2012: 20). 
However, the implications of co-optation are far more severe for feminist praxis when 
they are used as an alibi for neutralising positive action or opposition and there is a 
real danger that institutions may ‘appropriate the language of advocacy in order to co-
opt social movement resistance’ (True, 2003: 379). Writing about the EU, Stratigaki 
(2005) examines how the formal endorsement of gender mainstreaming has served to 
provide an alibi for not developing more targeted and powerful equality measures. As 
she further points out, mainstreaming was ‘manipulated so that it served to counteract 
the emerging demand of women for binding positive action measures’ (Stratigaki, 
2005: 181). 
The adoption of feminist agendas by governments and international organisations can 
also be a manifestation of resistance to feminism itself. For example, Martin (2000: 
213) finds that organisations which adopt legislative recommendations before they are 
binding are likely to do so because they are vulnerable to attack either legally or 
publicly because of their size and visibility. The existence of a public commitment to 
such a policy may indeed loosely correlate to certain specific actions taken by the 
organisations. However, ultimately this commitment allows the organisation to depart 
from the objectives of policy to support its own agenda and co-opt it to support an 
alternate message (Martin, 2000: 213). The implications of such co-optation are 
epitomised in the relationship of feminists to the World Bank. Following the 1995 
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Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing, a ‘Women’s Eyes on the Bank’ 
initiative was established to monitor and attempt to transform the World Bank. This 
entailed the mainstreaming of gender into the Bank’s policies through the 
establishment of an External Consultative Gender Group and an increase in number 
of gender specialists within the Bank. O’Brien et al (2000 as cited in True, 2003: 379) 
identify  a significant change in the approach of the women’s movement from 
challenging the bank to viewing the bank ‘as a potential ally in dialogues between 
women’s groups and their own governments’. This raises a salient question on the 
ability of the women’s movement to sustain a challenge to the dominant discourse, in 
this case on capitalism being here to stay, when the feminist agenda has been framed 
as part of it. In order to realise transformative feminist praxis it is necessary to realise 
an alternate feminist discourse (Bergeron, 2001: 1002). 
 
(2.2.3) Instigating change from within: the criticality of femocrats  
In 2000, Enloe asked ‘where are the women?. Asking this same question in relation to 
international security institutions enables us to theorise the sites and opportunities for 
transformative change within them.  In order to address this question, it is necessary 
to theorise how women enter these spaces, why they remain in a minority position and 
if (and how) they can act for women. Transformative change within organisations 
occurs at the site of ‘everyday routines and practices’ (Kronsell, 2011: 286) which 
serve to reproduce dominant norms. Strategies for change must, therefore, challenge 
the status quo and the existing gender relations underpinning it (Cockburn, 2010: 143). 
Acknowledging the gendered nature of organisations and politics with the subsequent 
gender bias favouring masculinity explains why women may not wish to be associated 
92 
 
as a representative of their gender (Childs and Krook, 2008: 733; Lewis and Simpson, 
2012). Research on women in leadership positions and women politicians indicates 
that these women prefer to be acknowledged for their individual abilities and not as a 
representative of women as a whole, with many distancing themselves from acting for 
other women (Mavin, 2008; Childs, 2004: 14).  In addition, Kronsell’s (2012) finding 
that gender parity in the military is more achievable than gender mainstreaming 
indicates a disjuncture between increasing the number of women in an institution and 
pursuing feminist praxis.  
‘Critical actors’ or ‘femocrats’ are crucial to instigating change from within 
institutions (Celis et al, 2008: 104). The use of the term femocrat5 in this thesis refers 
to an individual positioned within a bureaucratic structure who act on their own, to 
initiate or support transformative policy initiatives, which benefit women and support 
feminist goals (Chappell, 2002: 86; Prugl, 2004: 64; Wright, 2016). Crucially, these 
actors do not necessarily have to be women. It is therefore necessary to know more 
about the role of femocrats in organisations and the functioning of bureaucracies - not 
only for scholarly interest - but as a valuable tool in the pursuit of feminist 
emancipatory praxis. Eyben and Turquet (2013: location 199) argue that although ‘a 
feminist bureaucrat appears a contradiction in terms’, it is this apparent contradiction 
which makes them well positioned to become agents of change. Femocrats inhabit a 
dual identity as both insider and outsider. Their insider status allows them to learn how 
                                                
5 Femocrat has been used pejoratively by those positioned both inside and outside 
organisations. Internally, conservatives view these individuals as ‘representing a select 
band of ‘special interests’ in the public service’ and externally, feminist activists use 
the term as one of derision because they view these women as having sold out 
(Chappell, 2002:86). However, as Chappell (2002) notes some practitioners have 
sought to reclaim the term and to use it to define themselves.
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to behave appropriately within the organisation to ensure their credibility, while as an 
outsider they are able to keep a critical distance and act to challenge the status-quo 
(Eyben and Turquet, 2013: location 199). This dual identity brings with it its own set 
of challenges and often leads to a sense of isolation and despondency from a lack of 
recognition. 
 
(2.3) Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined the necessity of a feminist approach to theorising 
international security institutions, which will be built upon in Chapter Three in order 
to outline a feminist approach to theorising NATO. The first section introduced a 
feminist approach to security, from its emergence in peace studies in the 1960s to the 
late 1980s/early 1990s where feminist IR scholars began to frame their analysis in 
terms of security. More recently feminist scholars studying security have begun to 
identify themselves as feminist security studies scholar in a challenge directed towards 
(critical) security studies to take the decades of feminist theorising into account.  
The section then went on to engage with the reflexivity underpinning feminist 
scholarship and outline how this has created space for ongoing engagement with the 
meaning and shape of the feminist security studies project. This has been most 
noticeable in the special issues/collections published in Politics & Gender and 
International Studies Perspectives, with scholars contesting just who can be part of 
the conversation on feminist security and a salient warning on the danger of making 
an exclusive (rather than inclusive) project if citational politics are not taken into 
account. 
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The section then engaged with the work of the Welsh School in relation to 
emancipatory security, outlining the contribution of feminist approaches. This also 
acknowledged that despite the synergies, feminist scholars should be cautious not to 
consumed under the umbrella of the Welsh School, given their lack of engagement 
with the decades of feminist theorising of security. A central departure of feminist 
work is the debate on whether emancipatory praxis should be directed at IR or realising 
‘real world’ change. This chapter has argued that the two are co-constitutive and to 
achieve change in one requires challenging the other (and vice versa). 
Next, the section outlined the parallels and divergences between feminist security 
studies and the work of (critical) security scholars, outlining a feminist critique of 
human security and the Copenhagen School. However, feminist security studies must 
also resist a defensive stance and preoccupation with the mainstream, even if this does 
reflect the centrality of the mainstream to individual scholar’s security within 
academia and the resulting insecurity of feminist security studies scholars (themselves 
on the margins). In defending feminist security studies against the mainstream, 
feminist security studies is in danger of defending feminist scholars as individuals not 
as a loosely defined group of feminist scholars. As a result, feminist security studies 
scholars are in danger of losing perspective of the grounding of feminist security 
studies in feminist politics, crucial to which is supporting feminist praxis through 
incorporating and continuing the feminist security studies conversation with scholars 
engaged in a variety of projects, with a plurality of understandings. Instead, feminist 
security scholars should reflect on the silences within the project and concentrate on 
building knowledge of how gender constitutes security at every level. Future research 
should therefore aim to address the under theorised areas of security and in particular 
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the role of international security institutions, especially when they adopt a feminist 
agenda. 
Finally, the Chapter drew attention to a key silence in feminist security studies, which 
in a challenge to the preoccupation of IR scholars to the study of national security and 
the ‘powerful’, has implicitly assumed that silencing and marginalisation is a natural 
process. In doing so the Chapter called for feminist theorising of international security 
institutions and argued that this was particularly salient given the increasing 
pervasiveness of global gender norms (including UNSCR 1325) and their 
implementation by international security institutions, such as NATO. Drawing on the 
work of feminist scholars of organisations and institutions, the section drew out key 
concerns for a feminist approach to theorising international security institutions. This 
included both the hindrances to change and the danger of the co-optation of feminist 
agendas by such institutions and the critical role of femocrats supporting 
transformative change. This has provided an important background for the next 
Chapter, which will introduce a feminist approach to theorising NATO and in so doing 
will outline the theoretical framework underpinning this thesis. 
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Theorising NATO as a ‘teaching machine’ 
(3.0) Introduction 
This Chapter makes a key contribution to this thesis. It outlines the theoretical 
framework which underpins this thesis, that is a feminist approach to theorising 
NATO. This is a key contribution to knowledge, give that international security 
institutions, including NATO, have remained under-theorised by feminist scholars, 
even following NATO’s adoption of UNSCR 1325. In part this can be attributed to 
the grounding of feminist IR in pacifism, however, this has not prevented feminists 
from engaging critically with the issue of women in the military (cf. Segal, 1995; 
Duncanson and Woodward, 2015; Kennedy-Pipe, 2008; Obradovic, 2014; Carreiras, 
2006; Mathers, 2013). This is not to say that feminists scholars have always done so, 
for example, in the 1980s, while militarism had been acknowledged as a feminist issue, 
relatively little attention had been paid by feminists to the issue of women in militaries 
(Enloe and Chapkis, 1981). Further, Enloe and Chapkis (1981: 5) identified a 
reluctance by women activists and academics to treat ‘women in the military’ as a 
‘serious’ issue given that women made up a very small minority in most militaries. 
Today, there is a vast swathe of literature examining this specific issue but there has 
been no sustained feminist critique of NATO, which continues to share ‘lessons’ on 
the utilisation of women in the military and has engaged extensively with UNSCR 
1325. There is therefore a salient need to develop a feminist theory of NATO in fill 
this gap in feminist knowledge. 
NATO is understood as an international security institution, which is more than the 
sum of its parts. It is composed of both formal institutional structures (or the 
organisation itself) and informal rules and norms which compose the informal 
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institution (see discussion in Chapter Two). The interaction between these two 
constitutes NATO as an actor in international relations in its own right. In this way, 
NATO as an institution is understood as separate and distinct from NATO member 
states but also composed of them given that it is an inter-governmental organisation.  
As Rynning (2014: 1383) notes, it is not possible to comprehend NATO as an inter-
governmental organisation, without considering the erosion of the nation state. Neither 
is it possible to understand NATO without understanding the role of NATO member 
states. For example, the role of major allies (US, Germany, UK and France) in shaping 
the agenda of the Alliance in contrast to second-tier allies and increasingly partners. It 
is the major allies which to some extent drive NATO’s agenda and purpose (Flockhart, 
2011: 267). The construction of NATO happens through internal socialisation, 
including the negotiation processes (Flockhart, 2011: 267). Member states interact 
with NATO through both the political and military structures, and in doing so 
contribute to shaping NATO’s purpose and role. NATO is nevertheless a two-tier 
structure, with NATO member states seeking closeness with the US, and while some 
achieve this through contributing to missions, those who do not are relegated to the 
second-tier (Williams, 2014).  
NATO partners are increasingly important to a globally engaged alliance and drawing 
on the contributions of other actors, is becoming increasingly important for the 
Alliance (Ringsmose and Rynning 2011: 41). The expansion of partnerships has been 
the principle means through which NATO has sought to improve its capacity to 
address a variety of threats post-9/11(Moore 2010: 219). In this way it is necessary to 
incorporate NATO partners into an understanding of how NATO functions as an 
international security institution. Partners, in addition to member states, are expected 
to some degree to contribute to military operations in order to gain influence in NATO 
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and with the US (Williams, 2014: 257). This means that US interests, are somewhat 
by default, prioritised with the Alliance and this acknowledgement is necessary to 
comprehend to understand how NATO acts. This also draws attention to the 
importance of understanding both the informal and formal aspects of the institution in 
order to comprehend NATO as an actor in its own right.  
Feminists have long been concerned with NATO’s role in international peace and 
security but have nevertheless left under examined and under theorised NATO’s role 
as an international security institution. For example, Enloe (2000: 1023) was surprised 
at the ‘NATO-ization of human rights’ in the late-twentieth century. This marked a 
change in her perspective on NATO and the military, where in the 1980s she had 
begun to pioneer a feminist approach to conceptualising NATO as a ‘teaching 
machine’ in respect of gender (Enloe, 1983).  However, an understanding of NATO’s 
long history of transformation provides the tools with which to comprehend this 
development as a continuation, rather than aberration in NATO’s shift from a Cold 
War alliance to a political community in the realm of security (Kitchen, 2010). And 
while Cockburn (2011) was ‘snagged on the contradiction’ that NATO, a militarist 
organisation, could adopt UNSCR 1325, a ‘feminist Resolution’, she did not take into 
account NATO’s longstanding concern with the status of women in NATO forces and 
that the organisation had already developed gender machinery. This has served to 
position UNSCR 1325 as an extension of this pre-existing agenda, rather than an 
unexpected development which came out of nowhere. 
The importance of incorporating an understanding of how NATO functions as an 
international security institution is underlined by the oversights in an otherwise very 
detailed report on the status of UNSCR 1325 globally and published by George 
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Washington University (Miller, Pournik and Swaine, 2014). The report refers to a 
‘NATO Regional Action Plan’ adopted in 2010 (Miller, Pournik and Swaine, 2014: 
21), although it is not clear what specifically they are referring to. It is most likely to 
be the NATO/EAPC Policy on UNSCR 1325, adopted in 2007 (revised 2011, 2014) 
but could also be Bi-Strategic Command 40-1 adopted in 2009. Further the report lists 
the collection of data on the representation of women in NATO forces as a possible 
consequence of UNSCR 1325. However, it is evident from an organisational 
understanding of NATO that the institution has been occupied with the status of 
women in NATO forces since the 1960s (see discussion in Chapter Three). Most 
pertinently, Miller, Pournik and Swaine (2014) are unable to explain the absence of a 
NATO Action Plan on UNSCR 1325, despite finding reference to one in NATO 
policy. This draws attention to the necessity of understanding how NATO functions 
as an organisation, in order to understand NATO’s adoption of UNSCR 1325. In doing 
so it is possible to explain the lack of a publicly available action plan and attribute this 
to the fact that NATO classifies operation relevant strategies (NATO Official, 2014). 
The limited feminist analysis of NATO to-date has focused on NATO as an actor in 
international relations and NATO’s preoccupation with the status of women in the 
armed forces. Herbert (2012), for example, examined NATO’s response to sexual 
misconduct in peacekeeping operations. McGrath (1998) in her article entitled ‘Bombs 
Away! Feminists Theorize NATO’, focuses on feminist reactions to the NATO 
intervention in Kosovo. Schjølset (2013) has critiqued the quality of NATO’s data on 
the representation women in the armed forces as inconsistent and of limited value for 
cross-national comparisons. While Obradovic (2014) has overcome these challenges 
to do just that by supplementing NATO data with the addition of four in-depth case 
studies. Obradovic’s (2014) cross-national analysis of the integration of women in 
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NATO member states’ armed forces provides an important contribution to 
understanding the different national contexts that shape the debate on women’s role in 
the military. However, while Obradovic did touch upon the role of the NATO 
Committee on Gender Perspectives the role of NATO as an institution was outside the 
scope of her study. Enloe (1983) has remained the only feminist scholar to seek to 
theorise NATO’s role as an international security institution and introduced the 
concept of NATO as a ‘teaching machine’ sharing lessons among members on best 
practice in relation to gender and integrating women into the military. And while 
Enloe’s framework provides an important starting point, it is underdeveloped and 
requires a more sophisticated understanding of how NATO functions as an 
organisation, across both military and political structures, in order to understand 
NATO’s adoption of global gender norms, including UNSCR 1325. For example, 
Enloe does not examine the role of NATO’s political/civilian structure in NATO’s 
role as a ‘teaching machine’. This thesis therefore contributes to learning on how 
NATO as an organisation functions as a ‘teaching machine’ in respect of gender and 
UNSCR 1325 in both the military and political structure.  
NATO’s adoption of UNSCR 1325 took many feminists by surprise. Cockburn 
(2011), for example, took exception to the adoption of this ‘feminist achievement’ by 
an organisation perceived as the bastion of militarised masculinity. Indeed, as 
Puechguirbal (2010: 179) asks, why would such institutions ‘open the doors to change 
and share the power and privileges they have accumulated over the years?’. However, 
feminist agendas are not new to NATO and there is evidence that femocrats have been 
operating within NATO, in particular through NATO’s military structure, for over 50 
years (Wright, 2016). It is femocrats who were instrumental in bringing the status of 
women in the military to the attention of NATO allies and whose actions supported 
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the creation of NATO’s gender machinery, or women’s policy unit (Walby, 2004:15) 
in the military structure in 1997 and the political structure in 2012. This has proven to 
be the locus for advancing women’s interests within the alliance. 
Feminists have long sought to expose silences by questioning what appear to be dull 
and everyday practices in order to make visible the gendered nature of international 
relations. The acceptance of NATO as a banal part of the international security 
architecture is one such silence that has contributed to a lack of public scrutiny of the 
Alliance (Kuus, 2007: 269). In order to expose such silences it is necessary to uncover 
what is ‘written between the lines or expressed as symbols and in practices’ (Kronsell, 
2006:109). This Chapter contributes to exposing that silence through building upon 
and expanding Enloe’s (1983: 131) conception of NATO as a ‘teaching machine’ in 
respect of gender (and UNSCR 1325) by incorporating an understanding of the way 
in which NATO functions as a gendered organisation. In order to do this the Chapter 
examines NATO’s unique political/civilian structure, which shapes how NATO 
functions as an international security institution. It then turns to examine how NATO 
has become adept at transformation in order to remain relevant as an international 
security actor in 2016. This includes discussion of the centrality of narrative 
construction to the continued efficacy of the Alliance, against which NATO’s 
engagement with the WPS agenda needs to be understood. The Chapter then examines 
the place of women within the Alliance, finding them overrepresented in 
administrative and support functions and vastly underrepresented in decision making 
roles. In order to understand why, this Chapter incorporates an understanding of how 
NATO functions as a gender regime. This Chapter then outlines NATO’s long 
standing preoccupation with the status of women in NATO forces, dating back to the 
1960s and argues that this contributes to understanding not only NATO’s adoption of 
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UNSCR 1325, but the focus within NATO policy on UNSCR 1325 on the 
representation of women in the military. Finally, the nature of NATO’s expanding 
relations with its partners is outlined, which will feed into an understanding of the 
centrality of NATO partners to NATO’s adoption and implementation of UNSCR 
1325 discussed in Chapter Five and Chapter Six.   
(3.1) NATO as a ‘teaching machine’ 
In order to understand NATO’s role as a ‘teaching machine’, it is necessary to provide 
a historical context for the organisation. The North Atlantic Treaty was signed in 1949 
and subsequently created the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). NATO’s 
origins are as a Cold War Alliance established to protect Europe from the Soviet 
Union. The North Atlantic Treaty consists of 14 articles, the most important of which 
is Article 5, which commits member states to viewing an attack against one ‘as an 
attack against them all’ (NATO, 1949). Despite the apparent centrality of collective 
defence to the Alliance, Article 5 has only been invoked once and not in the way 
originally envisaged in 1949 to ensure US protection for European states (Kitchen 
2010:78). Rather, Article 5 was invoked by European allies in 2001 as a gesture that 
they would stand by the US in response to the attacks of September 11th (Kitchen, 
2010: 78). It is important to note that the US chose not to use the NATO framework 
when it intervened in Afghanistan. Instead, the US asked NATO to contribute five 
NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control Force and this formed the basis of 
Operation Eagle Assist (NATO, 2009b). This represents a limit to understanding of 
NATO purely as an organisation shaped by the most important provision of the North 
Atlantic Treaty and emphasises the need to include consideration of the informal 
institution underpinning NATO and how it interacts with the formal. NATO’s 
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continued salience in international politics after this event, indicates a broader 
understanding of what NATO is, is required.  
The starting point for understanding NATO’s role as a ‘teaching machine’ must be the 
acknowledgement of the interaction between formal and informal institutions (as 
discussed in Chapter Two). The interaction between the two influences the ways in 
which gender norms and practices are incorporated within the institution (Chappell 
and Waylen, 2013). For example, informal institutions are particularly important to 
understanding how NATO functions. As Waylen (2014: 2) describes, informal 
institutions are networks, informal rules and the differing ethos between different parts 
of the bureaucracy. The predominance of male bodies within NATO means networks 
are deeply gendered, while the military and political structures have different cultures 
resulting from either the preponderance of military or civilian staff. These shape the 
way in which NATO functions as a ‘teaching machine’ and make it necessary to look 
beyond the formal institutional structures to how these informal elements interact and 
shape them. This is particularly important when seeking to understand policy 
outcomes, such as NATO’s policy on UNSCR 1325 (discussed in Chapter Five).  
 
In a Post-Cold War world, NATO’s interpretation of collective defence has broadened 
and in doing so has blurred the lines between Article 5 and non-Article 5 missions, for 
example, in Kosovo where the operation was to protect the security of a non-ally 
(Yost, 2010: 86). In 2003, NATO assumed leadership of the International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF), initially established by the UN Security Council following 
the Bonn Agreement, to assist the Afghan government in securing the country (NATO 
2009b). This was a non-Article 5 mission intended to prevent the emergence of an 
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Article 5 threat (Yost, 2010: 87). This indicates that the invocation of Article 5 is 
accepted as a very last measure in reaction to a present threat to a member state. 
Another significant feature of the North Atlantic Treaty is Article 4, which can be 
invoked by any member state who feels that its security, territorial integrity, or 
independence is threatened. Article 4 states that: ‘the parties will consult whenever, in 
the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence, or security 
of any of the parties is threatened’ (NATO, 1949). The Article outlines provisions for 
a joint decision or action on behalf of the Alliance to be taken as a result of talks at the 
North Atlantic Council. The invocation of Article 4 is extremely rare and Turkey and 
Poland are the only member states to have used the option since 1949. Turkey invoked 
Article 4 during the 2003 Iraq war and twice in 2012 over the conflict in Syria, first 
when a Turkish jet was shot down and then when Turkish civilians were killed 
(NATO, 2014g). In all three instances NATO took action to support Turkey through 
agreeing an increase in defensive measures (NATO, 2014g). Poland invoked Article 
4 in March 2014 in response to increasing tensions in Ukraine, but no NATO action 
resulted  (NATO, 2014g). Following the emergency meeting held on March 4th 2014, 
the North Atlantic Council concluded that ‘despite repeated calls by the international 
community, Russia continues to violate Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, 
and to violate its international commitments. And that these developments present 
serious implications for the security and stability of the Euro‑Atlantic area’ (NATO, 
2014f). Article 4 therefore provides a useful means for member states to engage the 
North Atlantic Council on issues threatening their security, but falling short of 
territorial intervention. However, it’s extremely rare invocation in the 67 years since 
the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, supports the contention that NATO is much 
more than a collective defence organisation. And while NATO’s military capabilities 
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remain crucial to the alliance, the development of NATO’s political structure indicates 
that dialogue and cooperation based on shared values are key to twenty first century 
NATO (Moore, 2002: 1). 
While it can be seen that the North Atlantic Treaty undoubtedly forms the basis of 
NATO as an organisation, it is also evident from the limited times its most serious 
provisions have been invoked that NATO as an organisation is much more than its 
treaty provisions. This supports the contention that NATO as an organisation did not 
truly come into existence until the establishment of the NATO bureaucracy, which 
was mandated in a resolution in 1951 and was followed in 1952, with the appointment 
of Lord Ismay as the first Secretary General and head of the newly created 
International Staff (IS). This supports Reggie’s (1992: 573) definition that ‘formal 
international organizations [sic] are palpable entities with headquarters and 
letterheads, voting procedures, and generous pension plans’.  
The provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty may focus around collective defence, but 
NATO is much better conceived of as  a political community in the realm of security 
(Kitchen, 2010). This helps contribute to understanding how NATO has proved itself 
to be the cornerstone of the relationship between North America and Europe for over 
sixty years. As Medcalf (2008:13) argues, despite the existence of other forms of 
interaction and dialogue – including economics and cultural ties - the very existence 
of NATO has led to security and defence becoming the primary basis for the trans-
Atlantic relationship. As a result and under the umbrella of ‘security’, NATO 
‘organizes and justifies an international division of labour [along gender lines], and 
encompasses a vast range of social issues’ (Enloe, 1981:65).  
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In order to understand the place of UNSCR 1325 on NATO’s agenda it is necessary 
to build on the notion that NATO is a political community in the realm of security and 
to outline how NATO’s unique dual military and political/civilian structure functions 
to support NATO’s role as a ‘teaching machine’ in respect of gender (Enloe 1981). In 
the political/civilian structure, member states’ delegations to NATO sit on the North 
Atlantic Council (NAC). The International Staff (IS) reports to the Secretary General 
and exists to provide advice and support to the NATO delegations (NATO, 2015i). 
The military structure is composed of military representatives from member states, 
who sit on NATO’s Military Committee (MC). The MC is composed of the Chiefs of 
Defence of NATO member countries, the International Military Staff (IMS), the MC’s 
executive body and the integrated military command structure (the Supreme Allied 
Commander Europe (SACEUR) and the Supreme Allied Commander Transformation 
(SACT)) (NATO, 2015i). Therefore, while the MC cannot dictate NATO policy, it 
does have an important advisory capacity to the NAC. The NAC is, however, the 
preeminent decision making body within NATO and can instruct the MC. 
In NATO’s political/civilian structure, the Secretary General is both the Head of the 
International Staff and the Chair of the North Atlantic Council (NAC). As Chair of the 
NAC, the Secretary General defines the agenda of the NAC and acts as the 
spokesperson for NAC. The Secretary General has no formal authority over the Heads 
of other NATO bodies (such as ACT, ACO), however, they must report to him as 
Head of the NAC and as such he has a role in determining a range of NATO-wide 
policies (Boeva, 2013: 10). For NATO bodies (whether Supreme Commands or the 
civilian agencies), the views of the Secretary General, spokesperson for the Council 
to which they all report, are central to determining a wide range of policies of NATO-
wide interest and significance. The Secretary General, therefore, has a salient role in 
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providing leadership on NATO’s implementation of UNSCR 1325 (see discussion in 
Chapter Six). 
The Military Committee (MC) is the primary link between NATO’s military and 
political structures, advising NAC and assisting in the development of strategic policy 
and concepts. The advice of the MC is sought prior to the authorisation of military 
action (NATO 2014j). The International Military Staff (IMS) is the executive body of 
the MC and ensures decisions and policies made by the NAC and MC are implemented 
by the appropriate NATO military authority. As such, the IMS represents an important 
link between the political structure and integrated military command structure (the 
Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and the Supreme Allied Commander 
Transformation (SACT) and they liaise closely with NATO’s International Staff (IS) 
with whom they share a building and were recently ‘co-located’ to work more closely 
with IS staff working on similar issues (Boeva in Bumgardner, Ochmannova, and 
Gialitaki, 2013:11). It is therefore significant to note that the office to support the 
Committee on Women in NATO Forces (later the NATO Committee on Gender 
Perspectives) is positioned within the IMS and well positioned to work with the IS. 
This discussion of NATO’s organisational structure sets the scene for understanding 
how NATO functions as a gendered institution interacting with informal structures. 
NATO embodies a particular militarised hegemonic masculinity, which forms the 
basis of the institution’s role as, what Enloe has described, a ‘teaching machine’ and 
‘structure for experimentation in gender’ among member states (1983: 131). At the 
political strategic level, as Enloe (1983) identifies, this extends to learning lessons on 
what works, and what does not work in respect of the integration of women into the 
military through both formal and informal structures. Enloe’s discussion was limited 
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to the military structure but given the increasing role NATO’s political structure is 
taking in respect of the implementation of UNSCR 1325 it can be seen that NATO’s 
role as a ‘teaching machine’ is also reflected here. This understanding of NATO is 
supported by Kitchen’s (2010) contention that NATO is a political community in the 
realm of security, through which membership is underpinned by a commitment to 
reflexivity. For Kitchen (2010) it is through ongoing talk and debate that members 
demonstrate not only their commitment to community but create the community. This 
supports the argument that NATO’s continued existence and adaptation post-Cold 
War can be attributed in part to the mundane way in which it functions as ‘an 
organization of hundreds of daily interactions and procedures’ (Wallander, 2000: 724).  
In contrast to other international organisations, NATO is not a ‘cumbersome forum 
for discussing big issues’ (Wallander, 2000: 724). This allows space for smaller 
member states to posit certain items onto NATO’s agenda and challenges 
understandings of NATO as an institution whose agenda is primarily dictated by the 
US acting as the ‘internal socialization agent’ (Flockhart 2011: 266). Rather, NATO’s 
unique structure, which relies upon an extensive committee system, enables members 
to focus on specific issues and practicalities. This makes room for arguments and 
debates to occur which are not only key to explaining change and continuity in the 
Alliance, but are the very foundations of the Alliance (Kitchen, 2010: 7). This 
contributes to understanding the focus on UNSCR 1325, through what is now the 
NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives, and indicates that UNSCR 1325 itself is 
becoming a foundation of the Alliance. 
Another notable factor in NATO’s organisational structure, is the Alliance’s decision 
making process. At every level, from committees to the North Atlantic Council, 
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decisions are made on the basis of consensus. One of the main tasks of the Secretary 
General is to facilitate this process. The consensus based decision making process is 
one common to international security institutions. The North Atlantic Council (NAC) 
is NATO’s principal decision making body and is located at NATO’s Headquarters in 
Brussels. It is here that the 28 Allies’ Permanent Representatives are based, along with 
a number of partners (who are situated on the outskirts of the complex, beyond an 
additional security gate). This setup is conducive ‘for the intensive involvement of 
Allies in the day-to-day executive decision-making role at NATO’ (Boeva, 2013: 7). 
The Secretary General is also based at NATO HQ, where he6 is supported by the 
International Staff (IS).  
It is ‘language games’ which have proved crucial to tie the Alliance together, and 
centre upon the relations between Europe and the US, in addition to the promise of the 
nuclear guarantee (Fierke, 1997: 228). The US, UK and France have been the most 
influential of the NATO allies since the outset and it is their positions which dominate 
transatlantic policy debates (Kitchen, 2010: 4). The positions of these major players 
must be considered in decision making and decision shaping processes at NATO 
which require ‘negotiation and persuasion’ (Widerberg, 2014: 5). However, Kitchen 
(2010: 4) argues, that studies which look solely to the US, as the alliance leader, are 
flawed because ‘they suggest that the identity of the United States can be read onto 
the community’. In this view NATO was seen as a tool for the United States to exploit; 
with NATO assets, decision making processes and joint military command perceived 
as valuable to the US for a wider range of post-Cold War missions (Wallander, 2000: 
723). Far from following the interests of the US, smaller states have proved capable 
                                                
6 To date only men have held the position of Secretary General. 
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of acting independently and of using alliance structures (including NATO) ‘to 
influence American policy and to alter American policy perspectives’ (Keohane, 
1971: 162). Keohane (1971) attributes this to the fact that the smaller the state, the less 
it has to take into consideration the ‘large-scale patterns of international politics’ 
because it has little chance of affecting them very much. 
It is this conception of NATO a ‘teaching machine’ that provides the basis for 
understanding NATO’s adoption of UNSCR 1325. This thesis identifies that 
‘learning’ on UNSCR 1325 at NATO occurs through both informal (socialisation) and 
formal (NATO’s gender machinery) structures.  That is to say that NATO members 
(and partners) learn the value of UNSCR 1325 through socialisation and shared 
experiences but also through formal structures, including the NCGP. 
 
(3.2) NATO transformations 
NATO’s purpose is to “keep the Americans in, the Russians out, and the Germans 
down.” 
Lord Ismay (1949), NATO Secretary General (1952-1957)7 
 
“Today’s goal is “to keep North America in, Europe up, and Russia with””. 
Admiral Giampaolo di Paola (2010), Chairman of the Military Committee (2008-
2011) 
                                                
7 Quoted in Kitchen (2010:78). 
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NATO has come a long way since Lord Ismay made this statement about NATO’s 
purpose when the Alliance was founded and just six years after Admiral Giampaolo 
di Paola revised Lord Ismay’s statement, NATO’s relationship with Russia has 
changed dramatically and the Alliance’s purpose has yet again transformed out of 
necessity. NATO is now seeking to stabilise relations with Russia (Webber, Hallams, 
and Smith, 2014:7 85). That, in the post-Cold War world, NATO continues to maintain 
a salient position as arguably the most important international security institution is 
testament to the organisation’s adeptness at transformation. This section will argue 
that it is NATO’s continued innovation and transformation that has ensured NATO’s 
post-Cold War survival and undermined neorealist assertions that NATO is ‘pointless’ 
outside of the Cold War context (Waltz, 2000: 32). This will provide the context 
against which NATO’s adoption and implementation of UNSCR 1325 should be 
understood, not as an aberration in NATO’s history but as part of NATO’s continued 
adaptation to retain its relevance. NATO has continued to react to an ever changing 
international security environment, in order to retain its relevancy and ultimately to 
survive. Although it is important to note that the continued existence of NATO 
remains far from guaranteed. The role of narratives to support NATO’s transformation 
(and continued relevance) is investigated in this section and in particular NATO’s 
Strategic Concepts. For the purpose of the analysis presented here, transformation is 
defined as efforts of reform to maintain NATO’s relevance (Rynning, 2014: 1391). 
It is important to note that NATO’s transformations are not confined to the post-Cold 
War era and that the organisation has long proved adept to change in order to retain 
its relevance. For example, as Wenger (2004) argues, the period from 1966 to 1968 
proved critical for the future of the alliance. In 1967, German Chancellor Kiesenger 
warned that NATO was in danger ‘of developing into a sort of ‘shell with no real spirit 
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left in it’ (quoted in Wenger, 2004: 71). This was a result of the French decision in 
1966 to withdraw from NATO’s integrated military command because it was 
perceived as a symbol of US hegemony and as such a barrier to détente (Wenger, 
2004). In reaction, and after a period of consultation, the Harmel Report on ‘The 
Future Tasks of the Alliance’ was approved by the North Atlantic Council in 
December 1967. This public statement made it clear that NATO would seek to strike 
a balance between its military and political functions, balancing military security and 
a policy of détente. The report signified NATO’s transformation and contributed to 
the shift from bilateral superpower détente in 1963 to multilateral European détente in 
the 1970s (Wenger, 2004: 72). It also provided an important acknowledgement that 
NATO’s political structure was a salient part of the Alliance, supporting Kitchen’s 
(2010) conception that NATO has become a political community in the realm of 
security.  
Today, NATO has transformed from a regional Cold War institution into one engaged 
in far away conflicts, including the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) 
mission in Afghanistan (Adler, 2008). However, NATO’s role in a post-Cold War 
world was far from evident, let alone its very survival. The end of the Cold War and 
dissolution of the Soviet Union brought an abrupt end to NATO’s raison d’etre. The 
institution had been founded to defend Western Europe against Soviet aggression, 
without the Soviet Union its purpose was far from evident.  Indeed, the end of the Cold 
War brought about the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact (Fierke and Wiener, 1999: 729). 
Although change was inevitable if NATO were to survive, change never occurred to 
the extent that members ‘could not see a fundamental continuity with the community 
of values they began to construct after the Second World War’  (Kitchen, 2010: 7). 
This supports Felix Ciut[Abreve] (2002) argument that only in understanding the 
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narrative dynamic underpinning NATO transformation, constructed by both scholarly 
literature and political statements with stories of permanence and stability, is it 
possible to understand ‘what NATO is and does’. NATO’s Strategic Concepts are a 
crucial part of this narrative construction. They are an example of innovation, which 
is an important strategy organisations employ in order to survive (Hage, 1999: 599). 
In respect of NATO’s adoption of UNSCR 1325, it is therefore evident that this could 
only come about if, the WPS agenda could be narratively constructed as commensurate 
with NATO values. 
An examination of NATO’s Strategic Concepts provides a clear indication of how 
each revision has contributed to the transformation of NATO through the redefinition 
of NATO’s purpose as an international security institution. NATO’s first strategic 
concept post-Cold War emphasised that ‘none of its weapons will ever be used except 
in self-defence’ (NATO, 1991) and supporting NATO’s Cold War purpose as a 
regional defensive organisation. The release of a Strategic Concept so close to the end 
of the Cold War signified NATO’s intentions to remain a permanent fixture of 
international security. Yet, in reaction to NATO’s role in Kosovo and the 
establishment of the Partnership for Peace programme, the 1999 Strategic Concept 
makes a significant departure from this proclamation with the inclusion of a crisis 
management role and a commitment to contribute to ‘Euro-Atlantic security’ (NATO,  
1999). The post-Cold War narrative shift from ‘keep NATO’, to the enlargement of 
the alliance is evidence that NATO has ‘transformed and was transformed by the 
European security environment’ (Ciut[Abreve], 2002:52) and strengthened its role in 
Euro-Atlantic security. 
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NATO’s latest Strategic Concept, released in 2010, represents another evolution in 
NATO’s approach to international peace and security and a necessary reaction to a 
changing environment. Despite a widening ambition for the institution and increasing 
demands on NATO’s capabilities, there is a sense of decreasing solidarity among 
member states and a focus on national ambitions (Shea, 2010: 20). Shea (2010: 20) 
identifies several challenges facing NATO, primary among these is an irony that 
‘NATO has sent its forces to more and more parts of the world, [yet] its political 
horizons have in fact narrowed’ and calls for NATO ‘to put the political before the 
military, and to put strategy before action’. The final challenge Shea identifies is the 
lack of trust certain smaller member states have in NATO to meet their differing and 
divergent security needs, particularly regarding NATO’s commitment to uphold 
Article 5 and to member states continued support for the ISAF mission in Afghanistan. 
The 2010 Strategic Concept addresses Shea’s concerns, incorporating provisions for 
‘cooperative security’ acknowledging the role of NATO’s partners in Afghanistan and 
expands NATO’s remit to fall under international security (NATO, 2010e). This is 
important for understanding NATO’s adoption of UNSCR 1325 because the WPS 
agenda was adopted in conjunction with the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council 
(EAPC) members.  
NATO’s continued transformation has ensured NATO’s survival post-Cold War and 
has undermined the neorealist assertion that NATO is ‘pointless’ outside of the Cold 
War (Waltz, 2000: 32). NATO is not an organisation that stands still and has continued 
to react to an ever changing international security environment, in order to retain its 
relevancy and ultimately to survive (if not always thrive). In understanding NATO as 
an everyday changing institution, it is possible to conceive of NATO’s adoption of 
UNSCR 1325 not as an aberration but as part of an adaptation to the changing nature 
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of operations, and relatedly the increasing importance of NATO partners, with 
UNSCR 1325 providing a ‘safe issue’ to discuss with a variety of partner countries 
(see discussion in Chapter Five). 
 (3.3) Where are the women (working at NATO)? 
Any understanding of NATO and NATO transformations would not be complete 
without considering the place of women within the Alliance and their importance for 
the Alliance. Women may continue to be most noticeable by their absence from 
decision-making positions within NATO, however, women (and gender) have been 
central to the construction of NATO’s identity from the outset.  For example, a poster 
released by NATO to mark its 10th anniversary in 1959 (see Figure 1) depicts a woman 
(mother) clutching her baby and looking reassured by the list of NATO members 
represented next to her with their flags.  
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Figure 1, NATO 10th anniversary poster (NATO 2015a) 
In order to understand the particular ways in which NATO is gendered, it is necessary 
to understand how the institution functions as a gender regime. Gender regimes refer 
to the configuration of gender relations in a particular setting, they exist in all 
organisational structures and at the same time are unique to each organisational 
context (Walby, 1997: 6). They are built upon ‘organisation history and associated 
with a different configuration of personal experiences and consciousness’ (Connell, 
2002: 844). The gender regimes of international security institutions are premised 
upon hegemonic masculinity (Kronsell, 2012). The concept of hegemonic masculinity 
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was brought to prominence by Connell (1995) and refers to the particular set of 
masculine norms and practices that come to subordinate other masculinities, enabling 
the continued dominance of men over women. Hegemonic masculinity is the norm 
and is normative, but it is never explicit and although this hegemony could be 
supported by force, it has primarily been built upon cultural norms (Connell & 
Messerschmidt, 2005: 832) and supported by institutional power (Kronsell, 2012: 45). 
For example, Connell (1995: 213) argues that the military (in Europe and the US) 
occupies the most important position for the definition of hegemonic masculinity. As 
a military alliance NATO is also a source of ‘normative conception of gender’, 
amplifying already dominant cultural norms but also actively participating in their 
construction (Carreiras, 2006: 40). This makes NATO, as a trans-Atlantic military 
alliance, a key site for the transfer of gendered values. 
NATO’s role as a military alliance means the organisation falls into the category of an 
‘extreme case of the gendered organisation’ (Carreiras, 2006: 40). Britton (2000) 
outlines three criteria for gendered organisations. These are: 1) structures that make a 
distinction between masculinity and femininity; 2) the preponderance of male bodies; 
and 3) built upon hegemonic masculinities. NATO fulfils all of these three criteria 
making it a gendered organisation. NATO is as an organisation dominated by male 
bodies, and as a military alliance is defined by structures which differentiate between 
masculine and feminist traits. 
The latest data on gender balance at NATO Headquarters comes from the Global Study 
on the Implementation of UNSCR 1325 commissioned by UN Women. This finds that 
at NATO Headquarters in Brussels just 6 of the 38 (16%) executive leadership 
positions are held by women. This percentage is slightly higher in regional offices 
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with 2 of the 7 (28%) positions held by women, in addition one of the two Special 
Representative positions is held by a woman (although it is important to note that this 
is the position on Women, Peace and Security) bringing the overall percentage of 
women in leadership positions to 19%, but still far short of achieving gender parity 
(UN Women, 2015: 258). This demonstrates that NATO has made little progress since 
the last publicly available diversity report published in 2012. The 2012 report states 
that 77.5% of senior management and 69% of A-grade positions are occupied by men 
(NATO, 2012). This indicates that NATO has a long way to go before it achieves 
gender parity in leadership positions, with a significant overrepresentation of men in 
decision-making positions. 
At the level of Secretary General the absence of women is most visible, with no 
women to-date having served as Secretary General. Moreover, NATO remains a long 
way from even considering the possibility of a woman as Secretary General (Harrison,  
2014). At the level of Assistant Secretary General, of the seven positions, only the post 
for Public Diplomacy has been occupied by women (Ambassador Kolinda Grabar-
Kitarović, 2011-2014 and Stephanie Babst, acting 2010-2011). The appointment of an 
Assistant Secretary General is much coveted by allies because of the prestige and 
influence which comes with the post. This has historically been a legacy position and 
dominated by the larger allies. However, Secretary General Rasmussen was successful 
in opening all positions, including Assistant Secretary General, to open competition 
(Dijkstra,  2014: 12). This paved the way for the Croatian Grabar-Kitarović to take 
office in 2011. It is noteworthy that the first woman to hold the (permanent) position 
of Assistant Secretary General did so for a position perceived by some as a ‘soft issue’ 
and outside NATO’s raison d’etre as a collective defence organisation (NATO 
Official, 2014). It is far less likely that a woman would be appointed to one of the 
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other Assistant Secretary General positions (NATO Official, 2014). Grabar-
Kitarović’s position as an Assistant Secretary General and close working relationship 
with the Secretary General meant she was in a pivotal position to champion the 
women, peace and security agenda at NATO (see discussion in Chapter Seven). 
Nevertheless, that the only Assistant Secretary General post to be occupied by a 
woman is for the ‘soft issue’ of public diplomacy is indicative of how far NATO still 
has to go before women are represented among the principal officials in line with the 
provisions of UNSCR 1325. 
Representation of women in NATO’s principle decision making body, the North 
Atlantic Council, is also poor, with women making up just 11% of representatives 
(Fellin, 2014: 22). While women account for just 21% of NATO defence ministers 
(NATO, 2015d). On the military side, women are not represented at all on the NATO 
Military Committee (Fellin, 2014: 22). The absence of women from these positions is 
the responsibility of member states and reflective of a wider absence of women in 
politics from key government portfolios (Annesley and Gains, 2012). Nevertheless, 
NATO as an institution of hegemonic masculinity plays a role in reinforcing (rather 
than challenging) gender stereotypes relating to security and defence present at the 
national level. 
In NATO’s administrative and civilian roles, women do reach a gender balance with 
men (defined by NATO as a 40-60 ratio) (NATO, 2012c), which in itself does not 
represent a balanced representation of men and women. This embedded gender 
hierarchy contributes to shaping NATO as an institution and is evidence of the role 
international organisations play in reproducing and reinforcing power constructed 
through gender hierarchies (Enloe, 2004: 281), with organisational structure forming 
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a core component of this gendering process (Acker, 1990). This makes NATO an 
institution of hegemonic masculinity because of the dominance of male bodies and 
masculine practices (Kronsell, 2011:284) and a division of labour along gender lines 
both in terms of roles and physical space (Acker, 1990:146-147).  
NATO has sought to mainstream gender balance and diversity efforts since 2002 to 
address imbalance in gender, age and national representation at NATO HQ (NATO, 
2011a). The NATO Prague Summit held that year also established a Task Force which 
recommend the creation of an Action Plan (although the Task Force opposed the 
imposition of quotas) (NATO, 2011a). As such, these efforts predate NATO’s 
implementation of UNSCR 1325 and until 2014 the two had been treated as separate 
in NATO policies. For example, Human Resource policy did not feature in the 2007, 
nor 2011 NATO/EAPC policy on UNSCR 1325. This is despite the fact that UNSCR 
1325 ‘urges Member States to ensure increased representation of women at all 
decision-making levels in national, regional and international institutions’ (United 
Nations Security Council, 2000). Charlotte Isaksson, Gender Advisor to NATO 
SHAPE, perceived two distinct aspects of the implementation of UNSCR 1325; equal 
opportunities and operations, with equal opportunities being the responsibility of the 
Human Resource Department and gender advisors supporting the integration of a 
gender perspective into operations  (Isaksson, 2012). Another initiative has been the 
production of reports to monitor diversity within the International Staff. However, 
these have not been made publicly available since 2012 (NATO, 2012c). The lack of 
transparency in NATO’s effort to strive for gender balance in the International Staff 
limit the accountability of the organisation to outside scrutiny, particularly in respect 
of up-to-date gender diversity reports. This goes against the spirit of UNSCR 1325 
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which includes provision for the increased representation of women in international 
and regional institutions. 
In response to the Task Force recommendation, NATO produced an Action Plan to 
increase gender diversity for the period 2007-2010. Although this Action Plan is not 
available publicly8, the NATO website states that the Action Plan had three key 
objectives: 1) to maintain a NATO Diversity Framework and Policy; 2) to improve 
NATO work environment; and 3) to promote the image of NATO as an ‘employer of 
choice’ (NATO, 2011a). It is not clear if NATO revised the 2007-2010 Action Plan as 
the webpage on gender and diversity has not been updated since 2011 (NATO 2011a). 
This is perhaps indicative of the low importance of the subject for NATO and certainly 
indicates that it is not a priority area. However, the 2014 NATO/EAPC Policy on 
UNSCR 1325 identifies Human Resource policies as a ‘cross-cutting enabler’ of the 
implementation of UNSCR 1325. This includes an acknowledgement that while 
striving towards gender balance should be a goal in itself, it is ‘also a means for 
improving performance (NATO, 2014c). The associated NATO/EAPC Action Plan 
on UNSCR 1325 includes specific outcomes, actions and indicators for Human 
Resource policy. The two outcomes identified are: 1) ‘Improved gender balance at all 
levels of NATO’s, Allies’ and partners’ defence and security institutions’; and 2) 
‘Demonstrated leadership within military and civilian structures in order to advance 
the Women, Peace and Security agenda’ (NATO/EAPC, 2014). This explicitly 
integrates NATO’s implementation of UNSCR 1325 as a Human Resource issue for 
the first time and as such moves beyond the provisions of the 2007-2010 Action Plan. 
                                                
8 This is a normal practice for NATO because Action Plans are likely to contain sensitive 
information. The NATO/EAPC Action Plan on UNSCR 1325 was the first to ever be made 
available publicly (see discussion here: NATO/EAPC Action Plan on UNSCR 1325). 
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Nevertheless, the indicators do not contain a commitment to make publicly available 
data on diversity within NATO HQ and are limited only to reviewing NATO Human 
Resource policies. In a sense this contradicts the point of releasing the Action Plan 
publicly (see discussion in Chapter Five), because it is not possible to hold NATO to 
account for the outcomes it has identified. 
  
(3.4) Women, the Military and NATO’s military structure 
‘The Committee on Women in the NATO Forces has long been a valuable forum for 
the discussion of national views on a wide range of issues affecting servicewomen 
throughout the Alliance. Delegates to the Committee have provided strong support 
within their individual nations for servicewomen’s roles in the Armed Forces. They 
collectively work towards improvements in the utilisation and development, equity 
and leadership, and quality of life of all military members.’ 
This quote from Admiral Guido Venturoni, Chairman of the Military Committee 
1999-2002 (CWINF, 2000) draws attention to NATO’s role as a ‘teaching machine’ 
sharing lessons on gender integration in the military and the role of institutional 
structures in supporting it, in particular through the specific NATO Committee 
established to monitor women’s representation in NATO forces. Although a number 
of studies (Carreiras, 2006; Obradovic, 2014; Schjølset, 2013) have examined gender 
integration into NATO armed forces, there has not been a focus on the key actors 
which have facilitated this drive to increase the representation of women in the military 
nor the role of UNSCR 1325 in furthering this agenda. As such, this thesis provides 
additional insights into the key actors involved, including femocrats. For the purpose 
of this thesis, the term femocrat is used to describe individuals who act on their own, 
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often in the context of a resistant institutional setting, to initiate or support policy 
initiatives, which benefit women and support feminist goals  (Chappell, 2002:86; 
Prugl 2004: 64; Wright 2016) (see discussion in Chapter Two). This section first 
overviews the external factors which brought the integration of women into the 
military onto NATO’s agenda, before turning to look at the institutional actors who 
supported its emergence and subsequent institutionalisation within NATO’s structure. 
Women have served within NATO militaries from its inception in 1949, however, they 
did not gain significant Alliance attention until the late 1970s/early 1980s. Enloe 
(1981: 67) draws attention to two reasons which contribute to understanding NATO’s 
apparent sudden interest in the the status of women within NATO forces. These are 1) 
the shortage of male recruits; 2) and the rise of the women’s movement. The shortage 
of men to fill military positions can be attributed to demographic changes, primarily 
declining birth rates not accompanied by a parallel decrease in demand for military 
personnel (Segal, 1995: 766). In addition, the transition to voluntary systems from 
conscription is often accompanied by an increased role for women, as was the case in 
France from the 1970s (Segal, 1995: 766). Enloe’s (1981: 67) contention that the 
women’s movement played a role in the increased attention to the status of women in 
the military is not reflected in all NATO member states, as demonstrated by 
Obradovic’s (2014) cross-national analysis of the integration of gender into NATO 
forces. In the US context, Enloe’s (1981) argument stands with the US women’s 
movement advocating the incorporation of women in the military as a gender equality 
issue, and one separate and distinct from any debate on militarism and NATO 
(Obradovic, 2014). However, she finds that in Italy there was a stark division within 
the women’s movement on whether women should be incorporated into the military, 
reflective of divisions in respect of militarism and NATO membership itself. It is 
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therefore context dependent whether the women’s movement had championed the 
issue of women’s representation within the armed forces, and is by no means reflected 
across all NATO members. 
The recruitment of women into the armed forces can also serve an ideological purpose 
(Mathers, 2013: 133) or become ‘a marker of civilizational difference and superiority’ 
(Mcbride and Wibben, 2012: 207). For example, McBride and Wibben (2012: 200) 
find the gendering of counterinsurgency and the use of Female Engagement Teams 
(FETS) as part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission was part 
of an attempt to frame intervention in Afghanistan as a ‘humanitarian, even 
progressive, mission’. In doing so the presence of women is used to support, rather 
than challenge, the existing gender regime. The emphasis on increasing the 
representation of women in NATO armed forces can also be attributed to the emphasis 
placed on the ‘added value’ of women to the effectiveness of military operations. 
However, this is in contradiction to the foundation of military training, whereby 
recruit’s individuality is stripped from them so that they become part an obedient part 
of the military whole able to respond to command structures (Whitworth, 2004: 158). 
Women are thereby positioned as different from everyday NATO soldiers. The ‘added 
value’ of women to the military is based on the notion that women will bring diversity 
and a different perspective to the operation which will enhance its effectiveness. 
Kronsell (2012: 67) has argued that this is problematic because it accentuates 
difference and rests upon the premise that the ‘different’ individuals will provide the 
diversity expected of them. In so doing the existing majority is normalised and 
constructed ‘as homogenous and naturally associated with the organization [sic]’ 
(Kronsell, 2012: 67). In addition, far from challenging the hegemonic masculinity 
militarism is built upon, the diversity argument reinforces an essentialist view of 
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women as in opposition to the norm (Whitworth, 2004: 154). Once recruited women 
are assigned to particular, often subordinate roles (Mathers 2013:134), for example, in 
Female Engagement Teams (FETS), who were used in Afghanistan as part of the 
adoption of counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine  as a way of engaging the local 
population otherwise out of bounds (in the sense that ISAF military men could not 
engage with Afghan women due to cultural reasons) to military personnel (Mcbride 
and Wibben 2012: 199).  
In addition to these external considerations, the role of institutional actors also 
contributed to NATO’s increased attention to the status of women in its forces. In the 
1960s senior women within NATO became concerned with the underrepresentation of 
women in NATO forces (Enloe, 1981: 69). As Enloe (1981: 69) notes, the starting 
point for their call for women’s inclusion may have been the aspirations of the ‘liberal 
wing of the women’s movement’ but they were aware that this would not convince 
their Brussels superiors, rather they sought to frame their argument within NATO’s 
strategic framework (Enloe, 1981: 69). One of their initiatives was to organise the first 
NATO Conference on Women, which took place in Copenhagen in 1961. The 
conference sought to draw attention to the status, employment conditions and career 
opportunities for women within NATO forces. The delegates, including Denmark, 
Holland, Norway, UK and USA, agreed to organise future conferences, expressing 
hope that other NATO allies would consider  increasing the representation of women 
in their armed forces (Gil Ruiz, 2012: 91). Despite this rhetorical commitment, only 
sporadic meetings followed in the proceeding years (Gil Ruiz, 2012: 91). The next 
significant meeting came five years later in 1966, and this time was organised by 
NATO’s information Service. This was the Directors’ Conference of Senior Women 
Officers which brought together representatives from seven NATO allies, or under 
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half of NATO member states at the time (Gil Ruiz, 2012: 91). These two conferences 
may have represented small steps but they nevertheless helped facilitate the 
transformation of the place of women in NATO forces (Gil Ruiz, 2012: 91). 
In the 1970s NATO began to establish its gender machinery and in so doing started 
the process of institutionalising specialised knowledge and expertise on gender issues. 
In 1973 an ad hoc Committee on Women in NATO Forces (CWINF) was created and 
officially recognised by the Military Committee (MC) in 1976 (North Atlantic 
Military Committee, 2014). At the first CWINF meeting delegates resolved that 
women should have the opportunity to serve in all military roles (with the notable 
exception of combat roles which were seen as a national competence) (Gil Ruiz, 2012: 
91). The goal of CWINF was to share ‘knowledge and information’ with NATO and 
EAPC countries on the integration of women into the military in order to create 
‘harmony in the workplace’ (Harris, 1997). Over the following decades CWINF held 
an annual conference attended by national delegations from NATO member states and 
(since 2007) NATO partners (Harris, 1997). The CWINF provided the framework for 
NATO’s role as a ‘teaching machine’ in respect of gender integration and best practice 
began to emerge. For example, the Netherlands took a proactive approach to the 
integration of women into the military through opening all ranks to women from the 
beginning of the integration process in the 1970s and putting in place an anti-
discrimination policy (Carreiras, 2006: 151). This resulted in the Dutch army being 
used as a test case by NATO, taking on a ‘pioneer role’ in eliminating restrictions on 
women in combat and operational functions’ (Carreiras, 2006: 155-156; Bolscher and 
Megens, 1991: 181). 
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However, it was not until the late 1990s that a real momentum began to emerge at 
NATO in respect of the status of women in the armed forces. This was the result of 
the positioning of critical actors within NATO’s gender machinery. In 1997 NATO’s 
Military Committee approved the creation of an office to support the work of the 
CWINF on a three year trial basis (CWINF, 2000). This was the result of lobbying by 
the then Chairperson of CWINF and the Director of the International Military Staff 
(IMS) to provide continuity in pursuit of the Committee’s goals (NATO, 2007a). The 
Office on Women in NATO Forces (OWINF) was headed by US Air Force Major 
Sarah Garcia and supported by US Air Force Master Sergeant Michele Tyler in the 
role of information management director. The two women were tasked with creating 
a link between NATO leaders and the CWINF. Major Garcia stated at the time that 
they had ‘to market our office because we're so new. People within NATO don't even 
know we're here’ (U.S. Department of Defense, 1998). Their efforts were ultimately 
successful and the Military Committee granted the office permanent status with the 
International Military Structure (IMS) (NATO, 2007a).  
The OWINF played a crucial role in supporting the work of CWINF through the 
collection of annual reports from member states to monitor the status of women in 
NATO forces (Obradovic, 2014: 52). In 2009 the terms of reference of CWINF were 
extended to include the integration of a gender perspective and to support the 
implementation of UNSCR 1325. The committee was also renamed as the NATO 
Committee on Gender Perspectives (NCGP) and the office as the NATO Office on 
Gender Perspectives (NOGP) (NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives, 2012). 
Against this history, the adoption of UNSCR 1325 appears a logical progression in the 
development of NATO’s gender machinery. This is because, despite the attention of 
NATO’s established gender machinery, the representation of women in NATO 
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militaries remains low. For example, Turkey (1%) and Poland (2.9%) have the lowest 
rates of gender inclusiveness and Hungary (20%) and Latvia (17.2%) have the highest 
(Obradovic 2014: 52). In addition, Obradovic’s (2014) study of gender integration in 
NATO armed forces found no correlation between NATO membership and the extent 
of women’s integration into the armed forces (although NATO membership did 
explain women’s admittance). This suggests that despite NATO’s gender machinery, 
significant challenges remain to the integration of women in NATO militaries and a 
limit to NATO’s role as a ‘teaching machine’ in respect of gender. In this respect, 
UNSCR 1325 is being used instrumentally to advance an established agenda which 
has stalled. 
NATO’s gender machinery has provided a crucial focal point for the adoption of 
UNSCR 1325, in particular through the extension of the annual reports from member 
states to include monitoring on the implementation of UNSCR 1325, specifically 
through requesting information on the provision of training and education on UNSCR 
1325 (NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives, 2013). Although a requirement on 
member states for a number of years, the actual submission of national reports to the 
NOGP has been far from consistent (see Table 3). As discussed in Chapter Six, the 
appointment of the NATO Special Representative on WPS in 2012 has proven critical 
to NATO’s implementation of UNSCR 1325. In relation to NATO’s agenda to 
increase the representation of women in the military, her time in office has coincided 
with an increase in the submission of member states reports to the NCGP from 67% 
in 2011 to 96% in 2013, with just one-member state (Luxembourg) failing to submit 
a report (see Table 3). In this respect NATO’s implementation of a global gender norm 
has supported and provided additional momentum for a pre-existing institutional 
imperative agenda, outside of the original intentions of the feminists who supported 
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the adoption of UNSCR 1325 (see discussion in Chapter One). Moreover, it has taken 
political leadership (within NATO’s civilian structure) to support the agenda within 
NATO’s military structure. 
Table 3  
 
The participants in the 1961 Conference of Senior Women Officers continue to 
contribute annual reports on the status of women to the NCGP (see Table 3). Denmark, 
the convenor of the first conference, has a 100% record for submitting reports since 
2003, as does the UK, with the Netherlands not far behind with a 91% record. The US 
and Norway, however, have fallen behind in their commitment to monitor the status 
of women in the military having submitted only 64% and 73% of annual reports to the 
NCGP respectively in the same period. The case of Norway is a particular surprise 
Adopted Updated 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total %
1 Albania* N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A No No No Yes Yes 2 40%
2 Belgium 2009 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 10 91%
3 Bulgaria** N/A Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 9 90%
4 Canada 2010 Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 10 91%
5 Croatia* 2011 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A No No No No Yes 1 20%
6 Czech Republic No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 7 64%
7 Denmark 2005 2008 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 11 100%
8 Estonia** 2010 N/A No No No No No No No No Yes Yes 2 20%
9 France 2010 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes 7 64%
10 Germany 2012 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 10 91%
11 Greece Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 10 91%
12 Hungary Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Yes 9 82%
13 Iceland*** 2008 2013 0 0%
14 Italy 2010 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 11 100%
15 Latvia** N/A Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes 8 80%
16 Lithuania** 2011 N/A ? Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 80%
17 Luxembourg No No Yes No No No No Yes Yes No No 3 27%
18 Netherlands 2011 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 10 91%
19 Norway 2006 2011 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No Yes 8 73%
20 Poland Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 11 100%
21 Portugal 2009 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 10 91%
22 Romania** N/A Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 8 80%
23 Slovakia** N/A Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes 6 60%
24 Slovenia** 2011 N/A Yes Yes ? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 9 90%
25 Spain 2007 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 11 100%
26 Turkey Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 10 91%
27 UK 2006 2012 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 11 100%
28 US 2011 Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No No Yes Yes 7 64%
Total 17 4 15 22 23 21 21 21 12 19 18 21 26
61% 14% 79% 85% 88% 81% 81% 81% 44% 70% 67% 78% 96%
Not	a	NATO	member	in	this	year
****In 2009 the NATO Committee on Women in NATO Forces (CWINF) had its Terms of Reference revised and extended to include the implementation of UNSCR 1325. 
Since that moment, the Committee is recognized under the name of NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives (NCGP).
2012 marks the appointment of the NATO Secretary General Special Advisor on Women, Peace and Security
NATO member state reports to the NCGP, 2003-2013
Member state
UNSCR 1325 NAP National reports on women in the military submitted to NCGP****
*accession 2009
**accession 2004
***Iceland does not have a military and is not represented on the NCGP
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given that Norway adopted a NAP in 2006 (revised 2011) and the reports missing are 
from the period 2009 to 2012. Croatia in contrast has a poor record (20%) of 
submission to the NCGP, yet on the political level remains one of the most actively 
seized on the issue. The disjuncture between the military and political commitment of 
Croatia and Norway could in part be explained by the leading role given to the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in coordinating implementation of UNSCR 1325 (DCAF, 
2013).  The US in contrast follows a more expected pattern, with the US not adopting 
a NAP on UNSCR 1325 until 2011 but since then submitting annual reports. 
The NCGP also supports NATO’s role as a ‘teaching machine’ by organising an 
annual conference. In 2014, for example, the conference focused on the recruitment 
and retention of women in the armed forces, bringing together representatives from 24 
member and 7 partner states. They heard from experts in gender and Human Resources 
analysed best practice at the national level to agree on a set of recommendations (Fellin 
2014: 22).  
This organisational context provides a broader perspective on NATO’s adoption of 
UNSCR 1325, which finds that gender has been a component of NATO’s agenda for 
a considerable period of time. This has coincided with a general (though not 
significant) increase in the number of women in NATO member states armed forces 
but one supported in part by NATO’s gender machinery. As Knell, Grimes and 
McCourt (2014) note, the role of the NCGP is significant because it is here that ‘best 
practice is shared between member nations, and is fed into the NATO Military Council 
for dissemination through the military chains of command’ For example, the US had 
the largest number of women in the military in 1981 (8.4%) so played ‘tutor’ to other 
NATO members. (Enloe, 1981: 70). This supports lesson sharing as a top down 
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approach at NATO. The UK has also been explicit in acknowledging that 
consideration was given to the work of the Committee on Women in NATO Forces in 
its review of women in combat9 (MoD, 2010). This supports Enloe’s assertion that 
NATO is a ‘teaching machine’ learning lessons on best practice in respect of gender 
integration into NATO forces. 
(3.5) The role of NATO partnerships 
“Ashdown’s Law No.1” “The best things that you can do are what you do with 
others.” 
Lord Paddy Ashdown (date unknown), former NATO High 
Representative for Bosnia10 
 
The relationship between NATO and its partners has deepened as the Alliance has 
expanded its reach globally (Daalder and Goldgeier, 2006). For the purpose of this 
thesis, it is necessary to understand the role of NATO partnerships because NATO 
partners have proved central to both NATO’s adoption and implementation of UNSCR 
1325. This adds an additional dimension to understanding NATO’s partnerships, and 
challenges assumptions that partners have little to gain from NATO partnerships and 
are almost solely for NATO’s benefit. 
NATO partnerships are a post-Cold War innovation which began with the 
establishment of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme in 1994. PfP provided an 
alternative to NATO membership and aimed to transform the military forces of former 
                                                
9 Four years later, the 2014 Review omitted any reference to the NCGP. 
10 Quoted in (Shea in Aybet & Moore, 2010:29) 
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Warsaw Pact states (Forster and Wallace, 2001: 116). The PfP programme provided a 
platform through which ex-Warsaw Pact militaries could be retrained and socialised 
within a multilateral context to promote civilian control of the armed forces and has 
continued to prove beneficial in fostering military cooperation across Europe (Forster 
and Wallace, 2001: 116). The deepening relationship with partner countries, 
necessitated the establishment of a forum for consultation. The Euro-Atlantic 
Partnership Council (EAPC) was established in 1997 to provide a political framework 
for conducting relations with Partnership for Peace (PfP) countries and has since 
expanded to include 22 partner countries11, along with 28 allies (NATO, 2014h). This 
diverse and loosely grouped collection of countries forming the EAPC meet monthly 
at ambassadorial level, annually at the level of foreign or defence minister and 
sporadically at summits to discuss a multitude of security issues under the framework 
of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Work Programme, ranging from crisis-management 
and peace-support operations; to civil-military coordination of air traffic management; 
and scientific cooperation (NATO, 2014h). Many of these partners have played a 
significant role in supporting and contributing to the NATO-led International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan.  
In addition to the EAPC, a number of others cooperate with NATO through the 
Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperative, or on an ad hoc basis. The 
Mediterranean Dialogue was established in 1994 and the Istanbul Cooperative 
Initiative in 2004.  In contrast to EAPC where the focus is on political cooperation, 
                                                
11 The EAPC members (in addition to NATO members) are Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Finland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
Georgia, Ireland, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Malta, The Republic of Moldova, 
Montenegro, Russia, Serbia, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and 
Uzbekistan (NATO 2012f). 
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the focus of the Mediterranean Dialogue is primarily military, for example, providing 
training for partner countries (NATO, 2015c). The Mediterranean Dialogue is 
currently composed of seven members, these are: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, 
Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia (NATO, 2015c). The Istanbul Cooperative Initiative 
established at the NATO Summit in 2004 is the newest partnership agreement and 
includes just four partners. NATO originally invited the six members of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council to join the Istanbul Cooperative Initiative, however only four - 
Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates - accepted this invitation, with Saudi 
Arabia and Oman declining (NATO, 2011b). The partnership is based upon political 
dialogue and this is supported in the practical dimension with ICI partners having 
contributed to NATO operations. In addition to these two formal groupings of 
partners, NATO cooperates with a number of other states who are not part of these 
structures. The relationship is built upon a partnership agreement. These states are: 
Afghanistan, Australia, Iraq Japan, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and 
Mongolia (NATO, 2012f). 
 
(3.6) Conclusion 
This Chapter has introduced the theoretical framework underpinning this thesis. It has 
outlined a feminist approach to theorising NATO as a ‘teaching machine’, building on 
and going beyond Enloe’s (1983: 131) conception, to incorporate an understanding of 
how NATO functions as an organisation through both military and political/civilian 
structures. This identified that NATO is best understood as a ‘political community in 
the realm of security’ (Kitchen, 2010: 4). The Chapter has demonstrated that in order 
to understand how NATO functions as an organisation, it is necessary to understand 
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how NATO has evolved beyond the organisation established by the North Atlantic 
Treaty. In particular, the commitment to collective defence, outlined in Article 5 may 
continue to shape how many states view the Alliance but NATO is much more than 
the sum of its parts. The signing of the North Atlantic Treaty has led to security and 
defence becoming the primary basis for the trans-Atlantic relationship (Medcalf, 2008: 
13). And while, the US (in particular) and the UK and France, have been the most 
influential allies, it is important not to discount the agency of smaller states to utilise 
NATO’s structure in pursuit of their own agenda. 
The Chapter then turned to examine NATO’s history of transformation. NATO has 
proved adept at transformation and not just in the post-Cold War period. Rather, the 
1967 Harmel Report was an early example of NATO transformation, in part, in 
reaction to France’s withdrawal from NATO’s integrated command structure. Post-
Cold War NATO survival was far from a foregone conclusion, the move towards 
‘cooperative security’ and the greater involvement of NATO partners has been key to 
NATO’s transformation. The Strategic Concepts have also been important to 
articulating a cohesive narrative surrounding the relevance of the organisation and 
represent an example of innovation, a strategy employed by organisations in order to 
survive (Hage 1999: 599). It is against this backdrop that NATO’s adoption of UNSCR 
1325 should be understood. 
In order to understand how NATO functions as a gendered institution, the Chapter 
turned to examine the place of women within the Alliance. This identified women as 
noticeable by their absence from senior leadership positions but meeting NATO’s 
(unbalanced) conception of gender balance in administrative roles, which NATO 
defines as a 60-40 split. This contributed to outlining how NATO’s gender regime is 
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underpinned by a particular militarised form of hegemonic masculinity, which shapes 
the Alliance’s role as an extreme example of a gendered organisation.  
The Chapter drew attention to the long history of organising around the status of 
women in NATO forces within the organisation and against which NATO’s adoption 
of UNSCR 1325 must be understood. This drew attention to the role of critical actors 
or femocrats who proved pivotal in supporting the establishment of the Committee on 
Women in NATO Forces and the later establishment of an office to support the role 
of the Committee. In drawing attention to this under examined component of NATO’s 
history, it is possible to see the potential for supporting feminist agendas even within 
resistant organisations, including UNSCR 1325. This section also outlined examples 
of where NATO has served as a ‘teaching machine’ in respect of the status of women 
in NATO forces, including the Netherlands and the US serving as test cases for 
integration and the UK stating it had taken into account the work of the CWINF when 
reviewing its own combat exclusion policy.  
The next part of the Chapter examined the creation of NATO partnerships post-Cold 
War, examining the way in which NATO’s relationships with its partners have evolved 
and expanded, with NATO now cooperating with 37 partner states (NATO, 2015f). 
These partnerships are conducted through forums, including EAPC, the Istanbul 
Cooperative and Mediterranean Dialogue, and also directly with states situated 
globally outside of these forums. This outlined the formal channels through which 
partner states relations with NATO are conducted, which is of particular relevance to 
understanding how NATO came to adopt a policy on UNSCR 1325 in conjunction 
with EAPC.   
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Researching International Security Institutions  
(4.0) Introduction  
This chapter outlines the main methodological considerations and approaches 
underpinning this thesis. Methodology is understood as the theory and analysis of how 
research does or should proceed (Harding, 1987: 2) or ‘theory about methods’ 
(Shepherd, 2013:1). This chapter is important because it draws attention to the 
disjuncture between feminist approaches and the mainstream of IR through the prism 
of methodology. The mainstream, or malestream, is understood as IR theory which 
perpetuates a ‘a distorted and partial world view that reflects the disproportionate 
power of control and influence that men hold, rather than the full social reality of the 
lives of women, children and men’ (Youngs, 2004 :76). The disjuncture between the 
two centres upon mainstream approaches privilege of methods to test a problem, in 
contrast to feminist approaches, which identify a problem and then identify the most 
suitable method(s) to address that question. The marginalisation of feminist research 
is a self-perpetuating process, which impacts not just on the positioning of the research 
within the discipline but also the individual (economic) security of the researcher. 
The Chapter is structured into two parts. The first part situates feminist methodology 
within International Relations and a wider discussion of feminist epistemology and 
ontology, including a discussion of feminist ethics. It argues that a feminist informed 
approach is a necessity for the study of an international security institution embodying 
hegemonic masculinity, rather than one of many options. The second part of this 
section acknowledges the particular challenges facing feminist informed research and 
feminist researchers in terms of both the value placed on their research and their 
individual career trajectories.  
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The second section of the Chapter outlines the research design and provide a 
justification for the methods this thesis employs to address the research questions, 
incorporating elite interviews and content analysis. In doing so, it acknowledges that 
elite interviews have been little used by feminist IR scholars and the Chapter therefore 
contributes to outlining a feminist approach to elite interviews. In line with a 
commitment to feminist reflexivity throughout the research process, this section 
reflects upon power and the particular difficulties researching an international security 
institution provides.  
 
(4.1) Situating Feminist Methodology 
This section justifies the necessity of a feminist methodology to interrogate this 
research puzzle. In very general terms, adopting a feminist methodology, entails 
rejection positivist claims to objective knowledge and enables the researcher to ask a 
wider range of questions and to choose appropriate methods to investigate the given 
problem, rather than being driven by a method to ask a particular testable question. 
This section outlines two key considerations in relations to adopting a feminist 
methodology. First, it outlines what a feminist approach to methodology looks like, 
including its likely considerations and preoccupations. Second, this section addresses 
the personal and political challenges to pursuing a feminist research project. Together 
these considerations underline the necessity of a feminist methodology and also make 
visible the challenges to pursuing such an approach. 
 
(4.1.1) Performing feminist methodology in IR 
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Feminist scholars make a valuable contribution to International Relations by exposing 
silences through employing methodology deemed unacceptable by mainstream IR. For 
instance Enloe (1983) was the first to look at the role of wives, examining the role 
military wives play in supporting militarism. Enloe later reflected that this at the time 
was a ‘risky thing to do’ (Enloe and Zalewski, 2010: 141) but that it allowed her to 
learn that the state was fragile because of its dependence on a group of people seen as 
insignificant to politics and that as a result of this dependence the state has to expend 
resources to control this group of women (Enloe and Zalewski, 2010: 141). In going 
beyond the formal construction of organisations and politics Enloe exposed the 
political nature of women’s roles, which mainstream approaches to organisation 
theory and International Relations cannot capture because they fall outside of what 
mainstream IR defines as a valid field of enquiry. 
Feminist methodology positions the researcher differently from mainstream 
approaches to International Relations and security studies. Feminist approaches to 
gender, treat gender no longer as a variable, but as an underpinning category of 
analysis, which enables the researcher to investigate how international politics is 
constituted by gender (and vice versa). Feminist approaches are problem driven and 
often draw across disciplines and upon multiple methods to address their research 
question. Feminist research is also underpinned by a normative commitment, and it is 
important to note here that this normative commitment makes it no less rigorous in the 
way that it approaches data gathering and analysis.  
Sjoberg characterises feminist method as ‘not an event or a performance but a 
journey—a journey of critique, revealing, reformulating, and reflexivity’ (Laura 
Sjoberg, 2009: 193). Indeed feminist methodology distinguishes feminist security 
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studies from other approaches to security (Tickner, 2006: 22; Wibben, 2011: 594).  
Feminist epistemology recognises that knowledge is co-constituted between the 
researcher and research participant or subject. This entails rejecting the false 
dichotomy between subjective and objective knowledge, and recognising that 
‘knowledge is necessarily contextual, contingent, and interested’ (Sjoberg, 2009: 192). 
All knowledge building is a political project and positivists deny this by claiming a 
false objectivity. The feminist political project is driven by feminist praxis to uncover 
– and thereby challenge – silences within international security and the study of it. 
Feminist International Relations scholars draw upon a different epistemological 
grounding than mainstream IR scholars and this means that their realities are very 
different. The discipline of International Relations remains dominated by positivist 
approaches, particularly in the US, and has therefore proved an unsupportive 
environment for the development of theoretical and methodological innovations. As a 
result, IR is in danger of being defined by its methodological approaches rather than 
the subject of the research (Tickner, 2005: 2177). In contrast, the methods employed 
by feminist security studies scholars remain broad and are expanding. For example, 
Wibben's (2010) work on narratives in IR. Scholars whose research is grounded in the 
use of scientific methodologies, find feminist methodologies challenging because they 
perceive them as atheoretical criticisms (Tickner, 1997: 612). 
There are a multitude of feminist approaches to IR and, with the exception of the 
feminist standpoint tradition, they would struggle to be reconciled with mainstream 
IR. Feminist security studies remains problem driven and so for mainstream IR to 
engage with feminism ‘would present a fundamental challenge to the epistemological 
foundations of the field’ (Tickner, 2005: 2173). In addition, a critical feminist ontology 
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is irreconcilable with the ontology of mainstream IR, based on states operating in an 
anarchical system, because it takes gender relations as its principle category of analysis 
and analysis begins with ‘individuals and the social relations in which their lives are 
situated’ (Tickner, 2005: 2177).  
To conclude, feminist research is driven by a ‘feminist curiosity’ (Enloe, 2004) to 
unpack a problem, not to test the method employed. The adoption of a feminist 
approach to methodology challenges the invisibility of ‘gendered absences, silences, 
differences, and oppressions’ (Ackerly and True, 2008: 695) surrounding the  research 
process because it entails the adoption of feminist ethics. The application of feminist 
ethics is particularly important when studying an international security institution, 
such as NATO, which embodies a particular militarised hegemonic masculinity. This 
challenges the researcher to actively identify power constructs which may bias the 
research.  
 
(4.2) Research Design (Methods) 
This previous section outlined the necessity of a problem driven approach to research, 
which allows the researcher to select the most appropriate methods to solve the 
problem, rather than being driven to use a particular set of methods. It is important to 
reiterate that feminist research is feminist not because of the method(s) it employs but 
because it is problem driven and is underpinned by a particular theoretical 
methodology (Ackerly, Stern, and True, 2006: 5). This thesis contributes a feminist 
methodological approach to studying international security institutions. In doing so, it 
acknowledges that the study of international security institutions poses a particular set 
of challenges for feminist researchers, whose approach to knowledge building, as co-
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constitutive, normally requires input from the researched. This is a means of 
empowering women both through the research process and with the results (Wibben, 
2010:18). In studying international security institutions feminists are by extension 
studying those with access to power – the majority of whom are men - in order to 
expose how these institutions function. However, as this thesis goes on to identify, the 
existence of femocrats (both men and women) working within these institutions does 
offer feminist researchers an opportunity to work towards supporting their 
empowerment and co-constituting knowledge for resistance within the organisations 
(see discussion in Chapter Six). In order to do so effectively, feminist scholars need to 
engage in reflexivity on their own perception of individuals working for change within 
organisations, because as Ferguson (2014) highlights many in academia discard the 
contribution of gender experts without an understanding of the context in which they 
operate. 
This section is structured in two parts. The first, contributes a feminist approach to 
elite interviewing and outlines elite interviews were a necessary part of this research 
process. The second, outlines a feminist approach to content analysis, outlining how 
this method was applied to facilitate addressing the research puzzle. 
 
(4.2.1) Elite interviews 
This thesis draws upon both primary and secondary sources and although much of the 
information can be found in open sources - including scholarly work and NATO 
documentation – closed sources offered a necessary addition. Therefore, consideration 
is given to the discussions which occurred behind closed doors in the form of elite 
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interviews, in order to understand NATO’s adoption of UNSCR 1325 as fully as 
possible. Elite interviews were conducted with individuals working at NATO on the 
implementation of UNSCR 1325. These individuals were drawn from both the 
permanent staffs (International Staff, International Military Staff or Military 
Authorities) and national delegations (member and partner). During the first set of 
interviews in February 2014 I employed the ‘snowballing technique’ to recruit further 
participants for the second set of interviews conducted in June 2014. In total 21 
interviews were conducted with officials working for or at NATO and based in 
Belgium or the USA. The interviews took place over a six-month period between 
February 2014 and August 2014, this included two visits to Belgium and one to the 
US. All of the interviews were conducted on condition of anonymity. For this reason, 
no distinction is made in the thesis between individuals employed directly by NATO 
or by national delegations.  
The interviews took the form of semi-structured confidential interviews in order to 
gather deep background information on the nature of NATO’s implementation of 
UNSCR 1325. The confidential nature of the interviews offered the opportunity for 
the interview participant to engage more openly with the questions, rather than 
consider answers structured for public consumption. The interview responses 
pinpointed areas for investigation within relevant policy documents and drew attention 
to the impact of organisational dynamics on policy, in addition to the role of critical 
actors, including femocrats. 
The definition of an ‘elite’ interview and problematising the categorisation of the 
‘elite’ is crucial for reflecting on how I approached my interviews. The dichotomy 
between elite and non-elite research participants is problematic and yet few studies 
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have directly addressed the falseness of this distinction, particularly research projects 
in IR and Political Science. Much of the literature on elites remains ‘superficial and 
atheoretical’ (Woods, 1998: 2101) and fails to consider how our understanding of 
power feeds into who we categorise as an elite. Smith (2006: 646) argues that it is not 
a simple process to identify individuals who exercise power to shape policy because 
this could take place through informal networks. Instead, he advocates employing the 
term elite not as a label but to define ‘the specific genre within which the interviewees 
do most of their work’ (Smith, 2006: 646). This leaves open the possibility for the 
researcher to discover that an elite they are interviewing actually has no influence or 
power over a given situation, despite their job title and responsibilities suggesting 
otherwise. It also reinforces the need for a reflexive research processes. In taking this 
possibility into consideration the researcher is able to reflect on why that individual 
may not be in a position to influence certain outcomes. The presumption that because 
they are an elite, they possess power limits the possible outcomes and limits the 
reliability of the researcher’s findings. In presuming that those in an identified elite 
group exercise power researchers create another silence in our understanding of how 
policy decisions are made and excludes the possibility that alternate actors not 
identified as belonging to that elite group may have exercised power.  
The interviews I conducted were semi-structured. This is preferable over quantitative 
analysis for elite interviews because it enables the identification of a narrative. In 
addition, it ensures that my research investigates gender identity, rather than drawing 
on categorisation according to sex and acknowledging that men and women’s attitudes 
and behaviours may be distinct from their sex (Childs and Krook, 2006: 23). This 
serves to overcome a problem identified by (Kronsell, 2006) in conducting interviews 
with only women recruits in the Swedish military, these women felt singled out and 
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were reluctant to draw attention to themselves or differentiate themselves further. 
Interviewing only women also serves to exacerbate the issue that gender is often 
perceived to equate only to women and falls short of the intentions of feminist scholars 
to transform not just observe gender dynamics. Interviews with men are also likely to 
illuminate men’s attitudes to changing gender dynamics. This also heeds the note of 
caution feminist researchers must take in order to mitigate the risk of influencing the 
results of their research. Childs and Krook (2006: 23) cite the example of research on 
women’s substantive representation, where researchers often choose to conduct 
interviews with only women. This only gives one side of the story, the women’s 
experience, and in overlooking the attitude of men limits an understanding of any 
change in gender dynamics which would be gained from a full balanced analysis of 
the situation. 
As a feminist researcher, I aim to uncover silences and to do this requires reflection 
on the power relationships between the researcher and elite. This requires being open 
about my research methods and the reasons I have chosen them, but beyond this it 
necessitates an acknowledgement of the limitations of my research. For feminist 
research to be transformative it is necessary to understand how power dictates the 
parameters of the interview and to continue to be reflexive on these dynamics before, 
during and after the interview. This is supportive of the feminist research ethic means 
seeking to transform and not simply explain (Ackerly and True, 2010: 2).  
First, before examining the power relations in the interview setting itself, it is 
necessary to contextualise the wider research process and the power relations within 
it. For example, reflecting on my own position as a white, privileged woman 
researcher who has been able to successfully utilise professional contacts to gain 
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access to NATO elites, suggests I already have some knowledge of the power system 
and have been able to use it to my own advantage. In this sense I am not too far 
removed from the ‘system’ itself and must acknowledge that my analysis of the 
situation, however unconsciously, is influenced by this position. I cannot strive for 
objectivity because this is un achievable. However, I can be rigorous in my approach 
to the research process, enabling me to strive for the closest representation of a 
‘reality’, while always acknowledging the particular position from which this ‘reality’ 
is presented from. 
The process of employing feminist ethics necessitates being conscious in the research 
process of the effect constructed boundaries can have on marginalising, excluding and 
producing silences. It is not only the relationships and power dynamics within NATO 
which must be taken into consideration but also the relationship between the 
researcher and elite. As a feminist scholar it is necessary to be attentive to and critically 
reflective of this issue in order to contribute responsibly to IR scholarship (Ackerly 
and True, 2008: 698). Assumptions about power emerge in the relationship between 
the researcher and elite in the interview setting. Here it is necessary to move beyond a 
superficial understanding of the interaction taking place to understand the complexity 
of it. In conducting elite interviews, there is a danger that elites are treated as 
something of a threat to the researcher and in some cases that the same ethical 
considerations are not applied to interviews with elites as with non-elites (Smith 
2006). In most cases this is because the researcher draws on a structuralist conception 
of power, as something which is possessed rather than routinely exercised by the elite 
group (Smith 2006). The presumption that the elite possesses power extends to 
presume that non-elite interviewees do not possess and therefore cannot possess 
power. This is problematic not only because it removes agency from the non-elite 
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interviewees but because it presumes the interviewer is vulnerable to the elite subject 
(and not vice versa). For example, Smith (2006) found that in conducting interviews 
with elites many expressed a higher level of ‘self-reflection, uncertainty and 
nervousness’ than was expected. If this logic is left unchallenged then the researcher 
has essentially limited the scope of what they can find before they have conducted the 
research. The focus should therefore be on trust between the two individuals, with the 
elite in a vulnerable position, relying on the researcher to live up to their commitment 
to keep the discussion confidential. This element of the interaction could shape the 
nature of the interview and the amount the elite is comfortable disclosing. 
As a feminist scholar it is necessary to be attentive to - and critically reflective of - the 
relationships and power dynamics between research and research subjects in order to 
contribute responsibly to IR scholarship (Ackerly and True, 2008: 698). It is inevitable 
that in conducting interviews, power imbalances occur between the researcher and 
participant. Usually this places the researcher as exercising power over the participant, 
which creates difficulties for attempting to rebalance this relationship because 
ultimately the interview is being conducted to find out information beneficial to the 
researcher and this creates a one way flow of information (Kirsch, 2005: 2165). 
Employing feminist ethics must then involve ‘delineating clear boundaries between 
researcher and participant, so that neither unwittingly compromises expectations of 
friendship, confidentiality, and trust’ (Kirsch, 2005: 2166). Kirsch (2005: 2169) 
suggests drawing on the researcher’s role as a teacher to act as a guide for conducting 
relations with participants, while acknowledging the differences in time, authority and 
commitment between the two roles. The value this conception of the researcher-
participant relationship can give is that it gives a clear differentiation between 
‘friendliness’ and ‘friendship’ (Kirsch 2005: 2169). This can be modified for the 
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conduct of elite interviews, where it is the elite who has the knowledge and expertise 
the researcher is interested in, this requires the researcher to position themselves as the 
facilitator of the conversation. In doing so, the researcher retains control of the 
situation and has a clearly designated role. 
The exercise of power in elite interviews cannot be understood as unidirectional, it can 
be a two-way process, or directed from the elite to the researcher, or even vice versa. 
As Enloe (2003) argues there is a need to be alert in conducting research in institutions 
embodying hegemonic masculinity because masculinities are not fixed and must be 
contextualised. A number of researchers have reflected on the power dynamics within 
elite interviews. Conti and Neil (2007) describe the feelings of despondency during 
elite interviews at being ‘talked down to’ by participants. In order to unpack the impact 
of these power dynamics on the research findings it is necessary to examine: 1) the 
specificities of feminist informed research and the co-constitution of knowledge; 2) 
the influence of the interview setting on the power imbalance and; 3) the specificities 
of gender-dynamics between researcher and interviewee in research conducted by a 
woman on gender. 
The interviewer-interviewee power relationship impacts not only how the interviews 
are conducted but the knowledge claims which the researcher produces, especially 
given feminist researchers acknowledgement of the co-constitution of knowledge 
from interviews. Careful consideration must therefore be given to the parameters of 
these knowledge claims and the manner in which they are presented. Cohn highlights 
some of the difficulties of researching institutions embodying hegemonic masculinity, 
Cohn’s research on nuclear defence experts drew attention to ‘the dangers’ (Cohn, 
1987: 714) of learning the language of defence intellectuals. This is a necessity to 
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understanding how security institutions work but Cohn found that she normalised the 
problematic language as her research continued. This Cohn called the ‘militarization 
of the mind’ (Cohn, 1987: 714). This poses a threat to a feminist methodology which 
aims to ‘challenge beliefs and practices previously assumed to be acceptable, unified 
and natural’ (Kronsell, 2012: 283). In using both content analysis and elite interviews 
I attempted to mitigate the difficulties Cohn (1987) faced in her use of participant 
observation. The power relationship between the interviewer-interviewee represents a 
crucial juncture of feminist informed research because of its fluid nature. Therefore, 
reflexivity must play an important role for any researcher using interviews. 
The setting for an interview can dictate the power dynamics between the researcher 
and interviewee. The most suitable setting for interviews is an issue open to contention 
and is a particularly important issue to consider given the impact it can have on both 
the power relationship between the interviewer-interviewee. This is not just an issue 
which should be considered when conducting elite interviews (Smith, 2006: 652) but 
is particularly salient for my research given my aim of understanding how NATO 
functions as a security institution. The nature of elite interviews means that inevitably 
they are conducted in a setting dictated by the interviewee. One advantage of this is 
that it provides an opportunity for understanding the ‘familiar scenes of everyday 
activities, treated by members as the ‘natural facts of life’ (Garfinkel, 1967: 35) and is 
of relevance to unpacking the working of security institutions.  
The interviews I conducted predominantly took place in the office of the interviewee 
or a meeting room, with the exception of two which took place in the NATO canteen. 
Those which took place in the office found the interviewee sat in their desk and I was 
sat opposite them. This led to a power imbalance in the favour of the interviewer, who 
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looked as if they were very much in control of the situation. These dynamics were 
mitigated slightly in the interviews in meeting rooms (either around a table or in a 
more relaxed seating area) and these felt like more of a ‘neutral’ meeting ground. The 
interviews conducted in the NATO canteen addressed this imbalance even further, 
although the public setting made it difficult to draw out answers to difficult questions 
and the interview was frequently interrupted by others dropping past to say ‘hello’ to 
me or the interviewee. 
Although, race/ethnicity, class, professional status or position as an elite, age, sexual 
identity have been noted to influence power dynamics between the researcher and 
research participant, Sallee and Harris (2011) suggest that gender becomes the 
dominant variable in research explicitly focusing on gender and masculinities. Cross-
gender interactions within the interview process have an influence on the outcome of 
the interview. Williams and Heikes (1993) study found that male nurses responded 
differently to female and male researchers by providing different answers to the same 
question. Sallee and Harris's (2011) study of gender and masculinities within 
universities found that their ‘gender led participants to make assumptions about how 
they were expected to portray themselves as men within interviews’ (2011: 410).  In 
addition, as the participants were aware that the study was about gender and 
masculinities there was a heightened awareness of how they presented themselves and 
performed gender within the interviews (Salle and Harris, 2011: 410). Understanding 
gender as performative allows for an understanding of how gender influences research 
findings to be considered. The discussion of gender issues with men is complicated by 
the typical male socialisation, which teaches them to avoid engaging on issues which 
are outside that socially constructed as masculine (Salle and Harris, 2011: 411). It is 
not just the research participant who is performing gender, the researcher also 
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performs gender. West and Zimmerman (1987: 127) argue that gender is situated 
within the context in which individuals perform gender. Although it is the individuals 
who ‘do’ gender it is the interactions through which they perform gender and the 
institutional setting, which are significant. 
A feminist approach to interviews also necessitates a focus on listening for silences in 
responses, and as such enables the research to identify what has not been said, in 
addition to what has been said (Sjoberg and Tickner, 2011: 142). Identifying silences 
is only possible when the researcher employs ‘feminist curiosity’ to engage with what 
is being said and not said, rather than relying on an assumption that the researcher 
knows which questions to ask. This is particularly important for the conduct of elite 
interviews, where participants may be hesitant to answer a question or provide certain 
information and it may mean the researcher has to change, rephrase or add a question 
on the spot. Ultimately though, silence can be an important indicator of the sensitivity 
of a certain topic or broader organisational politics. 
Feminist researchers have questioned the predominance of scientific epistemology 
within International Relations, which argues that objectivity and distance from 
research are possible and a necessity. Despite this, as Sylvester (2011: 687) argues, 
these rules are quietly adhered to by feminist IR researchers. Indeed, not doing so 
could reinforce gender stereotypes (Sylvester, 2011: 687). However, in not discussing 
the emotions experienced by feminist IR scholars in conducting their research are 
silenced and they become perceived as ‘superhuman’, which in turn may serve to deter 
others entering the discipline (Marshall, 2011: 690). Marshall (2011: 690) finds that 
where emotion is discussed in feminist research it is left to the margins and found in 
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introductions or conclusions, or merely hinted at only visible on a second or third 
reading of the text. 
Reflecting on the impact of emotion on research is just as salient for those conducting 
research in international organisations, as it is for those in war zones. It is necessary 
to acknowledge that conducting elite interviews in a ‘safe’ environment (such as an 
international organisation like NATO, with offices in Belgium and the USA) will not 
invoke the same emotions as conducting research in a conflict zone, where the 
researcher is aware that they are personally at risk, even if the researcher’s emotions 
are still at play. In preparation for conducting my interviews, I tried to prepare myself 
for the emotional impact of the experience by reflecting on the power hierarchies at 
play and my position as the researcher. I used a fieldwork diary to reflect on and record 
my experiences of conducting the interviews, a practice used for example by Higate 
and Cameron (2006). This helped me to identify the silences in how my interviewees 
responded to questions and to draw out what were perhaps the most challenging 
questions to be answered. For example, one interviewee called me a ‘clever girl’ when 
I asked a question about UNSCR 1325 and the role of partner countries. Their slightly 
patronising language suggested the Resolution has become a key part of NATO-
partner relations, as such I looked into this aspect further and it now forms a core part 
of my thesis. 
 
(4.2.2) Content analysis  
In addition to elite interviews, this thesis utilised content analysis. No method in the 
social sciences can truly strive for objectivity, nor is this a valid goal because it 
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overlooks the role of the researcher in co-constituting knowledge. To ensure validity 
the results of content analysis should be replaceable so it is necessary to be transparent 
on how the method is applied. (Krippendorff, 2012: 5). In this respect, computer-aided 
content analysis is one of the more practical ways of analysing various forms of 
communication including text, images and interview transcripts because it is efficient, 
systematic and replicable. 
Content analysis has normally aimed to describe rather than explain (Leavy, 2000), 
however, it is increasingly being used for exploratory and explanatory research 
(Ackerly and True, 2010: 191). This makes it compatible with a feminist 
transformative agenda. A feminist approach to content analysis requires an 
understanding of not just the text/artefacts but also the processes of their production 
(Reinharz, 1992: 145). This necessitates a problem driven approach, which takes the 
starting point as conceiving of the research question(s) before applying them to the 
analysis of the text in order to provide an empirical grounding for the findings 
(Krippendorff, 2012: 37). Krippendorf (2012: 37) argues that preconceived research 
questions also allow the researcher to approach the analysis in a critical way by reading 
a text for a purpose, rather than for what the author may want them to read from the 
content. 
Bacchi (1999) conceptualises a particular problem driven approach by asking ‘what’s 
the problem presented to be?’, this provides a useful starting point for guiding feminist 
informed content analysis. Bacchi’s approach is different from one which asks how 
and why certain issues make it onto the political agenda. Instead, in focusing on what 
does make it onto the agenda it is possible to identify how the construction of these 
problems limits the range of possible outcomes and defines what is (un)desirable 
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(Bacchi, 1999: 3). This leads her to argue that ‘policy responses need to be understood 
as part of the discursive construction of the ‘problem’ (Bacchi, 1999: 8). Although 
Bacchi focuses on social problems, this approach can be extended to international 
governance to provide insight into the construction of problems. 
Content analysis draws on the strengths of both quantitative and qualitative 
approaches allowing for the analysis of the text at two levels. At the first level, the 
content of the text can be analysed to reveal the frequency of words used allowing for 
the quantification of the content and for it to be presented in text statistics. This form 
of descriptive research has a long history in feminist scholarship, particularly in the 
study of women and the media. For example Bode and Henning’s (2012) study of 
media coverage of the 2018 US Vice-Presidential candidates. At the second level, the 
researcher can draw out the latent meaning of the text which requires further 
interpretation. The quantitatively defined patterns identified act as the guide for the 
second level of qualitative analysis allowing for the interpretation of the meaning of 
these patterns, moving beyond the descriptive to engage in an explanatory analysis of 
the data, congruent with the feminist praxis underpinning this thesis. 
As Reinharz (1992: 145-147) notes there are two key advantages for feminist 
researchers of employing content analysis. First, the researcher has not taken part in 
the construction or constitution of the item and knowledge it embodies. Second, the 
theme extracted from the data is separated from the researcher’s own political 
discourse and represents the discourse of the individual(s) who created the item and is 
reflective of the social context in which they did so (Reinharz, 1992: 145-147). In 
addition, three key practical and methodological benefits are identified by Duriau et 
al (2007). First, the coding scheme can be corrected if flaws are identified during the 
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analysis. Second, the analysis, when done correctly, is replicable, making it verifiable. 
Third, content analysis lends itself particularly well to use with other methods for the 
purpose of triangulation (Duriau et al., 2007: 7). 
There are also drawbacks associated with the use of content analysis, which need to 
be acknowledged and addressed. A central one is that documents produced by the 
organisation are biased for different audiences and therefore may not be reflective of 
strategic decision making, making intent difficult to identify (Duriau, Reger and 
Pfarrer, 2007: 16). Annual reports and speeches are likely to provide a different picture 
to reports and memos intended for internal consumption. Nevertheless, there is 
considerable value in identifying the message that an organisation wishes to present 
to the outside world because this identifies the value placed on that particular policy 
in relation to the organisation’s identity. This ties in with Bacchi's (1999) approach of 
identifying how the problem is presented in policy responses. Further insight can also 
be drawn if there is a disjuncture between policy provisions and public statements and 
the reality of the implementation of the policy by the organisation. In order to establish 
the reality of NATO’s implementation of UNSCR 1325 is therefore necessary to draw 
on multiple sources of data for the content analysis. The triangulation of the the content 
analysis with semi-structured interviews serves as a check on the findings of the 
content analysis and identify any disjuncture between rhetoric and policy. 
The issue of rationality in policy making is also necessary to consider when conducting 
content analysis. First of all because identifying rationality in policy making can be 
problematic, especially because rationality is frequently conceived of in public policy 
literature as the best fit between means and goals resulting in the production of 
consistency. Rather, as Lombardo and Meier (2009) contend rationality could produce 
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inconsistency in policy documents if a policy is framed to strategically link with 
existing dominant goals. Looking for rationality in this sense also presumes an 
oversimplified policy making process and that policy making is a homogenised 
process, rather than one which can take many different forms, which may not fit an 
external conception of rationality. Further than this, time is a consideration in our 
understanding of consistency, a policy may appear consistent at the time it is written 
but look inconsistent when analysed at another time because of the dynamic process 
of policy making (Lombardo and Meier, 2009: 138). Therefore, we must understand 
consistency as ‘consistency in a specific moment or context’, and define it as an 
‘attempt to pursue some coherence in the framing of a policy issue’ (Lombardo and 
Meier, 2009: 138).  
This thesis draws upon content analysis of policy documents and reports intended for 
external consumption. Drawing on both of these sources has two advantages. First, it 
provides an understanding of the message NATO intends an external audience(s) to 
receive on its implementation of UNSCR 1325. This is particularly salient given the 
role provided for NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division in implementing UNSCR 1325 
(NATO, 2007: 4.1), indicating NATO has a concern with how their implementation 
of UNSCR 1325 is perceived. Second, this external perception can be contrasted with 
the reality of the implementation of the Resolution within NATO by drawing on 
documents intended (also) for internal consumption and the elite interviews.  
Documents and content for analysis were gathered from multiple sources intended for 
both internal and external consumption and this process started in October 2012. This 
includes policies related to the implementation of UNSCR 1325, including all three 
iterations of the NATO/EAPC Policy on UNSCR 1325 and related military command, 
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Bi-Strategic Command 40-1 (see discussion in Chapter Five). In addition, the 
Secretary General’s annual  
This thesis used the computer aided qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS), 
NVivo. CAQDAS provides a number of advantages for researchers and can reveal 
patterns within the text, using the text search and word frequency functions, which can 
then be further analysed qualitatively. The other advantage of CAQDAS is that it 
allows the researcher to carry out analysis on a large body of text efficiently with the 
use of automatic coding, while also enabling the researcher to examine the actual text 
segments coded by the software to confirm they were coded correctly. 
In addition to text, I also examine images as part of my content analysis of NATO’s 
implementation of UNSCR 1325, looking at two particular images used by NATO and 
the UK (see: Figure 1 and Figure 2), in addition to analysis of the NATO Public 
Diplomacy Division’s web-documentary Return to Hope (see discussion in Chapter 
Seven). The incorporation of images into my analysis is importance because of their 
increasing use in communications facilitated by new media technologies (Hansen, 
2010: 53) and the integral part visual communication plays in NATO’s public 
diplomacy strategy. It is therefore important to examine this form of communication 
because of its role in constructing ‘contemporary popular culture’ (Weber, 2008: 138). 
Meaning can be drawn from both the image itself and the textual discourse 
surrounding the image and, as Lena Hansen, argues there is a need to look at both 
(Hansen, 2000: 54). In addition, supplementing linguistic analysis with analysis of 
visual communications allows for a better understanding of the location of power 
(Weber, 2008: 152), especially when as Enloe argues ‘so much of intellectual life is 
about the meaning of images’ (Enloe and Zalewski, 1998: 139-140). However, as 
157 
 
Enloe found her own seminal work Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist 
Sense of International Politics (1989) was easy to dismiss because it was trivialised 
for its use of images (Enloe and Zalewski, 1998: 139-140). In this respect using 
content analysis is particularly advantageous because it is a rigorous approach which 
allows for systematic and replicable analysis of the images.  
(4.2.3) A Case Study approach 
The use of qualitative case studies in the sub-discipline of International Relations has 
been as important as quantitative approaches, in contrast to Political Science where 
quantativate methods have predominated (Bennett and Elman 2007). This is because 
qualitative approaches offer the researcher a better advantage in studying complex 
phenomena (Bennett & Elman, 2006a; Mahoney & Goertz, 2006). The case study 
method should be understood as a particular way of defining cases, it does not 
prescribe a particular approach to methodology or analysis (Gerring, 2004). This 
understanding is the starting point for addressing some of the travails the case study 
has faced within Political Science.  
The prevalence of case studies does not mean the approach has been without its critics. 
The critique that the use of a case study absolves the author from methodological 
consideration (Maoz, 2002) is a sweeping critique which does not apply universally. 
As Bennett and Elman (2007:172) note, the use of case studies does not mean that 
studies are carried out without rigour and their use increasingly coincides with 
considerable methodological considerations. They also counter that the use of multi-
method approaches, as this thesis draws upon, is an advantage. This is particularly 
important in this thesis because while the interview data is necessarily kept 
confidential, the content analysis is replicable. The documents used are freely 
available from the NATO website and I have described in detail the queries used in 
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NVivo while outlining the analysis. Case studies offer an important and necessary 
contribution to improving our understanding of internatintional politics.  
A key advantage of case studies and one which underpins this thesis is that the 
intenstive study of a case allows for the development of focused concepts (Bennett 
and Elman, 2007: 179). The deep engagement with a subject, both theory and case, 
gives them ‘an unusal capacity to see the general in the particular’ (Collier, 1999: 4). 
In this thesis that has been the conceptualisation of NATO as a ‘teaching machine’ 
and an indepth focus on NATO as a gendered institution, something neglected by 
NATO studies. In doing so this not only contributes a particular theory of how NATO 
functions in this regard but supports feminist praxis in drawing attention to a key 
silence in NATO studies and also feminist IR (as discussed in Chapter Two). The use 
of a case study can therefore contribute valuable conceptual innovation. This is 
supported by the problem driven approach of this research project underpinned by 
feminist ethics. 
 
 
(4.3) Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that a feminist informed methodology is a necessity for the 
study of international security institutions. Further, it has argued that rejecting 
positivist knowledge claims enables this research to be problem driven, rather than 
driven to test a particular set of methods. Doing so enables this research to draw upon 
the most appropriate methods to examine NATO’s implementation of UNSCR 1325. 
This means that it is necessary to reflect upon and justify the methods employed in 
this thesis and a feminist informed approach enables the researcher to do this and 
reflect upon power dynamics throughout the research process. To summarise, these 
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extensive methodological considerations are central to the feminist emancipatory 
praxis which underpins this thesis and which can only be realised through continued 
reflexivity throughout the research process. In particular, the gendered challenges to 
conducting elite interviews. The process of reflexivity central to this methodology also 
provides an important insight into the gendered organisational dynamics operating 
within NATO, and against which UNSCR 1325 is being implemented.  
 The particular challenges facing feminist researchers mean that a commitment to 
feminist informed research could come at a personal cost, acknowledging these 
challenges make it all the more pertinent that sufficient space is given to justify the 
need for a feminist methodology in this research. 
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SECTION TWO: NATO and the Women, Peace and 
Security Agenda 
This section contributes a case study of NATO’s engagement with UNSCR 1325, the 
three chapters examine the adoption, implementation and elevated role of the Public 
Diplomact Division in this process. This section highlights that NATO’s involvement 
in Afghanistan is key to understanding NATO’s engagement with the Women, Peace 
and Security agenda. This operation, over others was highlighted in interviews as 
influencing NATO’s engagement with the Women, Peace and Security agenda 
(NATO Official, 2014). The challenge ISAF faced from 2006 necessitated an 
acknowledgement of the gender dimension of the intervention and UNSCR 1325 
provided a means to do so (NATO Official, 2014). The centrality of Afghanistan to 
NATO’s adoption and implementation of UNSCR 1325 is also explained by taking 
account of the centrality of NATO partners to this process. The ISAF operation 
brought together a disparate group of states and WPS provides a shared starting point 
to foster cooperation through (as discussed in Chapter Five). In particular, with 
Sweden but also Australia, whose implementation of UNSCR 1325 takes NATO and 
ISAF as the starting point. The centrality of Sweden to NATO’s implementation of 
UNSCR 1325 (discussed in Chapter Five) and Sweden’s role in ISAF and importantly 
not KFOR in Kosovo, has reinforced the centrality of Afghanistan to NATO’s 
engagement with the WPS agenda. This is evident in the analysis in Chapter Six of the 
Secretary General’s annual reports on UNSCR 1325 which focus predominately on 
the ISAF operation, over KFOR (mentioned just once).  
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Chapter Seven presents a case study of NATO’s public diplomacy efforts respect of 
the ISAF mission in Afghanistan through an examination of NATO’s Return to Hope 
documentary released in Autumn 2014 to tell NATO’s story of Afghanistan. This case 
study has been chosen for three inter-related reasons. First, as Chapter Five discussed, 
NATO policy on UNSCR 1325 gives a significant role to NATO’s Public Diplomacy 
Division. Second, Afghanistan was central to NATO’s adoption of UNSCR 1325 in 
2007 (as discussed in Chapter Five) and coincided with the adoption of NATO’s 
Comprehensive Approach, driven by the challenging nature of the ISAF operation. 
Third, NATO’s public diplomacy efforts in respect of UNSCR 1325 have focused 
inordinately on Afghanistan, rather than other NATO missions, for example in KFOR 
in Kosovo. NATO’s public diplomacy efforts in Afghanistan in respect of UNSCR 
1325 therefore warrant examination in their own right.  
 
The focus on Afghanistan, rather than Kosovo in respect of UNSCR 1325 by NATO’s 
Public Diplomacy is particularly visible on the NATO.TV site hosted on YouTube. It 
is here that NATO uploads videos on particular issues for use in public diplomacy 
efforts across the NATO website and other social media platforms. A search of the 
site for ‘women’ or ‘1325’ and ‘Afghanistan’ brought back 34 and 47 videos on the 
topic (some of the videos were duplicated in both searches). In contrast a search for 
‘women’ or ‘1325’ and ‘Kosovo’ brought back just 2 for each (the same 2 videos). 
This demonstrates the inordinate place of Afghanistan in NATO’s Public Diplomacy 
efforts in respect of UNSCR 1325. In one respect this is surprising, as a peacebuilding 
operation it could be expected that KFOR would provide a better platform for ‘selling’ 
NATO’s engagement with UNSCR 1325. However, in understanding NATO’s 
implementation of UNSCR 1325 it is clear that it is understood to be of ‘added value’ 
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to the Alliance both in respect of the NATO operation in Afghanistan (see discussion 
in Chapter Six) and in increasing the representation of women in NATO forces 
(Chapter Five). This makes it clear why NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division has 
focused on Afghanistan and has used UNSCR 1325 as a way of ‘selling’ a positive 
story about NATO’s engagement there through the web-documentary Return to Hope.  
 
Given the instrumentalisation of (Afghan) women during ISAF and previous 
interventions in Afghanistan, a focus on how they are used as part of a ‘good news 
story’ of the Alliance’s involvement in the country is warranted. And while, as Chapter 
Seven goes onto acknowledge, the operational use of Female Engagement Teams 
(FETs) by ISAF and Provisional Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) provides an additional 
dimension to this instrumentalisation, these were not born directly out of NATO’s 
engagement with UNSCR 1325. Rather, this initiative was drawn from the US as part 
of counterinsurgency efforts prior to their adoption of a NAP on UNSCR 1325 
(Mcbride and Wibben 2012: 199). Moreover, the NATO/EAPC Policy and Action 
Plan makes no mention of Afghanistan. Rather, it is through an examination of the 
Public Diplomacy’s role in implementing UNSCR 1325 that the importance of 
Afghanistan to NATO’s engagement and understanding of the WPS agenda comes to 
light. This draws attention to the importance of distinguishing between UNSCR 1325 
and NATO’s implementation of the Resolution and the instrumentalisation of women 
outside of this framework, while acknowledging that NATO’s implementation of the 
WPS agenda supports rather than challenges this trend.   
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Silences: NATO’s Adoption of UNSCR 1325 
(5.0) Introduction 
‘The EAPC, with a membership running from Ireland to Kyrgyzstan, often finds it 
difficult to identify topics of common interest for discussion at a political level. The 
discussion of UNSCR 1325 was a topic in which most Allies and Partners expressed 
an interest, especially given their engagement in International Security Assistance 
Force operations in Afghanistan.’ 
US Mission to NATO (2009) 
This quote from the US Mission to NATO (released via WikiLeaks and so never 
intended for public consumption) demonstrates the utility of UNSCR 1325 as a means 
to engage disparate member states and partners in dialogue. In addition, it draws 
attention to the centrality of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) 
mission in Afghanistan to shaping NATO’s adoption of UNSCR 1325. This Chapter 
contributes an understanding of NATO’s adoption of UNSCR 1325 which takes into 
account both the organisational context and wider political considerations of NATO 
members and partners, which has been neglected from other accounts of NATO’s 
adoption of UNSCR 1325 (Schjølset, 2013; Miller, Pournik and Swaine, 2014).  
NATO’s adoption of UNSCR 1325 embodied significant silences and silos resulting 
from the context against which the policy was adopted. Silences are identified in what 
NATO does not mention or omits from policy and rhetoric on 1325. Silos are 
understood as both pertaining to the isolation of policy on women, peace and security 
from the mainstream NATO agenda but also the military understanding of silos as  an 
underground chamber in which a guided missile is kept ready for firing (Cohn, 1987:  
698). As discussed in the Chapter Three, NATO’s adoption of UNSCR 1325 initially 
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separated the policy from NATO’s own Human Resource policy, until the 2014 
revision of the NATO/EAPC policy on UNSCR 1325. This represented both a silence 
but also a silo, in that NATO’s adoption of UNSCR 1325 was kept separated from an 
area in which it was relevant but was also a tool for supporting NATO’s relationship 
with its partners.  
This Chapter will first examine the role of the informal group ‘friends of 1325’ in 
supporting the WPS agenda at NATO and the emergence of a counter-discourse. It 
will then examine how the emergence of the WPS agenda at NATO as part of a 
counter-discourse, supported by partner states, resulted in an outward facing focus to 
NATO’s approach to Women, Peace and Security, situating the Resolution as external 
to – and of ‘added value’ for – the Alliance. Finally, this section examines the role of 
NATO as a ‘teaching machine’ in respect of three NATO member states who have 
been particularly supportive of UNSCR 1323, the Netherlands, Norway and the UK. 
The next section in this Chapter looks at the ‘added value’ of UNSCR 1325 for NATO, 
in particular the use of UNSCR 1325 as a tool to support NATO’s pre-existing agenda 
to increase the representation of women in NATO forces. Again, representing a silo in 
NATO’s adoption of UNSCR 1325. The section then turns to examines the value of 
UNSCR 1325 as a tool to increase operational effectiveness, focusing on how NATO’s 
role as a ‘teaching machine’ has facilitated lesson sharing on the value of UNSCR 
1325 in this respect. 
The final section of the Chapter analyses NATO policies on UNSCR 1325 applicable 
to the civilian and military structures, examining the NATO/EAPC Policy on UNSCR 
1325, Bi-Strategic Command 40-1 and the NATO/EAPC Action Plan. First, it details 
the provisions within these policy documents. This finds that the latest NATO/EAPC 
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Policy, released in 2014, and associated Action Plan demonstrate the significant 
progress NATO has made in articulating a more nuanced and comprehensive 
understanding of the WPS agenda. This is in contrast to the outdated military concept, 
adopted in 2012, which omits the three latest WPS Resolutions. The first publicly 
released NATO/EAPC Action Plan is examined in detail, finding a comprehensive 
document but one supported by technocratic quantitative indicators, not always 
applicable to the action they relate to. The section then turns to examine the language 
within the policies and Action Plan, finding that the military concept, in particular, 
reinforces the gender essentialisms embodied in the WPS agenda. 
 
(5.1) The emergence of a counter-discourse: the ‘friends of 
1325’ 
Europe has been a leader in the implementation of UNSCR 1325, with the majority of 
National Action Plans (NAPs) produced by European states (PeaceWomen 2015). 16 
of the 28 NATO member states (or 58%) have produced NAPs, with 25% being 
members of the ‘friends of 1325’ at the UN (see Table 4). It would therefore seem to 
follow that NATO member states would play a role in shaping NATO’s adoption of 
UNSCR 1325, with their support critical in an intergovernmental setting. However, it 
was NATO partners who have proved most critical to NATO’s adoption of the 
Resolution and who supported the emergence of the counter-discourse. Among 
members of the EAPC (non-NATO members), there is a lower take-up on NAPs, with 
just 9 (or 41%) having done so and only three being members of the informal group at 
the UN (See Table 5). However, among the EAPC members, Sweden has proved 
particularly supportive of the WPS agenda globally and at NATO. This section 
explores the emergence of the ‘friends of 1325’ group of NATO member and partner 
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states who have supported NATO’s adoption and implementation of UNSCR 1325 
and the strategies they have employed. The section then moves onto examine the role 
of NATO partners (Austria, Finland and Sweden), before looking at the role of key 
NATO members (Netherlands, Norway and the UK) in supporting UNSCR 1325 at 
NATO. 
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Table 4  
 
NATO member NAP adopted in Member of 'friends of 
1325' at UN?
Albania No No
Belgium 2009 No
Bulgaria No No
Canada 2010 Yes
Croatia 2011 Yes
Czech Republic No No
Denmark 2005 No
Estonia 2010 No
France 2010 Yes
Germany 2013 No
Greece No No
Hungary No No
Iceland 2008 No
Italy 2010 No
Latvia No No
Lithuania 2011 No
Luxembourg No No
Netherlands 2008 Yes
Norway 2006 Yes
Poland No No
Portugal No No
Romania No No
Slovakia No No
Slovenia 2010 No
Spain 2007 No
Turkey No No
UK 2006 Yes
USA 2011 Yes
Total 16 7
57% 25%
NATO member states support for UNSCR 1325
Source: (PeaceWomen, 2015; NATO, 2015f; Villellas, 2010)
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Table 5  
 
(5.1.1) The ‘friends of 1325’ 
In 2007, NATO’s commitment to UNSCR 1325 was far from a fait accompli. Rather, 
it would appear that the adoption of the NATO/EAPC policy on UNSCR 1325 must in 
part be attributed to the non-conventional way in which it appeared on NATO’s 
agenda. In a departure from the usual NATO protocol, the proposal for the 
NATO/EAPC policy on UNSCR 1325 was heard by the EAPC before being raised with 
Country NAP adopted in Member of 'friends of 1325' 
at UN?
Armenia No NAP No
Austria 2007 No
Azerbaijan NO NAP No
Belarus NO NAP No
Bosnia and Herzegovnia 2010 No
Finland 2008 Yes
Georgia 2012 No
Ireland 2011 No
Kazakhstan No NAP No
Kyrgyzstan No NAP No
Macedonia 2013 No
Malta No NAP No
Moldova No NAP No
Montenegro No NAP No
Russia No NAP No
Serbia 2010 No
Sweden 2006 Yes
Switzerland 2007 Yes
Tajikistan No NAP No
Turkmenistan No NAP No
Ukraine No NAP No
Uzbekistan No NAP No
Total 9 3
41% 14%
EAPC members support for UNSCR 1325
Source: (PeaceWomen, 2015; NATO, 2015f; Villellas, 2010)
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the North Atlantic Council (NAC). When NATO’s Deputy Secretary-General 
informed the NAC of his intention to get the EAPC to approve the NATO/EAPC policy 
on UNSCR 1325 (which significantly tasked NATO’s Military Committee to respond 
to UNSCR 1325), the Turkish Permanent Representative raised an objection that the 
EAPC had discussed an issue requiring action by the senior military authority in 
NATO. In response the US Ambassador Nuland suggested the NAC approve the 
measure there and then, which they did (NATO [Wikileaks] 2007). Although it is not 
possible to say whether UNSCR 1325 would have appeared on the agenda of the NAC 
without a proposal having first been put forward by EAPC for a NATO/EAPC policy, 
it would not appear that the Military Committee (as the primary source of military 
advice to NAC) had put forward a proposal to NAC for a NATO policy on UNSCR 
1325. Rather, in a reversal of normal protocol, it was EAPC through the NAC who 
effectively tasked the Military Committee with developing a bi-strategic command for 
the implementation of UNSCR 1325. The adoption of the NATO/EAPC policy on 
UNSCR 1325 therefore relied upon the diplomatic skills of supportive member and 
partner states to navigate NATO decision-making structures. These states participated 
in an informal ad hoc working group of states (NATO, 2010a: 5.1.1), known as the 
‘friends of 1325’12 (NATO Official 2014), in order to advance the agenda. 
The role of NATO member and partner states in the ‘friends of 1325’ has been crucial 
to providing ‘insider’ support to advance WPS at NATO. Among member states it has 
been the Netherlands, Norway and the UK which have played a particularly active 
role, corresponding to their early adoption of NAPs on UNSCR 1325 (EPLO, 2010). 
                                                
12 The ‘friends of 1325’ operating at NATO is distinct from the ‘friends of 1325’ instigated by 
Canada to support WPS at the UN, but follows a similar principle (Joachim & Schneiker 
2012:4). 
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A more recent member state, Croatia, has also proved supportive of UNSCR 1325 at 
NATO from its time as an EAPC member and Austria and Sweden have been stalwarts 
among NATO partners. 
The ‘friends of 1325’ brought together a diverse range of like-minded states who 
sought to champion UNSCR 1325 at NATO. The informal grouping provided a critical 
forum for consultation with like-minded allies prior to the official negotiations and 
meetings, an important part of any diplomatic initiative (Widerberg, 2015: 5). This 
enabled the ‘friends of 1325’ to coordinate strategies for the implementation of 
decisions in meetings (NATO, 2010b) and has proved pivotal to advancing the WPS 
agenda (NATO Official, 2014). There is only one official NATO reference to the 
grouping (in the 2010 Comprehensive Report on the NATO/EAPC policy), which 
states that 20 member and partner states are involved but does not go as far as to 
specify which 20 states are involved (NATO, 2010a: 5.1.1). However, the interviews 
I conducted at NATO suggest that Austria, Croatia, Iceland, Netherlands, Norway, 
Sweden and the UK had participated in the group.13 Their reasons for joining the 
informal group varied but in the majority of cases relied upon WPS being a foreign 
policy deliverable.  
In addition to identifying some of the states who were members of the ‘friends of 
1325’, the interviews drew attention to the absence of the USA, at least from providing 
substantive (rather than symbolic) support for the WPS agenda. In particular, a number 
of interview participants noted that since Hillary Clinton stepped down as Secretary 
of State in 2013, the USA had noticeably disengaged from the women, peace and 
                                                
13 Austria and Sweden are not NATO members but are members of EAPC. Croatia became a 
NATO member in 2009. 
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security agenda (NATO Official, 2014). This is surprising given that the USA had 
supported the creation of the office to support the NATO Committee on Women in 
NATO Forces in 1997 (see discussion in Chapter Three) and demonstrated that 
although the position of a high level champion can support progress from the 
leadership level, one-time support for an issue is by no means a guarantee that that 
support will continue. It also meant that the USA did not act as NATO’s ‘internal 
socialization agent’ (Flockhart, 2011) in respect of UNSCR 1325, creating space for 
other member states to support the WPS agenda.  
It is evident that the ‘friends of 1325’ have proved to be a cornerstone of NATO’s 
adoption and implementation of UNSCR 1325 but the limited engagement, 
particularly from the USA, is reflective of the comparatively low priority given to 
WPS within NATO as a whole. It also reflects a limit of the transformative potential 
of NATO’s role as a ‘teaching machine’ in respect of gender, with the reluctance of 
the group to engage unsupportive states directly resulting in a limited group of states 
(already supportive of WPS) ‘learning’ lessons on UNSCR 1325. It should also be 
noted that membership of the ‘friends of 1325’ group does not by extension equate to 
a commitment to implementing UNSCR 1325 for its transformative potential, rather 
there is a concern that states have learned the cost of not providing – at least - tacit 
support for the WPS agenda; as one NATO Official put it ‘gender is an issue you can’t 
be seen not to support’ (NATO Official, 2014). This indicates an understanding of 
UNSCR 1325 (and gender) as a non-contentious issue, or even a side-issue and one 
which does not pose a threat to national agendas. Nevertheless, the ‘friends of 1325’ 
has provided an important forum through which NATO’s adoption of UNSCR 1325 
could be advanced. 
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The centrality of smaller member states and partners (and the absence of the USA) 
supports Keohane’s argument that the smaller the state, the less it has to take into 
consideration in the ‘large-scale patterns of international politics’ because it has little 
chance of affecting them very much (Keohane, 1971:162). The approach of the 
‘friends of 1325’ to meet to discuss an issue before it went to committee has helped to 
ensure cohesion on the strategy to advance that particular issue (NATO Official, 
2014). However, as one NATO Official noted this can also be detrimental because it 
effectively becomes an exercise in preaching to the converted (NATO Official, 2014). 
In excluding more critical members at this stage it is also difficult for the ‘friends of 
1325’ to envisage the obstacles a particular issue will face when it does reach 
committee. It had been suggested at a meeting of the ‘friends of 1325’ that critical 
friends should be included earlier in the process but this was disregarded by the wider 
group (NATO Official, 2014).  
The support of NATO members and ‘friends of 1325’ for the WPS agenda is 
demonstrated in the list of states who supported the Review into the implementation 
of UNSCR 1325 in NATO operations commissioned at the Chicago Summit (see 
discussion in Chapter Six). The list of member states that supported the Review 
demonstrated a widening of those states supporting UNSCR 1325 at NATO. These 
states were Bulgaria, Estonia, Germany, Iceland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and the 
United States (Lackenbauer and Langlais, 2013:15). It is notable that one of the 
supporters, Bulgaria, has yet to develop a National Action Plan (NAP) of its own 
(PeaceWomen, 2013). Further, Estonia and Germany had not previously been noted 
as active supporters of the WPS agenda or of UNSCR 1325 at NATO (NATO Official, 
2014). The NATO partners who supported the Review included those partners which 
had an established record of supporting NATO’s work on UNSCR 1325: Austria, 
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Finland and Sweden. In addition to partners who had not previously been active 
supporters of the WPS agenda at NATO: Australia, Ireland and Switzerland. This 
represented a widening of the number of member and partner states supporting 
UNSCR 1325 at NATO. 
 
(5.1.2) NATO Partners and UNSCR 1325: influence incommensurate with 
status? 
Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has instigated a range of partnerships and these 
have expanded globally (see discussion in Chapter Three). The role of a number of 
partner states, in particular Austria and Sweden, has been pivotal to NATO’s adoption 
and implementation of UNSCR 1325, in particular through their participation in the 
‘friends of 1325’.  
Austria was an early adopter of a NAP on UNSCR 1325, in 2007 , and has a track-
record of championing UNSCR 1325 as part of a foreign policy deliverable, for 
example at the EU (Holzner, 2013). At NATO, Austria proved itself as an effective 
supporter of UNSCR 1325, acting as a ‘tiger team’ to bring in others to support the 
agenda (NATO Official, 2014). And Austria’s NAP states that since September 2007, 
‘Austria has initiated discussions on UNSCR 1325 (2000) and possible NATO or 
partner activities’ (Federal Ministry for European and International Affairs (Austria), 
2007). The impetus for Austria’s support of WPS comes from the former Minister for 
Foreign and European Affairs, Ursula Plassnik, who was active in the area of WPS, 
and instigated the development of Austria’s NAP adopted in 2007 (EPLO, 2010). 
Plassnik’s role was crucial in keeping UNSCR 1325 on Austria’s foreign policy 
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agenda and she remained a champion of WPS within the Ministry, following her exit 
from office, taking up the role of Special Representative for Women’s Affairs 
(Austrian Development Cooperation, 2010). The effective championing of UNSCR 
1325 at NATO by Austria was a result of high-level institutional support within the 
Austrian government, which resulted in WPS becoming a foreign policy deliverable. 
It also relied upon the diplomatic skills of the Austrian delegation to NATO to 
mobilise in an effective way. 
The centrality of Sweden, a non-NATO member, to NATO’s adoption of UNSCR 
1325 is perhaps unsurprising. Sweden’s relationship with NATO is conducted through 
the Partnership for Peace framework, which Sweden joined in 1994 becoming ‘one of 
NATO’s most active and effective partners’ (NATO, 2013b). This does not mean that 
the NATO-Swedish relationship is one which has come easily, rather, NATO’s 
relationship with Sweden has been seen as one based on practical cooperation, rather 
than as part of a ‘community of values’ (Wagnsson, 2011:598). For example, 
Sweden’s discourse on Afghanistan ran counter to the dominant discourse emanating 
from NATO. Rather than focusing on terrorism, Sweden’s contribution to the ISAF 
mission was framed as value driven, in particular it focused upon the progress made 
in integrating a ‘gender function’ into Swedish armed forces in Afghanistan (Swedish 
Government, 2010b cited in Wagnsson, 2011:589).  
Sweden has actively sought to position itself at the centre of global efforts to 
implement UNSCR 1325 and as part of this has supported the efforts of international 
organizations, including NATO’s adoption of Bi-Strategic Command 40-1 on 
integrating a gender perspective into NATO-led missions (Egnell, Hojem, and Berts, 
2014: 63). In addition, Sweden was given responsibility for coordinating and 
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delivering the report commissioned at the Chicago Summit on the implementation of 
UNSCR 1325 in NATO operations (see discussion in Chapter Six). The delegation of 
a task monitoring NATO’s implementation of UNSCR 1325 to a partner state, is 
indicative of the separation of UNSCR 1325 from NATO’s core tasks as an 
international security institution. It is symbolic in the sense that NATO delegated 
responsibility for monitoring UNSCR 1325 outside of NATO. Sweden continues to 
perform an integral role in supporting NATO’s implementation of UNSCR 1325 and 
provides gender training for NATO commanders, leaders and gender advisors at the 
Nordic Centre for Gender in Military Operations (NCGM), NATO’s ‘Department 
Head’ for gender training (see discussion in Chapter Six). This supports Wagnsson’s 
(2011) argument that UNSCR 1325 has proven to be an important cornerstone in the 
development of the otherwise implausible security community, incorporating Sweden 
and NATO, which otherwise diverges on ‘identities, values and meanings’ essential 
for the construction of a security community (Wagnsson, 2011: 585). In addition to 
Masdea's (2012:16) contention that NATO has framed the Resolution as a strategic 
necessity, for ‘NATO [to] achieve the interoperability of its troops’  
In addition to Sweden, Finland is another Nordic state and NATO partner that has 
proved supportive of NATO’s implementation of UNSCR 1325 and again was an early 
adopter of a NAP (in 2008, revised in 2012). This has included funding a Voluntary 
National Contribution (VNC) position in the International Staff to work on UNSCR 
1325 (NATO Official, 2014). A significant focus of the Finnish NAP is to increase the 
representation of women in crisis management, particularly in leadership positions 
(Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, 2012). This has resulted in Finland working 
closely with NATO to implement UNSCR 1325 - with a specific focus on crisis 
management - at an organisational and operational level. For example, Finland 
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supported a gender advisor position in Afghanistan and subsidised NATO’s Review 
of the Practical Implications of UNSCR 1325 published in 2013 (Leino, 2014). 
It is important to stress that not all partners are supportive of the Women, Peace and 
Security agenda, although only Russia has been vocal in their hostility to NATO’s 
implementation of UNSCR 1325. At a meeting of the EAPC in May 2009, the Russian 
Ambassador to NATO criticised NATO’s implementation of UNSCR 1325 in the 
context of Afghanistan, arguing that this was in fact an attempt to impose "white 
Caucasian culture". This comment has to be taken in context, Russia had just returned 
to formal relations with NATO after its participation in the NATO-Russian Council 
was suspended following Russian incursions into Georgia in August 2008 (it was 
again suspended in April 2014, in response to the Russia-Ukraine conflict) (NATO, 
2015e). However, it must be noted that relations continued at the Ambassadorial level 
and through EAPC during this time and EAPC therefore became a sounding board for 
Russia frustrations with, and antagonism towards NATO.  
UNSCR 1325 has proven a useful diplomatic tool for NATO’s EAPC partners to 
further their engagement and influence at NATO, incommensurate with status. The 
role of partner states in NATO’s adoption of UNSCR 1325 has challenged 
assumptions that NATO partnerships are (solely) a means through which NATO can 
influence the aspirations of non-members by setting the parameters of the relationship 
This challenges assumptions that NATO partnerships are (solely) outward facing and 
that NATO sets the parameters of the relationship (Holmberg, 2011:534; Webber, 
Hallams and Smith 2014:776: Simón, 2014:18; Wallander, 2000: 729). For example, 
the NATO/EAPC policy calls for NATO partners to be involved in the development 
of the Military Concept (what would become Bi-Strategic Command 40-1) ‘to the 
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maximum possible extent’ given ‘their important contributions of Partner nations to 
NATO-led operations’ (NATO, 2007b). This has demonstrated that norm sharing can 
be a multi-directional process with NATO partners having had a significant role in 
putting UNSCR 1325 onto NATO’s agenda and in continuing to support it. This 
challenges understandings of NATO partnerships as unidirectional, both as a means 
through which NATO can influence the aspirations of non-members by setting the 
parameters of the relationship (Wallander, 2000: 729) and as a ‘functional tool for 
burden sharing’ (Hallams, 2013: 119). This is significant given the widening and 
broadening of NATO partnerships, including into Asia and the Middle East, 
necessitates a reassessment of the value of partnerships (for NATO and partners), even 
if NATO has yet to fully resolve the purpose of partnerships (Moore, 2012: 57).  
 
(5.1.3) NATO member states support for UNSCR 1325 at NATO 
A number of NATO member states have proved particularly supportive of UNSCR 
1325 at NATO and have participated in the informal grouping, known as the ‘friends 
of 1325’ (at NATO). These states are the Netherlands, Norway and the UK. An 
examination of the National Action Plans (NAPs) of these states finds that the 
championing of WPS at the regional level features in many as a foreign policy 
deliverable. Moreover, a number of member states have made significant contributions 
to support NATO’s implementation of UNSCR 1325. This underscores the importance 
of studying regional-level implementation because it is a key site for the realisation of 
the WPS agenda.  
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The Netherlands has been an active supporter of UNSCR 1325 at NATO. In line with 
a number of other members of the ‘friends of 1325’ at the UN, the Netherlands was an 
early adopter of a NAP on UNSCR 1325, with the first Dutch NAP adopted in 2008. 
In 2011, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, along with civil society, led the way in 
developing the second NAP (EPLO, 2013:42). The second NAP made UNSCR 1325 
a priority for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and included a specific objective to 
increase awareness of UNSCR 1325 at regional and international institutions (EPLO, 
2013:42-43). The Netherlands have actively supported NATO’s adoption of UNSCR 
1325 from the outset and they were one of four states (and two NATO members)14 to 
contribute to a 2007 study on the implementation of UNSCR 1325 in NATO’s 
Provisional Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan, in preparation for the 
adoption of a NATO policy on UNSCR 1325 (Olsson et al., 2009: 16). The 
Netherlands also supported the 2013 Review of the Practical Implications of UNSCR 
1325 for the Conduct of NATO-led Operations and Missions  (Lackenbauer and 
Langlais, 2013). In this way, the Netherlands is an example of a state which has 
consistently integrated WPS into its foreign policy concerns. Its support for WPS at 
NATO was therefore to be expected.  
Norway is another state which has proved to be a critical supporter of UNSCR 1325 
at NATO. In common with the Netherlands, Norway was one of the first states to 
launch a NAP in 2006. In Norway, the military has come to have a prominent role in 
the implementation of UNSCR 1325 and the discourse on UNSCR 1325 has focused 
on gender equality within the military (EPLO, 2013: 50). One of the main criticisms 
                                                
14 Four countries contributed eight independent experts to author the report. These 
were (non-NATO members) Sweden and Finland and (NATO members) Netherlands 
and Norway.  
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levied against the Norwegian implementation of UNSCR 1325, is that there is a lack 
of political will to translate rhetoric of the NAP into action (EPLO, 2013: 51). 
However, in respect of NATO, Norway has made a tangible and significant 
contribution to NATO’s implementation of UNSCR 1325. For example, in providing 
gender advisors to the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in 
Afghanistan (EPLO, 2013: 50) and along with the Netherlands, contributed to the 2007 
study on the implementation of UNSCR 1325 by NATO’s PRTs in Afghanistan 
(Olsson et al., 2009: 16). Norway’s most significant contribution to supporting 
UNSCR 1325 at NATO, came in 2012 when Norway volunteered to fund the 
appointment of Norwegian diplomat, Mari Skåre, to the newly created position of 
NATO Secretary General’s Special Representative on Women, Peace and Security 
(WIIS, 2012). This was particularly noteworthy given that without Norway’s funding 
of the post it is likely to have remained vacant (NATO Official, 2014) and the Special 
Representative has proved to be an important focal point for NATO’s implementation 
of UNSCR 1325 (see discussion in Chapter Six). These actions pinpoint Norway as a 
stalwart in NATO’s adoption and implementation of UNSCR 1325.  
The UK has been a particularly active state on UNSCR 1325. It was an early adopter 
of a NAP, the second state to do so globally in 2006, and is the only state to-date to 
have produced three subsequent NAPs in 2010 (revised 2012), and 2014 (Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office, 2010; Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2012; Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office, 2014). The 2010 and 2012 revisions commit the UK to 
providing political support to NATO’s implementation of UNSCR 1325 (Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office, 2010; Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2012), while the 
2014 NAP states that the UK will champion UNSCR 1325 in its ‘privileged positions 
in major multilateral organisations, including the UN, the EU and NATO’. (Foreign 
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and Commonwealth Office, 2014: 2). The UK has made a number of contributions to 
NATO implementation of UNSCR 1325, these have focused on working with other 
states to support the WPS agenda. For example, at the 2012 Chicago Summit the UK 
worked with other states to ensure UNSCR 1325 was featured on the agenda (Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office, 2013: 10). The 2014 NAP lists in detail the progress made 
by NATO on UNSCR 1325 but not the specific UK contribution to this, aside from 
using the 2014 NATO Wales Summit as an opportunity to assess NATO’s progress in 
advancing the WPS agenda (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2014:23) (See 
discussion in Chapter Six). This supports findings of the interviews with NATO 
Officials, where a number of participants mentioned the UK as a supporter of UNSCR 
1325 (and member of the ‘friends of 1325’) but where less able to provide specific 
details of the UK’s support (NATO Official, 2014). The UK’s support for UNSCR 
1325 at NATO differs from the Netherlands and Norway, with a clear emphasis on 
rhetorical commitment over tangible support and outcomes attributable to the UK’s 
support. 
Another interesting point in respect of the UK’s implementation of UNSCR 1325 and 
support for UNSCR 1325 at NATO is the dominant role of the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office (FCO), rather than the Ministry of Defence (MoD). This is 
despite the fact that all the UK’s NAPs outline roles for three external relations 
ministries; the FCO, Department for International Development (DFID) and the MoD. 
It was not until the 2014 NAP that the MoD was committed to actively support the 
NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives (NCGP) (Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office, 2014: 11). This late development is particularly interesting given that two of 
the last Deputy Chairs of the NCGP, Lieutenant Colonel Kathie Knell and Major 
Rachel Grimes, have either been in active, or retired from, service in the UK armed 
182 
 
forces (Knell et al., 2014). It should be noted that there is no evidence that their 
appointment was actively supported by the UK, but given that both women took the 
post prior to the 2014 NAP, it is unlikely to have come about as a direct result of the 
UK MoD’s role in supporting UNSCR 1325 at NATO. 
 
(5.2) The ‘added value’ of UNSCR 1325 for NATO’s 
operations 
NATO’s adoption of UNSCR 1325 has focused upon the ‘added value’ for NATO in 
respect of military capabilities. This has had two separate but nevertheless interrelated 
components. The first is the focus on increasing the representation of women in the 
military, building upon NATO’s pre-existing agenda. The second, is to increase 
operational effectiveness, particularly in relation to NATO’s ISAF mission in 
Afghanistan. This section examines both of these components and the implications for 
NATO’s adoption of UNSCR 1325 and its transformative potential.  
 
(5.2.1) ‘Manning principles’: Increasing the representation of women in 
NATO forces 
NATO has framed an essential part of achieving the aims of UNSCR 1325 as the 
‘pursuit of real operational use of female soldiers’ (Masdea, 2012: 15). The first 
NATO/EAPC policy (2007b) calls for NATO Military Authorities to prioritise 
‘successful force generation by mobilizing additional resources’ and Bi-Strategic 
Command 40-1 includes a focus on ‘manning principles’ to ‘strive for a more 
representative workforce’, including through the appointment of Gender Advisors 
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(NATO 2009a) (see discussion below on NATO Policy on UNSCR 1325). On one 
level, this serves to illustrate the failure to recognise the gendered nature of policy, 
with a policy to support the increased representation of women in civilian and military 
structures (and thus increase representation) framed as about men. The conflation of 
the agenda to increase the representation of women within NATO forces and the need 
to appoint Gender Advisors, also points to an understanding of gender as about women 
and Gender Advisors as posts to be filled by women, rather than (just) to support the 
integration of a gender perspective. 
There are two factors which help explain NATO’s association of the WPS agenda with 
a drive to increase the representation of women in the military. The first, is the 
centrality of the Nordic states (in particular Norway and Sweden) to NATO’s adoption 
and implementation of UNSCR 1325, with the discourse of the Nordic states on 
UNSCR 1325 focused on increasing the representation of women in the military 
(Bergman Rosamond, 2014: 18). The second is NATO’s long standing concern with 
the status of women in NATO armed forces which has formed the focus of NATO’s 
established gender machinery, in particular the NATO Committee on Gender 
Perspectives (NCGP).  
The NCGP/CWINF emerged as a means to support the integration of women in the 
military in NATO member states, with member states required to submit annual 
reports on the integration of women in their armed forces for over a decade (see 
discussion in Chapter Three). More recently, the NCGP has become a focal point for 
the implementation of UNSCR 1325 within the military command of NATO, and 
NATO member states provide details on their progress in the implementation of 
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UNSCR 1325 in their annual reports. This further reinforces the association of women 
in the military and the WPS agenda among NATO members.  
Member states’ reports to the NGCP on their implementation of UNSCR 1325 should 
support NATO’s role as a ‘teaching machine’ in respect of WPS, offering an 
opportunity for transparent monitoring and evaluation of the implementation of 
UNSCR 1325. However, although there is a template for the reports available, few 
member states use it and the data provided and focus varies from report to report. 
Another factor, limiting the utility of the reports, is that is not always clear which 
government entity has submitted the report. This is important because the majority of 
NAPs split responsibility for implementation among government departments, usually 
the Foreign Ministry, Defence Ministry and (if applicable) the Department for 
Development. For example, in the case of the UK, it is clear in the 2013 submission 
that it is the UK Join Delegation to NATO (Ministry of Defence and Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office) but previous reports do not specify the author(s). This is likely 
to be reflective of bureaucratic politics but it means, in the case of the UK, that the 
department reporting on the issue is not necessarily the one responsible for it within 
the provisions of the UK’s NAP (UK Government, 2013; UK Joint Delegation to 
NATO, 2012; UK Government, 2011).15  
Although the NOGP (cited in Egnell, Hojem, and Berts, 2014:18) and a NATO SPS 
funded project (Oudraat et al., 2015:6) have both found the integration of UNSCR 
1325 into military operations inconsistent across NATO members, an examination of 
                                                
15 The terms of reference of the NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives where extended in 
2009 to include UNSCR 1325, however, the UK did not start reporting on its implementation 
of UNSCR 1325 to the Committee until 2011. 
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member states NAPs suggests NATO is serving a role as a ‘teaching machine’ on 
UNSCR 1325. This can be discerned from content-analysis of NATO member states 
and partners NAPs on UNSCR 1325, drawing out references to NATO and NATO 
policy on UNSCR 1325, in addition to framings of UNSCR 1325 in line with the value 
placed on UNSCR 1325 in NATO policy. This demonstrates that NATO and EAPC 
members have sought to assign the same meaning to UNSCR 1325 as ascribed in the 
NATO/EAPC policy on UNSCR 1325. 28 NATO and EAPC member states make 
reference to NATO in their NAPs, with only Denmark and Austria (EAPC) refer 
explicitly to the NATO/EAPC policy on UNSCR 1325. Content-analysis, using a word 
frequency search, of NATO and EAPC members’ NAPs on UNSCR 1325 reveals that 
‘NATO’ is the most frequently occurring word (0.71%) in the plans, after the expected 
references to ‘women’ (1.91%), ‘gender’ (1.11%) and ‘security’ (0.76%). This 
demonstrates the centrality of NATO to member and EAPC partners’ implementation 
of UNSCR 1325. 
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Table 6 
 
The value placed on UNSCR 1325 by NATO as a tool to support their existing agenda 
on increasing the representation of women in NATO forces, is also reflected in 
member states NAPs. All NATO member states NAPs now contain provisions for 
increasing the representation of women in the security institutions (DCAF 2013:15). 
In addition to seven EAPC members (see Table 7), including Austria and Sweden 
which are states that have proved instrumental in supporting NATO’s adoption and 
implementation of UNSCR 1325 (see discussion above on the role of NATO partners). 
The focus on women in the military is one which was not necessarily present in the 
first iteration of NAPs and has since emerged. For example, the UK’s 2006 NAP did 
not mention increasing the representation of women in the military but the 2010 NAP 
did (Department for International Development (DFID) et al., 2006; Foreign and 
Year of NAP or revision NATO/EAPC member
2012 Austria
2007 Austria
2008 Belgium
2010 Canada
2011 Croatia
2005 Denmark
2010 Estonia
2012 Finland
2008 Finland
2010 France
2012 Germany
2013 Iceland
2008 Iceland
2010 Italy
2013 Macedonia
2012 Netherlands
2007 Netherlands
2006 Norway
NAPs with references to 'NATO'
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Commonwealth Office, 2010). This is indicative of NATO’s role as a ‘teaching 
machine’ and suggests the emergence of a regional understanding of the value of 
UNSCR 1325. NATO’s gender policy machinery and the NCGP (discussed in Chapter 
Three) and the provision of gender training (discussed in Chapter Six) have 
contributed to providing the framework through which NATO member states and 
partners learn the value fo UNSCR 1325 in line with that supported by NATO. 
Table 7  
 
The pursuit of the increased representation of women in NATO armed forces, under 
the auspices of UNSCR 1325, can undermine the transformative potential of 
implementation of the Resolution where this goal is pursued for instrumental reasons. 
This is because the premise that women are of ‘added value’ to the military is in 
contradiction when it frames women as separate from the homogenous military whole. 
For example, the foundation of military training is to strip a recruit’s individuality 
from them, making them an obedient part of the military whole and able to respond to 
command structures (Whitworth, 2004: 158). Adding women to increase operational 
effectiveness is problematic because it accentuates difference and rests upon the 
premise that the ‘different’ individuals will provide the diversity expected of them 
Year of NAP (or revision) EAPC member
2007 Austria
2012 Austria
2012 Finland
2008 Finland
2011 Ireland
2013 Macedonia
2010 Servia
2009 Sweden
2006 Sweden
2007 Switzerland
NAPs with references to women in the military
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(Kronsell, 2012: 67). In so doing the existing majority is normalised and constructed 
‘as homogenous and naturally associated with the organization’ (Kronsell, 2012: 67). 
This in turn leaves behind the emancipatory potential of UNSCR 1325 as a challenge 
to the existing gender regime. In addition, far from challenging the hegemonic 
masculinity militarism is built upon, the diversity argument reinforces an essentialist 
view of women as in opposition to the norm (Whitworth, 2004: 154). Once recruited 
women are assigned to particular – often subordinate  -  roles (Mathers, 2013: 134). 
For example, Female Engagement Teams (FETS), who were used in Afghanistan as 
part of the adoption of counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine as a way of engaging the 
local population otherwise out of bounds to military personnel (McBride and Wibben, 
2012: 199). McBride and Wibben (2012: 200) find the gendering of counterinsurgency 
and the use of FETS as part of this was part of an attempt to frame intervention in 
Afghanistan as a ‘humanitarian, even progressive, mission’.  
 
(5.2.2) Increasing operational effectiveness: ISAF 
 ‘NATO’s adoption of UNSCR 1325 would not have come about had it not been for 
NATO’s involvement in Afghanistan, and NATO’s approach to UNSCR 1325 is 
shaped by the particular specificities of gender in Afghanistan’ 
This quote from a NATO Official, interviewed in 2014, highlights the centrality of the 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) (both NATO allies and partners) 
mission in Afghanistan for both bringing UNSCR 1325 onto NATO’s agenda, but also 
for shaping the framing of UNSCR 1325 within NATO policy. It also draws attention 
to another aspect of NATO’s role as a ‘teaching machine’, providing evidence that 
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this extends beyond the parameters conceived of by Enloe (1983) - the NATO HQ and 
Commands - to NATO operations themselves. Moreover, it is not just member states, 
but partners, who are sharing best practice on the integration of gender into military 
operations and implementation of UNSCR 1325. The gendered specificities of the 
ISAF mission have provided NATO with a context from which to interpret the 
Resolution. This has had implications for the way in which NATO has sought to 
implement the Resolution in two respects. First, at the organisational level and second, 
at the national level for supporting cooperation among NATO members and partners. 
At the organisational level, the adoption of UNSCR 1325 was intended to support 
NATO’s Comprehensive Approach (NATO, 2007b) - an acknowledgement that 
military means on their own were not enough to achieve operational goals - and this 
led, in part, to UNSCR 1325 being viewed as a tool to increase operational 
effectiveness when it was adopted by NATO’s military structure. This has resulted in 
NATO’s longstanding preoccupation with the status of women in NATO forces16 
being folded under the UNSCR 1325 banner, with a central role given to the NATO 
Committee on Gender Perspectives (NCGP) (see discussion in Chapter Three). An 
additional site for ‘learning’ on UNSCR 1325 is the Supreme Headquarters Allied 
Powers Europe (SHAPE), where member states’ troops serve terms of duty. This 
integrated military command structure has provided NATO with ‘an infrastructure, a 
set of practices and procedures, and a culture of professionalism’ (Wallander, 2000: 
725) through which a sense of trust has developed through being ‘trained, exercised, 
and schooled together’ and this makes the military command ‘sacrosanct’ and 
                                                
16 The Committee on the Status of Women in NATO Forces (CWINF) was established in the 1960s. 
Feminist work has demonstrated the link between recruitment of women into the armed forces and a 
‘manpower’ shortfall, for example due to the end of conscription or a declining birth rate (see: Segal, 
1995 and Enloe, 2007). 
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effectively ‘what NATO is’ (US official quoted in Wallander 2000). In addition, 
SHAPE’s Gender Advisor, Charlotte Isaksson, has played a particularly active role in 
supporting NATO’s implementation of UNSCR 1325 (NATO Official, 2014). It 
therefore follows that the military command structure has had a crucial role in 
reinforcing the dominant understanding of UNSCR 1325 as a tool to increase 
operational effectiveness, with NATO members ‘learning’ the value of UNSCR 1325 
through interaction with each other. 
At a national level, NATO’s role as a ‘teaching machine’ in operations has facilitated 
the emergence of a shared understanding of the value of UNSCR 1325 for increasing 
operational effectiveness among NATO members and partners. The Nordic states, 
including Sweden and Norway, which have actively supported NATO’s 
implementation of UNSCR 1325, have provided an active role to the military in 
implementing UNSCR 1325  (Kronsell, 2012; Bergman Rosamond, 2014: 18). This 
has mapped on to the understanding of UNSCR 1325 within NATO’s adoption of 
UNSCR 1325 (see discussion below). Moreover, it has provided a shared starting point 
for dialogue with partners contributing to the ISAF mission. The challenges of the 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission required NATO to improve 
strategic dialogue among contributors (Mattelaer, 2011) and UNSCR 1325 offered one 
shared starting point from which NATO could foster a ‘community of practice’ with 
partners, including Sweden (Wagnsson, 2011: 598). The adoption of UNSCR 1325 
was therefore - in part out - of strategic necessity, for ‘NATO [to] achieve the 
interoperability of its troops’ (Masdea, 2012: 16). This represents an instrumental use 
of UNSCR 1325 and one which has facilitated a shared understanding of UNSCR 
1325 across ISAF contributing states, limiting the transformative potential of the 
Resolution to challenge existing dominant conceptions of international security. The 
191 
 
implications of the ISAF mission for providing a context against which UNSCR 1325 
has been interpreted at the organisational and national level are mutually reinforcing, 
and epitomise NATO’s role as a ‘teaching machine’. Both NATO’s bureaucracy and 
member/partner states have helped facilitate the institutionalisation of learning on 
UNSCR 1325 as a tool to increase operational effectiveness as a result of NATO’s 
intervention in Afghanistan. 
The integration of gender into Allied Joint Doctrine, the responsibility of the Gender 
Advisor at ACT (NATO ACT 2015) is important to acknowledge because doctrine 
contributes to standardising operations and establishing common ways of 
accomplishing military tasks between different military actors. Bi-Strategic Command 
40-1 offers the tool to do this with and yet, as discussed further on in this Chapter, the 
command is outdated and encapsulated an outmoded conception of gender. Allied 
Joint Doctrine provides an additional and problematic encapsulation of NATO’s role 
as a ‘teaching machine’ with contributors to NATO-led operations working under a 
common understanding of gender and UNSCR 1325.  
The UK is a particularly interesting example to examine in respect of UNSCR 1325 
because there is evidence that the dominant understanding of the value of UNSCR 
1325 at NATO - as an instrumental tool to increase operational effectiveness - has 
come to shape the UK’s own approach to WPS. For example, the UK’s 2014 NAP 
included for the first time a focus on increasing the representation of women in the 
armed forces (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2014: 11, 18, 23). This has brought 
the UK in line with NATO policy on UNSCR 1325, which has called for the greater 
representation of women to increase operational effectiveness (NATO 2011c). 
Moreover, it is an indication that NATO’s military structure is functioning as a 
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‘teaching machine’ sharing lessons on best practice (as discussed here: (3.1) NATO as 
a ‘teaching machine’).  
The impact of framing gender initiatives as something different and as being of ‘added 
value’ can be a barrier to the mainstreaming of UNSCR 1325 within organisational 
culture and structures. As Kronsell (2012: 66) notes, in reference to the Swedish armed 
forces, the manner in which new initiatives on gender are launched has an impact on 
the way in which they are perceived within the institution.  
 
(5.3) NATO Policy on UNSCR 1325 
The adoption of the NATO/EAPC policy on UNSCR 1325 in 2007 and Bi-Strategic 
Command Directive 40-1 in 2009 as part of NATO’s commitment to implementing 
UNSCR 1325 has introduced a new variable into the conception of security issues at 
NATO. Previously, NATO’s only consideration of gender issues had been in relation 
to the status of women in the military. The NATO/EAPC policy is applicable to 
NATO’s civilian structure and includes provisions for human resource policy, 
education and training, and public diplomacy (see discussion in Chapter Seven) 
(NATO, 2014c). BI-Strategic Command 40-1 extended the provisions of the 
NATO/EAPC policy to NATO’s military structure. The two NATO Strategic 
Commands17 jointly drafted BI-SC 40-1, with the aim of providing ‘guidance for the 
integration of Resolutions, Conventions, Protocols and gender perspective into the 
planning and conduct of NATO-led operations’ (Colao, 2013:19). The document is 
binding on all International Military Headquarters and any entity under the ACO or 
                                                
17 Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and the Supreme Allied Commander 
Transformation (SACT) 
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ACT chain of command (it is therefore binding on contributing partners to NATO 
missions). The content of Bi-Strategic Command 40-1 is therefore significant given 
that it represents a site from which NATO’s role as a ‘teaching machine’ is realised, 
with NATO member and partners compelled to subscribe to the provisions within it. 
While the NATO/EAPC policy encompasses the value placed on UNSCR 1325 by 
NATO members and partners and offers an opportunity to transform NATO as an 
organisation. It is therefore essential to consider the overarching aims of both policies 
and how these documents may challenge (or not) the foundations of the gender regime 
underpinning NATO. This section examines the NATO/EAPC policy applicable to 
NATO’s civilian structure (and associated Action Plan) and Bi-Strategic Command 
40-1 applicable to the military structure using content analysis. In doing so it draws 
out the key frames used to define UNSCR 1325, gender and women within the 
documents. 
 
(5.3.1) The military and civilian structures 
The NATO/EAPC policy and Bi-Strategic Command 40-1 represent NATO’s attempt 
to integrate UNSCR 1325 into organisational and operational considerations. It is 
therefore necessary to examine the extent to which these policies are reflective of the 
wider WPS agenda encapsulated in the eight WPS Resolutions. This has seen the 
provisions of the agenda widened (for example, to include countering violent 
extremism), while developing a more nuanced conception of WPS (see discussion in 
Chapter One). The NATO/EAPC policy was adopted in 2007 and was subsequently 
revised in 2011 and 2014. This brings the policy up-to-date with all but the most recent 
of the WPS Resolutions, UNSCR 2242 adopted in October 2015. 
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adoption in 2009, Bi-Strategic Command 40-1 has been revised only once, in 2012. 
This means that the NATO policy applicable to the military structure and binding on 
all contributors to NATO led missions does not reflect the full scope of the WPS 
agenda, missing the provisions of UNSCRs 2106, 2122 and 2242. 
The first iteration of the NATO/EAPC Policy on UNSCR 1325 adopted in 2007 is a 
brief document and acts more as an aspiration for what NATO can achieve through 
the adoption of the Resolution. It grounds the adoption of UNSCR 1325 in a normative 
role for NATO (and partners), outlined as the promotion of ‘democracy, individual 
liberty and the rule of law’ (NATO, 2007b). In addition, to highlighting the added 
value of women through the ‘distinctive role women can play in conflict resolution’ 
(NATO, 2007b). The policy was initially applicable to operations, although it was 
intended that a wider application would follow (and it has done with two further 
revisions of the NATO/EAPC policy widening its remit). It calls for the development 
of a military concept on UNSCR 1325 (which was realised in Bi-Strategic Command 
40-1) and for NATO Military Authorities to take the lead in the implementation of the 
Resolution (NATO, 2007b). This contributes to understanding how NATO’s adoption 
of UNSCR 1325 came to associate WPS with the military structure’s existing 
preoccupation with the status of women in NATO militaries (see discussion in Chapter 
Three). The policy also calls for NATO to engage with civil society in developing a 
broader policy on UNSCR 1325 (NATO, 2007b). This is particularly interesting as it 
is not evident that formal consultation with NGOs occurred until 2014, following the 
appointment of the Secretary General’s Special Representative on UNSCR 1325 (see 
discussion in Chapter Six). There is also a call to consider the need to appoint a 
dedicated gender adviser to NATO HQ (NATO 2007b). This suggests the ambition 
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for a NATO Special Representative realised in 2012 had its roots as far back as 2007 
(again, see discussion in Chapter Six). 
The NATO/EAPC policy on UNSCR 1325 was first revised in 2011. This document 
was far more substantial than the initial policy and further articulated NATO’s 
approach to WPS. Of particular note, is the aim for the Resolution ‘to become an 
integral and complementary part of NATO's corporate identity’ (NATO, 2011c). This 
is interesting in two respects. First, the adoption of UNSCR 1325 is implied as 
something a ‘good’ institution would do and frames NATO’s adoption of UNSCR 
1325 as instrumental to bolster perceptions of NATO. Second, it goes against the 
intentions of the feminist activists who supported the realisation of UNSCR 1325 in 
the Security Council, with the Resolution intended to challenge, rather than support 
the militarism NATO embodies (see discussion in Chapter One).  
The 2011 NATO/EAPC policy goes onto outline a six track approach to implementing 
UNSCR 1325. The first part of this approach is the mainstreaming of WPS into 
policies, programmes and documentation. This is framed as necessary because of the 
‘impact and benefits of [mainstreaming] the Resolutions in the daily work of the 
organisation, its staff and committees’ (NATO, 2011c) and is representative of the 
framing of UNSCR 1325 as of ‘added value’ to NATO. The second approach is to 
foster cooperation with international organisations and civil society, to include 
‘exchanges of information, best practices and expertise, as well as practical 
cooperation’ (NATO, 2011c). This again reflects the ‘added value’ of UNSCR 1325 
in fostering cooperation with partners, but also NATO’s role as a ‘teaching machine’ 
sharing lessons on best practice in relation to gender and UNSCR 1325. The third and 
fourth parts of the six track approach, ‘operations’ and ‘education and training’ are 
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related. The operational aspect is descriptive, with the provisions on how this aspect 
will be implemented detailed in a confidential NATO Action Plan (see discussion 
below). There is more information in relation to education and training, which is 
framed as an ‘essential tool’ to contribute to the ‘effectiveness of operations and 
missions’ (NATO, 2011c). Of particular interest, is the inclusion of public diplomacy 
in the  six track approach, with the intention of raising awareness of NATO’s policies 
on gender and to reinforce the message that the Alliance is committed to UNSCR 1325 
(NATO, 2011c) (see further discussion in Chapter Seven). This reinforces the notion 
that UNSCR 1325 is perceived as an effective public diplomacy tool by NATO to 
bolster the Alliance’s image (as discussed in the previous paragraph). The final point 
of the six-point approach is support for national initiatives to implement UNSCR 
1325, including the promotion of women’s participation in national militaries. This 
situates UNSCR 1325 within NATO’s pre-existing agenda on increasing the 
representation of women in NATO militaries and supports NATO’s role as a ‘teaching 
machine’ in respect of gender and UNSCR 1325 (see discussion in Chapter Three).  
The 2011 NATO/EAPC policy encapsulates the ‘added value’ of UNSCR 1325 to 
NATO in a number of aspects. First, as a public diplomacy tool to frame the Alliance 
as inherently ‘good’ (discussed further in Chapter Seven); second, as a means to 
engage partners, other international organisations and civil society’; third, to bolster 
an existing agenda to increase the representation of women in NATO militaries; and 
finally in a practical sense as a means of increasing operational effectiveness. The 
policy also outlines NATO’s role as a ‘teaching machine’ sharing lessons on best 
practice with international organisations and civil society but also in supporting 
member states to implement UNSCR 1325 and to increase the representation of 
women within their armed forces.  
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In addition to outlining the six track approach to NATO’s implementation of UNSCR 
1325, the 2011 NATO/EAPC policy also includes provision for monitoring and 
accountability mechanisms. This includes a biennial review of the policy and an 
annual report to be released by the Secretary General (see discussion in Chapter Six) 
(NATO, 2011c). In addition, an implementation plan was produced ‘to provide an 
overall framework for NATO's practical implementation of the Resolutions with its 
Partners’ and identified ‘goals, concrete actions, action authorities (IS, IMS, NATO 
Military Authorities, Allied and Partner nations), measurement of progress, timelines 
and status of work’ (NATO, 2011c). However, this Implementation Plan was 
classified which made it difficult for it to be used to hold NATO account for its 
implementation of UNSCR 1325.  
The 2014 NATO/EAPC policy represented a significant development in NATO’s 
approach to UNSCR 1325 and was reflective of the progress made following the 
appointment of the Secretary General’s Special Representative on Women, Peace and 
Security (see discussion in Chapter Six). Most pertinently, there is a shift away from 
the emphasis in previous policies on the ‘added value’ of UNSCR 1325 to bolster 
NATO’s existing agendas, to a focus on how NATO can support the broader WPS 
agenda. For example, the implementation of UNSCR 1325 is framed ‘within the 
context of NATO’s wider policy objectives core tasks’, rather than as an add on. The 
policy also applies for the first time to NATO’s own human resource policies (civilian 
and military), stating that ‘gender balance within our institutions is a goal in itself, and 
is also a means for improving performance’ (NATO, 2014c). In addition, the 
monitoring and reporting mechanisms are also strengthened and provide greater 
transparency to enable outside scrutiny of NATO’s implementation of UNSCR 1325, 
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with the NATO/EAPC Action Plan being released publicly for the first time (see 
discussion below). 
In relation the military structure, the first iteration of Bi-Strategic Command 40-1, 
adopted in 2009, has three chapters. In addition to the introduction, which includes a 
focus on ‘manning principles’ and education and training, the other two chapters, 
address NATO standards of behaviour in operations and the protection of women and 
children. The document is grounded in protectionist rationale, relating not just to the 
protection element outlined in UNSCR 1325 but also to the protection of children and 
civilians in conflict, as mandated in UNSCR 1261, UNSCR 1314 and UNSCR 1674 
(in addition to WPS Resolution 1820). The conflation of these two agendas, and the 
predominant focus on the protectionist element of UNSCR 1325 undermines the 
transformative potential of the WPS agenda. 
The 2012 revision of Bi-Strategic Command 40-1, again includes three chapters but 
this time focuses on education and training, and implementation, including gender 
balance within NATO forces, operational planning and standards of behaviour. The 
focus on ‘manning principles’ has been all but removed, with only one reference to a 
‘manning conference’. However, the 2012 Bi-Strategic Command 40-1 maintains the 
reference to the formal agendas on the protection of civilians and children in conflict 
and there are still a significant number of references to children (or women associated 
with children) (see table: 10). It is therefore a much more nuanced and thought through 
document in the way it is presented, although it maintains a focus on protection as a 
result of the conflation of protection agendas for children and civilians with the WPS 
agenda.  
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In contrast to the NATO/EAPC Policy, which remains a regularly revised document, 
Bi-Strategic Command 40-1 is now an outdated concept. Since the Command was 
adopted in 2012, the Security Council has adopted three further Resolutions. UNSCRs 
2106, 2122 and 2242 have contributed to creating a more nuanced WPS agenda, 
calling for increased monitoring and the inclusion of the CVE agenda (see discussion 
in Chapter One). 
(5.3.2) NATO/EAPC Action Plan on UNSCR 1325 
In November 2010, NATO adopted an Action Plan on mainstreaming UNSCR 1325 
into NATO-led operations and missions (NATO, 2011c). This first Action Plan was 
adopted only by the North Atlantic Council (Oudraat et al., 2015:5) and was classified 
due to the sensitive and operation specific information it contained (NATO Official, 
2014). In addition, an Implementation Plan was adopted to support the overall 
implementation of UNSCR 1325, which was again classified (NATO, 2011c). The 
document was revised in 2014 and replaced with an overarching Action Plan to include 
the EAPC, Afghanistan, Australia, Japan, Jordan, New Zealand, and the United Arab 
Emirates. (Oudraat et al., 2015: 5). This document was unclassified and is freely 
available on the NATO website (NATO/EAPC, 2014). This in itself is a significant 
development given that it opens up the reality behind NATO’s implementation of 
UNSCR 1325 to public scrutiny for the first time. 
The 2014 NATO/EAPC Action Plan applies not just to operations (as the previous 
classified iteration had) but comprehensively. It is divided into seven sections. The 
first outlines two overarching goals of the implementation of UNSCR 1325. These are 
1) reducing barriers to women’s ‘meaningful participation’ in defence and security 
institutions and, 2) the integration of a gender perspective in NATO policies and 
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activities (NATO/EAPC, 2014). The next section focuses on cooperative security, or 
the role of partners, indicating that this continues to be a priority area for NATO’s 
implementation of UNSCR 1325 (see discussion in Chapter Six) (NATO/EAPC, 
2014). The NATO/EAPC Action Plan clearly supports the centrality of NATO 
partners to NATO’s adoption of UNSCR 1325, given their priority as the second issue 
discussed (after overarching goals). In part, this is to be expected given that it is 
adopted jointly with the EAPC but the fact that this is the case is also reflective of the 
role partners continue to play in supporting NATO’s implementation of UNSCR 1325. 
This serves to situate the Resolution as somewhat external to NATO’s own core 
identity and purpose as a defence organisation, given that UNSCR 1325 can only 
really be implemented according to the Action Plan, with the involvement of NATO 
partners.  
The Action Plan then turns to focus on crisis management in NATO-led operations 
and missions, and specifically the value of UNSCR 1325 as a tool to increase 
operational effectiveness. This is consistent with the value NATO has placed on 
UNSCR 1325 as a tool to increase operational effectiveness (see discussion above). 
The Action Plan then places an action on national authorities to report on the status of 
women in their militaries, although interestingly the NATO Committee on Gender 
Perspectives, which collates such information (see discussion in Chapter Three) is not 
referred to. The next three sections are categorised as ‘cross-cutting enablers’ and 
include human resource policies, education and training, and public diplomacy. The 
reference to these topics as ‘cross-cutting enablers’ suggests that there is an awareness 
that it is necessary to integrate UNSCR 1325 into these areas in order to fully 
implement UNSCR 1325 (and support its ‘added value’ as a tool for operational 
effectiveness).  
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The NATO/EAPC Action Plan is supported by a set of 34 indicators, 26 of which are 
quantitative. These ask for the implementing entity to provide either a number or 
percentage in order to evaluate the progress made in implementing a particular action 
in support of a desired action (NATO/EAPC. 2014). As McLeod (2016) notes, 
quantitative indicators in action plans are technocratic and give the appearance of 
being rational, efficient and apparently neutral (regardless of the reality). As an inter-
governmental organisation, NATO is not in a position to demand that member states 
provide information, the loose quantitative reporting requested on the status of women 
in NATO militaries is reflective of this. It also does not go much beyond what member 
states already report to the NCGP annually on, that is, the number of women in their 
armed forces and the status of their action plan on UNSCR 1325 (NATO/EAPC, 
2014). Most significant perhaps, is that the indicators do not necessarily support the 
realisation of the actions. For example, an action on national authorities is to ‘include 
gender advisory capacity as part of recognised military capability’ (NATO/EAPC, 
2014), however, states are not asked to report on the number of gender advisors or 
their position within armed forces. Another example is in respect of the action on states 
to promote women’s equal participation in the military, there is no clearly associated 
indicator for this. A quantitative indicator could include reporting on the number of 
schemes supported at a national level in support of this action. However, it could be 
expected that states continuing to uphold a combat exclusion policy, including the UK, 
would be resistant to such an action. This makes the quantitative indicators somewhat 
hollow. 
In respect of human resource policies to support the increased representation of 
women in NATO HQ, there are a number of actions on NATO International Staff, 
military authorities and national authorities. These include the provision of appropriate 
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policies, training and the establishment of informal networks (NATO/EAPC, 2014). 
However, the quantitative indicator for this action is so broad as to be meaningless. It 
only asks for data on the number and scope of human resource policies and so is not 
able to measure the provision of training or informal networks. Part of the issue here 
lies in the fact that this action is applicable to a broad range of actors, a necessity, 
perhaps, given that states continue to have such an important role in the promotion and 
recruitment of individuals to positions within NATO. A narrower focus on NATO 
International Staff would perhaps have produced better incentives for results. 
The actions and outcomes in respect of gender education and training for military and 
civilian staff within the Action Plan fall short. They require reporting on the number 
of training modules that include WPS, exercises that include gender advisors, 
assessments of the impact of training, and the extent to which WPS is included in 
exercises (NATO/EAPC 2014). It is interesting to note that no quantitative indicator 
is included for the indicator on the inclusion of WPS in exercises, this particular action 
would lend itself well to quantitative analysis of the number of exercises that did 
include WPS. The lack of a quantitative indicator here suggests this was a contentious 
issue for the Allies, with a quantitative indicator unlikely to reflect well on the 
implementation of UNSCR 1325 (McLeod, 2016) 
The indicators related to the actions on Public Diplomacy also fall short because, while 
NATO and national authorities are tasked with ensuring WPS is integrated into all 
public diplomacy efforts, the only indicator relates to the ‘number and scope of public 
diplomacy efforts including website and NATO TV Channel stories’ (NATO/EAPC,  
2014). This means it is not possible to effectively monitor the implementation of 
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UNSCR 1325 in respect of public diplomacy efforts (see further discussion in Chapter 
Seven).  
The final section of the Action Plan focuses on monitoring and reporting. The actions 
here include the establishment of a Women, Peace and Security Task Force to 
coordinate efforts across NATO structures, this is a useful addition given the 
complexity of NATO’s organisational structure. NATO International Staff and 
Military Authorities are also tasked with developing their own specific 
implementation plans and sufficiently resourcing them. The indicator supporting this 
action, monitors the number and scope of such plans. This has the potential to be a 
positive move, in that it puts responsibility for the implementation of UNSCR 1325 
onto specific actors across the organisation. This section also calls for the appointment 
of gender focal points and while this can be seen as a positive measure, there is a 
danger that such focal points can become the locus for WPS within structures and 
actually hinder efforts to mainstream WPS. 
The NATO/EAPC Action Plan was opened up to inspection from civil society before 
it was formally adopted with formal consultation held in Brussels in June 2014 
(ENNA,  2014). The significance of this for the Alliance should not be underestimated, 
this was the first time any NATO policy issue had been formally opened up to civil 
society scrutiny (NATO Official, 2014). Outside of operations where NATO-civil 
society consultations can be a necessity, NATO has had a difficult relationship with 
NGOs. The role of the Secretary General’s Special Representative was instrumental 
in paving the way for NATO’s first consultations with civil society, on taking office 
she actively sought to engage civil society and met with them at every opportunity she 
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could, seeking to engage them on NATO’s implementation of UNSCR 1325 (see 
discussion in Chapter Six). 
There are, however, two caveats to the transformative potential of the Action Plan. 
The first is that the civil society groups invited to the consultation were self-selected 
by NATO and EAPC member states (DCAF, 2014: 3) and as a result are likely not to 
have been representative of more critical voices from civil society. In total NGOs from 
27 different countries (NATO, EAPC and a number of other partners)  and two 
networking platforms: Women In International Security (WIIS) and European 
Network of NGOs in Afghanistan (ENNA) were present (DCAF, 2014). In addition, 
given that the NGOs governments are likely to draw upon are in all likelihood 
recipients of government funding, there could be a reluctance on the behalf of those 
NGOs to engage fully in a critique of the Action Plan in case it jeopardised future 
funding opportunities. The danger of the co-optation of NGOs reliant on funding from 
governments has been highlighted in studies of development NGOs (Hudson, 
2002:412; Edwards and Hulme,1996).  
The second caveat is that in making the Action Plan publicly available significant 
compromises had to be made in the content of the Action Plan due to security 
concerns, which would not have been necessary had it been classified (NATO Official, 
2014). This resulted in the 2014 Action Plan being a broad document with less 
operational relevance than the previous iteration. It also meant that for UNSCR 1325 
to be incorporated into more sensitive policy areas, an additional classified action plan 
would have to be produced (NATO Official, 2014). The broadening of the Action Plan 
was a necessary compromise to open up NATO’s implementation of UNSCR 1325 to 
public scrutiny, however, given that this did not alter the need for operational 
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sensitivity it was somewhat of a superficial move and much of NATO’s operational 
level implementation of UNSCR 1325 will inevitably fall outside of the purview of 
public scrutiny given security concerns. 
 
(5.3.3) Language matters: Gender, men and ‘womenandchildren’ 
This section now turns to examine the language embodied within the NATO policies 
on UNSCR 1325, including the NATO/EAPC Policy and Action Plan and Bi-Strategic 
Command 40-1. In doing so it will examine whether the weaknesses and tensions 
within UNSCR 1325 in relation to the framing of gender and women have been 
incorporated or challenged at the regional level. These criticisms include: the framing 
of women as victims, rather than agents; gender as synonymous with women; and the 
association of women with children. This relates to the criticusms levied against the 
WPS agenda more broadly and discussed in Chapter One. This analysis concludes by 
outlining an understanding of UNSCR 1325 as a ‘travelling concept’, in order to 
understand how it can support both pacifism and militarism. 
A central criticism of the WPS agenda is that women are framed both as agents with 
capacity to affect change and as victims in need of protection. The duality of these 
roles creates a tension within the WPS framework (Shepherd, 2011). Using NVivo, I 
performed two text searches in order to assess the way ‘women’ are framed as a 
category in the key NATO policy documents on WPS, the NATO/EAPC Policy for 
Implementing UNSCR 1325 (2007, 2011 and 2014), the NATO/EAPC Action Plan for 
Implementing UNSCR 1325 (2014) and Bi-Strategic Command 40-1. The two chosen 
frames were: ‘women as victims’ and ‘women as decision-makers’.  In the case of the 
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‘victims’ frame, the analysis focused on ‘victims’ and ‘protection’, and stemmed 
words. The second frame, ‘women as decision-makers’, sought to link women’s 
contribution to decision making by focusing on key words. These were ‘agents’, 
‘politicians’, ‘actors’, ‘policy-making’, ‘peace-making’, ‘participation’ and stemmed 
words. For both these frame I then ran a compound query18 to establish the frequency 
of the association of women as victims (see Table 8) and women as decision-makers 
(see Table 9). The NATO/EAPC Policy has consistently associated women as both 
victims and agents through its three revisions, with no particular emphasis on either 
frame. This is also found in the NATO/EAPC Action Plan. Bi-Strategic Command 40-
1 differs, with women predominantly associated as victims in its first iteration in 2009. 
This marks a disjuncture with the wider understanding of women in the WPS agenda 
as both victims and agents. The latest revision (2012) brings Bi-Strategic Command 
40-1 in line with the NATO/EAPC Policy and (subsequently) the NATO/EAPC 
Action Plan with an equitable focus on women as victims and agents.  
Table 8 
 
                                                
18 The compound query identified when these frames occurred within 5 words of ‘women’. 
Date Policy References Coverage
2007 NATO/EAPC Policy for Implementing UNSCR 1325 3 1.45%
2011 NATO/EAPC Policy for Implementing UNSCR 1325 3 2.94%
2014 NATO/EAPC Policy for Implementing UNSCR 1325 4 2.57%
2014 NATO/EAPC Action Plan for Implementing UNSCR 1325 4 2.04%
2009 Bi-Strategic Command 40-1 8 2.09%
2012 Bi-Strategic Command 40-1 7 1.48%
Framings of women as victims within NATO policies on UNSCR 1325
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Table 9 
 
Another key constraint of the WPS agenda, again relates to the use of gender 
essentialisms. For example, the association of women with children in a category 
Enloe (1993) refers to as ‘womenandchildren’. This Enloe argues, serves to group 
them together in opposition to the male norm, and reinforces the notion that women 
are mothers (and family members) above all else. In doing so states and international 
institutions are provided with a paternalistic role to protect these vulnerable women 
and children (Enloe, 1993). Moreover, reinforcing established gender essentialisms 
risks making those who do not conform vulnerable, and as such undermines the 
intended aim of protecting this group (Carpenter, 2005: 328). In NVivo, I performed 
a text search query to find references to women and children (boys and girls) and then 
ran a compound query19 to identify where women are framed as associated with 
children. The results (see Table 10) indicate that the association of women with 
children in the NATO/EAPC Policy and NATO/EAPC Action Plan is insignificant. 
However, Bi-Strategic Command 40-1 does significantly associate women with 
children and this association has increased in the most recent 2012 revision. This is 
problematic, especially given that Bi-Strategic Command 40-1 is the means by which 
                                                
19 The compound query identified where references to ‘children’, ‘boys’ or ‘girls’ occurred 
within 5 words of ‘women’. 
Framings of women as decision-makers within NATO policies on UNSCR 1325
Date Policy References Coverage
2007 NATO/EAPC Policy for Implementing UNSCR 1325 4 2.44%
2011 NATO/EAPC Policy for Implementing UNSCR 1325 3 2.42%
2014 NATO/EAPC Policy for Implementing UNSCR 1325 4 2.19%
2014 NATO/EAPC Action Plan for Implementing UNSCR 1325 4 3.00%
2009 Bi-Strategic Command 40-1 0 0.00%
2012 Bi-Strategic Command 40-1 6 1.38%
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UNSCR 1325 is operationalised in NATO operations. The association of women with 
children, removes women’s agency and frames them as in need of protection.  
Table 10 
 
In addition to the association of women with children, UNSCR 1325 has been 
criticised for associating gender with women by using the terms interchangeably 
(Puechguirbal, 2010: 184). It is therefore unsurprising that NATO has adopted this 
understanding. The association of gender with women has become more predominant 
in NATO policy on UNSCR 1325 in their latest iterations (see Table 11). Using 
NVivo, I ran a text search for ‘women’ and ‘gender’ and then a compound query20 to 
identify where gender was framed as synonymous with women. This analysis 
demonstrates that the NATO/EAPC Policy has gone from 13 references in the 2009 
iteration, to 25 in 2014. This is a significant increase and is in line with the association 
of gender with women in the NATO/EAPC Action Plan published in 2014, which 
outlines specifically the actions NATO will take to operationalise the implementation 
of UNSCR 1325. In contrast to the NATO/EAPC Policy, both iterations of Bi-Strategic 
Command 40-1 have a significant association of gender with women and this has only 
                                                
20 The compound query identified where references to ‘gender’ occurred within 5 words of 
‘women’. 
 
Date Policy References Coverage
2007 NATO/EAPC Policy for Implementing UNSCR 1325 4 1.79%
2011 NATO/EAPC Policy for Implementing UNSCR 1325 2 1.94%
2014 NATO/EAPC Policy for Implementing UNSCR 1325 2 1.28%
2014 NATO/EAPC Action Plan for Implementing UNSCR 1325 3 1.17%
2009 Bi-Strategic Command 40-1 14 3.42%
2012 Bi-Strategic Command 40-1 25 4.80%
Framings of women associated with children (or boys or girls) within NATO policies on UNSCR 1325
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increased. This analysis demonstrates that the latest NATO policies on UNSCR 1325, 
applicable to both the civilian and military structures, do associate gender with 
women. However, a text search for ‘women’, ‘men’ and ‘gender’ identifies that Bi-
Strategic Command 40-1 does make mention of men, and significantly more so than 
the NATO/EAPC policy. For example, the NATO/EAPC policy makes no mention of 
men in its first two iterations and only two in the 2014 revision (see Table 12). A 
similar pattern is found in the Action Plan which makes only two references to men. 
In contrast, Bi-Strategic command 40-1 does mention men in both the 2009 and 2012 
versions, with the ratio of men to women improving from 26% (46/12) in 2009 to 46% 
(68/29) in 2012. In this respect, Bi-Strategic Command 40-1 has a more nuanced 
understanding of UNSCR 1325 as applicable to the concerns of women and (to some 
extent) men. While Bi-Strategic Command 40-1 does associate gender with women, 
there is also an acknowledgement that UNSCR 1325 is applicable (to a lesser extent) 
to men too. Whereas the NATO/EAPCP policy presents a far less nuanced approach, 
with UNSCR 1325 framed as only applicable to the concerns of women, limiting the 
transformative potential of NATO’s implementation of the WPS agenda. 
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Table 11, Framings of gender associated with women within NATO policies on 
UNSCR 1325 
 
Table 12 
 
The conceptualisation of UNSCR 1325 as a ‘travelling concept’21 is useful for 
understanding the specific way in which NATO has understood the WPS agenda and 
for understanding how the Resolution can be used to support both feminist pacifism 
and militarism. For example, McLeod’s (2012:137) work on Women in Black (WiB), 
in Serbia finds that at the local level the group learn about UNSCR 1325 and conceive 
of ways in which the Resolution can be used strategically to support the existing goals 
of the group. McLeod (2012:137) finds that WiB did not articulate ‘security’ as a key 
value of the group until 2005 and this coincided with UNSCR 1325 becoming a 
                                                
21 This term is introduced as a theme in the section entitled ‘Institutional Practices and 
Traveling Concepts’ in Kronsell and Svedberg's (2012) edited book Making Gender, Making 
War: Violence, Military and Peacekeeping Practices. The theme includes chapters by Laura 
Herbert, Jane Freedman and Laura McLeod. 
Date Policy References Coverage
2007 NATO/EAPC Policy for Implementing UNSCR 1325 13 5.85%
2011 NATO/EAPC Policy for Implementing UNSCR 1325 8 6.42%
2014 NATO/EAPC Policy for Implementing UNSCR 1325 25 15.26%
2014 NATO/EAPC Action Plan for Implementing UNSCR 1325 35 14.69%
2009 Bi-Strategic Command 40-1 40 8.58%
2012 Bi-Strategic Command 40-1 55 9.21%
Framings of gender association with women within NATO policies on UNSCR 1325
Date Policy.'women' or 'girls' .'men' or 'boys' .'gender'
2007 NATO/EAPC Policy for Implementing UNSCR 1325 42 0 27
2011 NATO/EAPC Policy for Implementing UNSCR 1325 10 0 0
2014 NATO/EAPC Policy for Implementing UNSCR 1325 31 2 17
2014 NATO/EAPC Action Plan for Implementing UNSCR 1325 38 2 39
2009 Bi-Strategic Command 40-1 46 12 81
2012 Bi-Strategic Command 40-1 68 29 115
References within NATO policies on UNSCR 1325
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strategy to achieve their objectives. The core values of WiB had not changed, rather 
they were articulated differently to align with UNSCR 1325, using ‘mainstream’ 
language on security to express feminist goals. Similarly, NATO aligns its own pre-
existing concern with the status of women in NATO militaries, rearticulating it to 
alight with the feminist agenda embodied within the Resolution. 
In understanding UNSCR 1325 as a ‘traveling concept’ we see how it has moved from 
transnational feminism, to formal acceptance by the UN Security Council and then 
adoption by grassroots (feminist) NGOs at the local level (McLeod, 2012:137). 
NATO’s adoption of the Resolution adds an additional dimension to this journey. 
NATO did not adopt UNSCR 1325 in response to pressure from feminist NGOs nor 
did it draw on civil society expertise, which a number of National Action Plans have 
done to their benefit (see discussion in Chapter One). Rather, NATO’s adoption of 
UNSCR 1325 was the result of state-level advocacy of the issue which framed the 
Resolution as part of NATO’s existing concern with the status of women in the 
military but also as a tool to increase operational effectiveness and engage partner 
states. This journey served to remove UNSCR 1325 from a direct link to feminist 
advocacy. Further, feminist anti-militarists who formed part of the transnational 
movement and also part of local grassroots movements are understandably reluctant 
to engage with a militarist organisation which they perceive as the ‘bastion of 
militarised masculinity’ (Cockburn, 2011). Despite the initial NATO/EAPC policy on 
UNSCR 1325 adopted in 2007 calling for civil society consultation, it is not evident 
that this occurred (at least openly) until seven years after NATO’s initial adoption of 
UNSCR 1325 that civil society were consulted and while this was a ground-breaking 
move for NATO the limitations to the consultations shielded NATO from a truly open 
dialogue on the issues involved (see discussion above).  In this sense NATO has been 
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isolated from the transformative feminist agenda which supported the adoption of the 
Resolution. 
  
(5.4) Conclusion 
This Chapter has demonstrated that an understanding of NATO as an organisation and 
the politics underpinning this are crucial to unpacking NATO’s adoption of UNSCR 
1325. In addition, it has challenged dominant understanding of agenda setting at 
NATO through outlining how UNSCR 1325 emerged as a counter-discourse 
supported by certain NATO member and partner states, with the USA disengaged from 
the process. The Chapter drew attention to the role of the informal grouping of 
members and partners, known as the ‘friends of 1325’, in supporting NATO’s 
adoption of 1325 and the strategies they successfully employed to advance the agenda, 
including discussing collective strategies before meetings. Specifically, the Chapter 
examined the role of Austria, Finland and Sweden in supporting NATO’s adoption of 
UNSCR 1325. It also examined the role of key NATO members (Netherlands, Norway 
and the UK) in supporting UNSCR 1325 as members of the ‘friends of 1325’ 
examining their understanding of the Resolution. This drew upon NATO’s role as a 
‘teaching machine’ to contribute an understanding of how the states who supported 
NATO’s adoption of UNSCR 1325 helped shape an understanding of UNSCR 1325 
as a tool of ‘added value’ to the military. 
The Chapter then went onto outline the ‘added value’ of UNSCR 1325 for NATO in 
two interrelated ways. First, as a means to further a long established and pre-existing 
agenda to increase the representation of women in NATO forces. And second, as a 
reaction to the gendered specificities of the ISAF mission in Afghanistan, which led 
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to the use of Female Engagement Teams and necessitated an understanding of the 
utility of a gender perspective. The adoption of UNSCR 1325 also served as a way of 
bringing together a disparate group of states contributing to ISAF, and this had the 
effect of providing a forum through which states learn the value of UNSCR 1325 as a 
tool to increase operational effectiveness, an example of NATO’s role as a ‘teaching 
machine’. This also serves to limit the transformative potential of UNSCR 1325, with 
the Resolution not challenging but reinforcing NATO’s approach to international 
peace and security. 
The last section of the Chapter examined the provision of NATO policies on UNSCR 
1325, in both the military and civilian structures. In the civilian structure, there has 
been the most development on UNSCR 1325, with three revisions of the NATO/EAPC 
Policy having been released in 2007, 2011 and 2014. The 2007 NATO/EAPC Policy 
had a narrow focus on operations, this was widened in the 2011 revision to include a 
focus on the ‘added value’ of UNSCR 1325 for NATO, in respect of public diplomacy, 
both for NATO’s image and as a means to enhance cooperative security efforts 
(discussed further in Chapter Seven). The 2014 NATO/EAPC Policy is the most 
detailed to date, reflecting the role of the Special Representative on WPS in 
maintaining momentum behind the WPS agenda at NATO. Two significant 
developments within the 2014 revision are the framing of UNSCR 1325 as part of 
NATO’s core tasks (rather than as of ‘added value’ to them), and the extension of the 
policy to apply to NATO’s Human Resource policy for the first time. 
As this Chapter identified, the NATO-NGO consultations on UNSCR 1325 offer, 
perhaps, the most scope for transforming NATO’s approach to international peace and 
security and opening the organisation up to greater transparency. However, in their 
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current form they were conducted in relatively superficial manner with a limited group 
of member and partner state selected NGOs, which it was not clear were reflective of 
civil society on women, peace and security more broadly. 
On the military side, Bi-Strategic Command 40-1 has been revised just once in 2012, 
following its initial adoption in 2009. The 2012 concept remains outdated, predating 
three of the WPS Resolutions. In addition, Bi-Strategic Command 40-1 is grounded in 
protectionist logic and conflates the WPS agenda with those on the protection of 
children and civilians. 
The section then turned to examine the NATO/EAPC Action Plan released in 2014. 
The public availability of the latest Action Plan represents a positive step towards 
greater transparency in NATO’s implementation of UNSCR 1325. However, this is 
not without controversy, particularly given that the provisions of the Action Plan had 
to be watered down to make it suitable for release to the public and this necessarily 
limited its applicability to the more sensitive aspects of NATO’s work. The Action 
Plan is, nevertheless, a comprehensive and detailed document covering the range of 
NATO tasks and activities, from operations, to public diplomacy, to Human 
Resources. The focus on quantitative indicators within the Action Plan, is perhaps a 
reaction to the political sensitivity surrounding some of the issues to be reported on by 
member states but could serve to limit monitoring efforts. It remains to be seen what 
impact the Action Plan will have as a monitoring tool, with the first revision due in 
June 2016 (NATO/EAPC, 2014). 
Finally, the section examined the language within NATO policies on UNSCR 1325. 
This analysis found a disjuncture between Bi-Strategic Command 40-1 and the more 
nuanced conception of the WPS agenda embodied in the NATO/EAPC Policy. The 
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NATO/EAPC Policy made no significant distinction between the framing of women 
as decision-makers or as victims, in contrast to the 2009 Bi-Strategic Command 40-1, 
which did (although the 2012 revision brought Bi-Strategic Command 40-1 in line 
with the NATO/EAPC Policy). Bi-Strategic Command 40-1, the NATO/EAPC Action 
Plan and the NATO/EAPC Policy (increasingly so) associate gender with women, 
meaning in effect that the policy is only perceived as applicable to the concerns of 
women. This is reinforced by the absence of references to men or boys in the 
NATO/EAPC Policy (until 2014, where two references are made). On this aspect, Bi-
Strategic Command 40-1 makes far more references to men or boys, although still 
only half of the references are made to women or girls. Overall NATO policies on 
UNSCR 1325 are reflective of the gender essentialisms embodied in the WPS agenda 
as a whole. However, these gender essentialisms are far more pronounced in Bi-
Strategic Command 40-1 and this is particularly problematic given that the command 
is binding on all serving under NATO command. 
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Silos: NATO’s Implementation of UNSCR 1325 
(6.0) Introduction 
In respect of NATO’s implementation of UNSCR 1325, this thesis focuses on the 
period from the NATO Chicago Summit held in May 2012 to the NATO Wales 
Summit in September 2014. This time span was chosen because the Chicago Summit 
represented an increase in NATO’s commitment to UNSCR 1325. This was 
demonstrated through the creation of the post of Special Representative on Women, 
Peace and Security and in the commissioning of a report on the implementation of 
UNSCR 1325 in NATO-led operations. The first NATO Special Representative on 
Women, Peace and Security was in place for a fixed term ending at the Wales Summit, 
this time period therefore represented a critical opportunity in which to deepen 
NATO’s implementation of UNSCR 1325.  
In NATO’s implementation of UNSCR 1325 significant silos are identified in 
NATO’s approach. As outlined in the introduction, silos are understood as both 
pertaining to the isolation of policy on women, peace and security from the 
mainstream NATO agenda but also the military understanding of silos as an 
underground caven in which a guided missile is kept ready for use. This Chapter is 
structured into three sections, the first examines the value placed upon UNSCR 1325 
as a ‘diplomatic tool’ by NATO, member states and partners in relation to NATO 
Summits, partnerships beyond EAPC and through the Science for Peace (SPS) 
programme. The next section examines whether the WPS agenda has been 
institutionalised or exceptionalised by NATO, drawing attention to the 
overrepresentation of Voluntary National Contributions (VNCs) in roles responsible 
for WPS, and that many responsible for providing WPS or gender expertise are 
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women, serving to reinforce the notion that gender is synonymous with women. 
Finally, the section exposes the external nature of NATO’s gender training provision 
both symbolically and practically, with the location of the ‘Department Head’ in 
Sweden and as a way for NATO to ‘learn’ Sweden’s understanding of UNSCR 1325 
as of ‘added value’ to increase operational effectiveness. As such this thesis identifies 
that ‘learning’ on UNSCR 1325 at NATO occurs through both informal (socialisation) 
and formal structures. 
The final section examines the institutional support and role of critical actors in 
supporting UNSCR 1325. First, through examining the challenges facing femocrats 
operating within an institution of hegemonic masculinity, particularly where their 
agenda is side-lined as a personal one, even when it is also part of an institutional 
mandate. The section then looks at the pivotal role of the Secretary General’s Special 
Representative on Women, Peace and Security in harnessing her position to best effect 
and navigating NATO’s institutional politics, in addition to garnering external scrutiny 
of the Alliance in respect of UNSCR 1325, which led notably to NATO’s first ever 
formal consultation with civil society on any policy in June 2014. 
(6.1) UNSCR 1325 as a ‘diplomatic tool’ 
This section examines the value placed upon UNCR 1325 by NATO and NATO 
members and partners as a ‘diplomatic tool’. It does so first by examining the place of 
the WPS agenda at the biennial NATO Summits, from the first fleeting mention of 
WPS in 2008 at the Bucharest Summit, to its elevation to inclusion on the formal 
agenda at the Wales Summit in 2014. The section them moves to examine the 
increasing role of UNSCR 1325 as an area of lesson sharing with partner countries 
beyond EAPC, finding it serves as a ‘diplomatic tool’ for NATO and partners as a 
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means to bring together often diverging security communities. In this respect UNSCR 
1325 operates within a silo, whereby although the purpose of all NATO partnerships 
is not fully resolved, it acts as an issue to bring together a disparate set of actors. 
Finally, the section turns to examine the Science for Peace (SPS) programme 
examining how this has been used by NATO as a ‘diplomatic tool’ to bring in partner 
states to learn lessons on UNSCR 1325. This is evidence that UNSCR 1325 operates 
within a silo, NATO may not be actively engaged in operations or missions with the 
partners contributing to SPS programmes at present but should it do so they will have 
a shared starting point for cooperation (and understanding of the value of UNSCR 
1325).  
 
(6.1.1) UNSCR 1325 at NATO Summits: from Bucharest to Wales 
This section explores the position of the Women, Peace and Security agenda in 
discussions at NATO Summits in order to establish the value placed upon the agenda 
by NATO member states and the actions agreed to advance the agenda. NATO 
Summits are held biennially and attended by NATO members’ heads of state. Over 
two days of talks, state leaders shape the agenda of the institution for the preceding 
two years. They are ‘comprehensive affairs’ addressing the broad range of alliance 
activities and pertinent international issues (Webber, Hallams, and Smith, 2014: 783). 
NATO summits serve to reaffirm the transatlantic relationship and provide guidance 
to both the military and civilian structures on the future direction of the Alliance 
(Webber, Hallams, and Smith, 2014: 784). The majority of the groundwork for a 
NATO Summit is done in the lead-up to the meeting, the Summit itself is therefore 
largely a symbolic meeting and represents an opportunity for Alliance leaders to 
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reconfirm their commitment to trans-Atlantic security and the future shape of the 
Alliance.  
Each NATO Summit produces an outcome document known as a ‘Declaration’, which 
is reflective of the discussions which took place and the issues the Alliance has 
prioritised as most salient to trans-Atlantic security. These documents therefore 
provide an indication of the increasing priority given to Women, Peace and Security 
by NATO. Reference to UNSCR 1325 in a summit outcome document first occurred 
in the Bucharest Summit Declaration in 2008, this followed the adoption of the 
NATO/EAPC Policy. That UNSCR 1325 did not appear on a NATO Summit agenda 
prior to the adoption of the NATO/EAPC Policy supports the notion that the agenda 
did not emanate (solely) from NATO members (see discussion in Chapter Five). The 
reference in the Declaration was also a passing one, rather than a substantive one, 
merely stating that the Alliance will give priority to the role of women in conflict 
resolution (NATO, 2008). This is reflective of the fact that UNSCR 1325 was at that 
stage a very new issue for NATO and on the side-lines of Alliance activity. Two years 
later, at the Lisbon Summit further progress was made when Alliance leaders agreed 
on an Action Plan for mainstreaming UNSCR 1325 into NATO operations (NATO 
2010d). This supports the notion that member states were supportive of an increased 
priority being given to UNSCR 1325 by NATO.  
The Chicago Summit, held in 2012, proved hugely symbolic for the place of UNSCR 
1325 on NATO’s agenda through the agreement of two key outcomes. These were the 
commissioning of a review on the implementation of UNSCR 1325 (which would 
become the Review of the Practical Implications of UNSCR 1325 for the Conduct of 
NATO-led Operations and Missions, published in 2013) and the appointment of a 
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Special Representative. The agreement to conduct a review on UNSCR 1325, also 
challenged the notion that NATO Summits are (solely) symbolic affairs devoid of 
opportunities to posit items not previously discussed onto the agenda. This supports 
Shea's (2007: 50) argument that NATO Summits ‘can no longer afford mainly to bless 
pre-cooked decisions, but must be an opportunity for the kind of open dialogue which 
alone can correctly identify the challenges that NATO faces and therefore generate the 
troops, money, and political will essential for success’. The commitment agreed at the 
Chicago Summit to conduct a comprehensive review of the practical implementation 
of UNSCR 1325 in NATO operations is one such example of an item being introduced 
onto the agenda at the Summit which had not been previously discussed with the 
International Staff. As Loredana Alemanno-Testa, from the NATO Operations 
Division stated ‘no one really knew what it meant because the staff didn’t see it 
coming’  (Alemanno-Testa, 2013). It is noteworthy that NATO International Staff 
were not involved in the plans for the Review, suggesting that this was an initiative of 
certain Allies (it is not clear who), sensitive to potential resistance to the Review, likely 
from other Allies.  
The Chicago Summit had further significance for the advancement of the Women, 
Peace and Security agenda at NATO, in the form of the agreement to create the 
position of Secretary General’s Special Representative on Women, Peace and 
Security. This was an important development for two reasons, first, the creation of the 
position at a high seniority level was symbolic of the aspirations underpinning 
NATO’s implementation of UNSCR 1325. Second, in reporting directly to the 
Secretary General, the Special Representative would have the authority to act as a 
high-level institutional champion of the WPS agenda. However, although the creation 
of the positon represented a significant commitment by the Allies to the WPS agenda, 
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it was nevertheless a non-permanent post outside of the International Staff structure 
and therefore relied upon a state to volunteer to fund the position as a voluntary 
national contribution (VNC) for two years (see discussion below). The position from 
the outset was therefore precarious and without Norway stepping up to fund the 
position, and appointing Norwegian Diplomat Mari Skåre, there was a possibility it 
could have remained a vacant post (NATO Official, 2014).  
In addition to the main Summit Declaration, the Chicago Summit also produced a 
declaration on Afghanistan. This emphasised ‘the importance of [the] full participation 
of all Afghan women in the reconstruction, political, peace and reconciliation 
processes in Afghanistan and the need to respect the institutional arrangements 
protecting their rights’ and stated that NATO remained ‘committed to the 
implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 on 
women, peace and security’ (NATO, 2012e). Indeed, the commitment to include 
Afghan women in the peace processes in Afghanistan, is in line with UNSCR 1325 
which ‘urges member states to ensure the increased representation of women’ in the 
‘resolution of conflict’ (United Nations Security Council, 2000). Yet despite this 
declaration, Afghan women were not initially represented in peace talks held at the 
Chicago Summit. Afghan President Karzai’s initial delegation was comprised solely 
of men before a last minute adjustment ensured two women participated. This small 
concession followed lobbying by Afghan civil society and Amnesty International 
(Afghan Voice Agency, 2012). The absence of Afghan women from the table deciding 
the future of their country, was made visible by a shadow summit organised by civil 
society, in which Afghan women participated (WIIS, 2012). It is significant to note 
that former US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright and US Ambassador-at-Large 
for Global Women’s Issue, Melanie Verveer participated in the Shadow Summit 
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(Amnesty International, 2012) and in doing so her high-profile drew attention to the 
Shadow Summit and the absence of Afghan women from the Chicago Summit. The 
disjuncture between the rhetoric on women’s participation and the reality suggests that 
NATO’s commitment to UNSCR 1325 cedes priority when there is a perception that 
wider security matters should take priority.  
The importance of the 2014 Wales Summit for the future of the Alliance following the 
draw-down in Afghanistan was much discussed (Hudson, 2014; Mattelaer, 2014; 
Simón, 2014; Thieme, 2014; Webber et al., 2014). However, what this scrutiny 
overlooked was the significance of the Summit for the place of UNSCR 1325 on 
NATO’s agenda. The creation of a Secretary General’s Special Representative on 
Women, Peace and Security at the Chicago Summit was instrumental in supporting 
the momentum gained on UNSCR 1325 at NATO prior to the Wales Summit. The 
Wales Summit marked the end of the Special Representative’s term in post and was 
viewed as ‘an opportunity to draw Nation’s attention to the operational benefits of 
fully implementing a ‘Gender Perspective’ by utilising the tools available’ (Ehrhart-
Duffo and Young, 2014). The agenda for the Wales Summit included WPS under the 
final item for discussion, Afghanistan (NATO, 2014b). The place of WPS on the 
formal agenda was symbolic, particularly given the absence of women from talks on 
Afghanistan at the Chicago Summit two years earlier, and reflected the progress made 
in advancing the agenda at NATO. Nevertheless, it was also indicative of the place of 
WPS on the margins of NATO’s future priorities as the final item for discussion. 
Further, the place of WPS as a sub issue to be discussed in relation to Afghanistan was 
reflective of the centrality of NATO’s involvement in Afghanistan to the value the 
institution placed on WPS (see discussion in Chapter Five). It also further relegated 
WPS to the margins because for the first time since the Lisbon Summit, Afghanistan 
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did not form the ‘signature theme’ of discussions but was ‘more an issue of the past’ 
(Webber, Hallams, and Smith, 2014: 785). The international security situation had 
transformed beyond comparison, as had NATO’s priorities. A revanchist Russia, the 
situation in Ukraine and the ‘Islamic State’ pressed for a response from the Alliance 
and dominated the Summit outcomes. The decreasing centrality of Afghanistan to 
NATO’s priorities (and the intertwined nature of UNSCR 1325 with this intervention) 
left the WPS agenda vulnerable to being side-lined. 
Although WPS remained on the margins of NATO’s priorities, the Wales Summit 
strengthened NATO’s commitment to the women, peace and security agenda in a 
number of respects. For example, a number of Summit headlines related to the women, 
peace and security were agreed in advance of the Wales Summit. This included the 
endorsement of revised NATO/EAPC policy on women, peace and security and the 
corresponding Action Plan, which for the first time was released for public 
consumption (see discussion in Chapter Five). However, the most significant of these 
was the transformation of the Secretary General’s Special Representative on Women, 
Peace and Security into a permanent position within the Secretary General’s Office 
(on a 3+3 year contract in line with all new International Staff) (NATO, 2014l). This 
was a significant commitment, the budgetary restrictions NATO operates under means 
that the International Staff has remained a comparable size since the end of the Cold 
War and following an enlargement programme which has seen NATO’s membership 
more than double (Dijkstra, 2014). It also came at a crucial time for the position of 
WPS at NATO as the Alliance entered a period of transition with new Secretary 
General, Jens Stoltenberg, taking office following the Summit. The previous Secretary 
General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, had certainly not proved resistant to the WPS 
agenda and had done his part to raise the issue on the Alliance’s agenda (see discussion 
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below). However, without a high-level institutional champion there was no guarantee 
that the WPS agenda would continue to develop with the momentum it had previously 
garnered. The NATO Wales Summit was therefore a crucial strep towards 
institutionalising UNSCR 1325 within NATO’s core agenda. 
Another issue of note in respect of the Wales Summit and WPS, is that it was hosted 
by the UK, and the UK used the Summit as an opportunity to champion its own 
Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict Initiative (PSVI), which relates to the WPS 
agenda more broadly. The intentions of the UK in regard to PSVI and the Wales 
Summit were made explicit in a statement by the UK government, which noted that 
the Summit will provide an opportunity not only ‘to assess the progress NATO has 
made to advance the Women, Peace and Security agenda’ but also to ‘deepen its 
political and practical cooperation with Partner nations and international 
organisations’ (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2014: 23). The tangible actions in 
this respect are more difficult to fathom. One such action was taken by the UK Foreign 
Secretary, William Hague, who hosted a meeting on ‘women’s role in ending sexual 
violence in conflict’ and ‘creating sustainable peace’ (Gov.uk, 2014) during the 
Summit. It was, however, indicative of the place of WPS on NATO (and the UK’s) 
security agenda that a photo of the meeting included a caption that stated that the 
meeting took place ‘in the margins’ (NATO Summit Wales 2014, 2014).  In a 
statement on the meeting, Hague states that he was ‘joined by Foreign Ministers and 
senior diplomats who all actively support the issue of preventing sexual violence in 
conflict and women, peace and security’ (Gov.uk, 2014). However, an image of the 
meeting released on the official NATO Summit Wales 2014 Flickr account indicates 
that only four individuals were at the table. They were (see Figure 2, clockwise): 
Hague, the Swedish Foreign Minister, an unknown individual, an unknown individual, 
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and NATO Special Representative on WPS Mari Skåre. The two unknown individuals 
were not at the time serving foreign or defence ministers within NATO or partner 
states.  This indicates a disjuncture between the rhetorical commitment to WPS by the 
UK as an important issue at the Wales Summit, and the reality of the importance of 
the issue at NATO. It also demonstrates that the value of this PSVI meeting was 
primarily as a ‘good news story’ for the UK hosts of the Summit. 
 
Figure 2 ‘In the margins of the NATO Summit in Wales’ (NATO Summit Wales 
2014, 2014) 
The position of WPS within NATO Summits draws attention to the increased priority 
given to UNSCR 1325, exemplified at the Wales Summit, while also indicating that 
WPS remains on the margins of the Alliance’s priorities. The association of UNSCR 
1325 with NATO’s involvement in Afghanistan suggests that WPS remains 
vulnerable, as the Alliance’s security concerns shift elsewhere. In charting the rise of 
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UNSCR 1325 at the NATO Summits, we see that they are not (just) a symbolic forum 
to confirm decisions already made, but can enable new state-led initiatives to be 
introduced, such as the commissioning of the review on NATO and UNSCR 1325 at 
the Chicago Summit in 2012.  
(6.1.2) Beyond the Euro-Atlantic: NATO Partnerships and UNSCR 1325 
NATO partners have been central to supporting NATO’s commitment to UNSCR 
1325 (see discussion in Chapter Five). Indeed, NATO partners who are members of 
the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) have by extension signed up to the 
NATO/EAPC policy on UNSCR 1325 (with the exception of Russia). Beyond the 
EAPC, a number of other partners have signed up to the NATO/EAPC Action Plan, 
including Afghanistan, Australia, Georgia, Japan, Jordan, Krygz Republic, New 
Zealand and the United Arab Emirates. This reflects that fact that NATO’s 
partnerships have increasingly included provisions on WPS. For example, through the 
inclusion of UNSCR 1325 as an optional part of the partnership framework (NATO 
Official, 2014). And while partnership agreements are in the main classified (unless 
the partner releases them), it is possible to ascertain from reports elsewhere that twelve 
partner states have chosen to include UNSCR 1325 in their partnership framework 
with NATO (NATO, 2014d), with a particular focus of partners in the Western 
Balkans (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2014: 23). In addition, UNSCR 1325 is 
a significant part in several partner’s relations with NATO beyond the EAPC 
countries, specifically the non-EAPC partners who contributed to the development of 
the NATO/EAPC policy. They are Afghanistan22, Australia, Japan, Jordan and the 
                                                
22 Afghanistan is the exception among the states who have reportedly contributed to 
the NATO/EAPC policy on UNSCR 1325 because it is the only one subject to an 
intervention by NATO forces. 
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United Arab Emirates (UAE) (NATO, 2014d). These states have ad hoc partnerships 
with NATO, not conducted through a formal structure (NATO, 2015f). This is 
expected for some of these states who have adopted NAPs and are members of the 
‘friends of 1325’ at the UN (see Table 13, Table 14 and Table 15 below). However, 
for those states that have not previously supported the WPS agenda, such as Jordan, 
this was a development. The centrality of partners to NATO’s implementation of 
UNSCR 1325 is significant because it represents a site for the extension of NATO’s 
role as a ‘teaching machine’ on WPS and draws attention to the two-way nature of this 
relationship, indicating that lessons are learned by both partners and NATO on the 
value of UNSCR 1325. It also supports Wagnsson’s (2011: 596) contention that 
UNSCR 1325 serves as a bridging issue to bring together diverging security 
communities. 
It is noteworthy that, aside from EAPC, in the other two formal forums for cooperation 
with partners, the Istanbul Cooperative Initiative (ICI) and Mediterranean Dialogue 
(MD), no partners have adopted their own NAPs on UNSCR 1325 nor are they 
supportive of the issue through the ‘friends of 1325’ at the UN (see Table 13 and Table 
14). In the informal global partnerships, a majority (63%) have adopted NAPs and just 
under half (38%) are members of the ‘friends of 1325’ at the UN (see Table 15).  
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Table 13  
 
Table 14  
 
Country NAP adopted in Member of 'friends 
of 1325' at UN?
Algeria No No
Egypt No No
Israel No No
Jordan No No
Mauritania No No
Morocco No No
Tunisia No No
Total 0 0
Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) support for UNSCR 1325
Source: (PeaceWomen, 2015; NATO, 2015f; Villellas, 2010)
Country NAP adopted in Member of 'friends 
of 1325' at UN?
Bahrain No No
Qatar No No
Kuwait No No
United Arab Emirates No No
Total 0 0
Istanbul Cooperative (ICI) support for UNSCR 1325
Source: (PeaceWomen, 2015; NATO, 2015f; Villellas, 2010)
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Table 15  
 
This section will now go on to examine the contribution of a number of partners 
situated outside of the North Atlantic region, broadly defined, in more detail in order 
to ascertain the place and value of UNSCR 1325 for these relationships. These states 
are Australia, a contributor to ISAF; Japan, aligned with the US but constitutionally 
forbidden from participating in war; and Jordan, and the United Arab Emirates. All 
three partnerships with NATO put the military at the forefront of learning on UNSCR 
1325. 
Australia is a non-EAPC partner country, and contributor to the ISAF mission, which 
has sought to cooperate with NATO on WPS to some extent. Although it is not 
possible to ascertain if WPS features in the NATO-Australia partnership framework 
signed in 2013 (which is not publicly available), WPS is noticeable by its absence 
from the 2012 joint political declaration (NATO, 2013b). Nevertheless, NATO’s 
implementation of UNSCR 1325, particularly in respect of the ISAF mission, has 
influenced Australia’s adoption of its NAP on UNSCR 1325. For example, the 
Australian Government’s Department of Defence (2013) has stated that:  
Country NAP adopted in Member of 'friends 
of 1325' at UN?
Afghanistan 2015 No
Australia 2012 Yes
Iraq No NAP No
Japan 2015 Yes
Pakistan No NAP No
Republic of Korea 2014 Yes
New Zealand 2015 No
Mongolia No NAP No
Total 5 3
Partners across the globe support for UNSCR 1325
Source: (PeaceWomen, 2015; NATO, 2015f; Villellas, 2010)
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‘Given Australia's commitment and contribution to NATO operations such as 
the International Security Assistance Force Afghanistan, it is imperative that 
the ADF develop the framework to provide greater emphasis and focus on 
gender mainstreaming activities that align with international, UN and NATO 
efforts to integrate gender perspective into armed forces, military operations 
and missions and planning processes’  
Australia’s involvement in NATO operations is therefore an imperative for aligning 
with NATO frameworks on integrating a gender perspective. In this sense Australia’s 
implementation of UNSCR 1325 represents an extension of NATO’s role as a 
‘teaching machine’ in respect of gender and UNSCR 1325. 
However, the NATO-Australia partnership in respect of UNSCR 1325 has not been 
unidirectional. For example, in order to support lesson learning on NATO’s approach 
to UNSCR 1325, Australia provided a Voluntary National Contribution (VNC) gender 
advisor to the Operations Division based within NATO HQ (NATO Official, 2014). 
The VNC serves in a temporary position before returning to work for their own 
government, with an increased knowledge on the issue they were seconded to NATO 
to work on. A more recent development is the acknowledgement by NATO of 
Australia as a ‘model for best practices’ in respect of gender integration in the armed 
forces (NATO 2015j). This identifies lesson learning on UNSCR 1325 between 
Australia and NATO as a two-way process. The focus of this lesson learning is on the 
military, rather than political dimension with the VNC provided to the Operations 
dimension and an explicit focus on Australia’s role in NATO operations. 
Japan’s relations with NATO are particularly interesting to examine because they have 
been a relatively recent development and have put WPS at the forefront. In 2014, Japan 
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signed a partnership agreement with NATO building on Japan’s support for the ISAF 
mission, which commenced in 2010 (Japan Security Watch, 2010). Significantly, this 
agreement included WPS as a priority area for cooperation (NATO, 2014a). In order 
to honour this commitment Japan provided  a VNC Gender Advisor to NATO HQ in 
Brussels, based in the office of the Special Representative (Nagata, 2015). This was 
the first time Japan had sent a VNC to work at NATO HQ (Nagata, 2015). The 
centrality of WPS to the NATO-Japan partnership is particularly interesting given that 
at the time Japan had yet to adopt its own NAP on UNSCR 1325, although the 
government had stated that it was working towards one (The Global Network of 
Women Peacebuilders, 2014). Japan was, however, supportive of the WPS agenda and 
a member of the Friends of 1325 group at the UN (see discussion Table 15). This 
suggests that Japan’s involvement in the ISAF mission in Afghanistan and subsequent 
deepening of relations with NATO were a factor in the development of Japan’s NAP 
on UNSCR 1325. Given that NATO’s institutional knowledge of WPS was therefore 
more developed than Japan’s, the Japanese VNC served as a means to transfer 
knowledge on WPS from NATO to Japan. This reinforces the concept of NATO as a 
‘teaching machine’ on WPS and widens it to include states beyond the Alliance’s own 
membership. 
Jordan’s relations with NATO have had a particular emphasis on the role of women 
in the Jordanian armed forces. Jordan has contributed to NATO missions in 
Afghanistan, Bosnia and Libya, and unlike Australia and Japan, Jordan is a member 
of a formal forum for cooperation with NATO, the Mediterranean Dialogue. Although 
the NATO-Jordan partnership agreement is not publicly available, Jordan’s 
contribution to the NATO/EAPC policy on UNSCR 1325 (although unspecified) 
(NATO/EAPC, 2014) and a series of visits suggest UNSCR 1325 is a focal point of 
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the relationship. For example, in 2010 a delegation of women from the Jordanian 
armed forces visited NATO HQ (NATO, 2010c) and in 2014, NATO’s Special 
Representative on Women, Peace and Security Mari Skåre visited Jordan to observe 
their work and went as far as to condemn the conditions in which the women were 
housed (NATO, 2014i). This is interesting, given that previously Jordan has not 
publicly engaged with the WPS agenda either through the adoption of a NAP or 
through the ‘friends of 1325’ at the UN (see Table 13). This is an example of a one-
way relationship with a partner, in which Jordan learns from NATO, rather than a 
mutually reinforcing one and again demonstrates a widening of NATO’s role as a 
‘teaching machine’ in respect of UNSCR 1325 to support partners less experienced in 
gender integration into their armed forces. 
NATO has sought to strengthen its relationship with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) 
because of the strategic importance of the UAE geographically, for example in 
combating terrorism (Saab, 2014). The UAE has also sought to strengthen its relations 
with NATO, and has taken advantage of opportunities to learn from NATO, for 
example through sending cadets to the NATO Training College in Italy (Saab 2014). 
The UAE is a member of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, the NATO-UAE 
partnership agreement is not publicly available and aside from the UAE’s contribution 
to the NATO/EAPC policy on UNSCR 1325 (NATO/EAPC, 2014) it is not evident if 
or how UNSCR 1325 has featured in cooperation between the two. Moreover, the 
UAE does not have a NAP on UNSCR 1325 and is not a member of the Friends of 
1325 at the UN, although it did support the Global Study on UNSCR 1325 (UN 
Women,  2014b). UNSCR 1325 also does not feature in the terms of NATO’s Istanbul 
Cooperative Initiative, which the UAE is part of (NATO 2011b) but the UAE is listed 
as a signatory to the NATO/EAPC Action Plan on UNSCR 1325 (NATO/EAPC, 
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2014). This suggests that beyond rhetoric, there is little substance to cooperation 
between NATO and the UAE on UNSCR 1325.  
Although UNSCR 1325 is a prominent (and visible) feature of many NATO 
partnerships, the issue should not be presumed to feature in all NATO-partner 
relationships. As such this represents a limit to NATO’s role as a ‘teaching machine’ 
on UNSCR 1325, with lessons shared only among states willing to engage with NATO 
on the issue of Women, Peace and Security. However, that UNSCR 1325 continues to 
feature prominently in many of NATO’s relations with its partners is significant. In 
particular, because where it does feature substantively, rather than just rhetorically, it 
is most evident in lesson sharing over military strategy and the status of women in the 
military. UNSCR 1325 has proved a salient ‘diplomatic tool’ for NATO to bring 
together a diverse and disparate set of partners across the globe, situating the WPS 
agenda within a silo where, although the immediate value of UNSCR 1325 for all 
partnerships (or of the partnerships themselves) may not be apparent, it serves as a 
means to maintain relations, in the event that these partnerships become more critical 
in the future. 
 
(6.1.3) Science for Peace and Security 
‘The added value of this project is that civil society institutions, like universities and 
human rights entities, are working together with a political and military 
organisation like NATO. This cooperation represents a force multiplier for all actors 
involved in this project’ 
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This quote from the Chief of the IMS Office of the Gender Advisor, Jesus Gil Ruiz, 
draws attention to the instrumental value of NATO’s Science for Peace and Security 
(SPS) programme for the Alliance, particularly in relation to the implementation of 
UNSCR 1325. In this sense, it represents both the widening and broadening of 
NATO’s role as a ‘teaching machine’ learning lessons on best practice to include 
partners and through the inclusion of non-NATO expertise. SPS is a ‘policy tool that 
enhances cooperation and dialogue with all partners, based on scientific research, 
innovation, and knowledge exchange’ (NATO, 2014j: 18). It does so through the 
provision of funding for expert advice and support for activities relevant to knowledge 
exchange between the NATO member and partner country (NATO 2014k).  
The SPS programme has sought to support NATO’s implementation of UNSCR 1325 
and has this has resulted in 3 projects related to UNSCR 1325 receiving funding since 
2013. This represents a small proportion of the applications approved by the Allies. 
For example, in 2014, 220 applications were received and 74 were approved by the 
Allies (NATO, 2014j: 18). Nevertheless, this still indicates that UNSCR 1325 is being 
integrated into wider aspects of NATO activities. The transformative potential of these 
projects, is however, limited. Applications for the SPS programme are pre-screened 
by NATO experts, then sent for review by independent scientists, before finally being 
put to the Allies for approval  (NATO, 2014j: 18). This means that while the content 
of the project must meet scientific approval, they must also not challenge the 
diplomatic positions of the Allies. The result is that lesson sharing on UNSCR 1325 
among NATO members and partners through the SPS programme, is unlikely to 
challenge dominant understanding of the value of the Resolution and is more likely to 
focus on the instrumental value of WPS. 
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It is worth examining how the SPS supports NATO’s role as a ‘teaching machine’ in 
respect of UNSCR 1325. The funding offers a means through which to bring together 
a member and partner state to ‘learn lessons’ on UNSCR 1325 that are then shared 
with the wider Alliance. The SPS projects on UNSCR 1325 also support NATO’s 
public diplomacy efforts to raise awareness of NATO’s implementation of UNSCR 
1325 (see discussion in Chapter Seven). The projects that have been funded to date 
have been shared widely on social media and the reports produced provide useful 
reference points for those working on WPS more broadly. In this way the WPS SPS 
projects serve to engage the wider pool of scholars and activists working on WPS with 
NATO’s work, in a non-threatening manner. The role of civil society and academics 
in supporting many of the projects means that they provide a useful resource for 
understanding key aspects of the implementation of UNSCR 1325 and has relevance 
beyond NATO and NATO delegations.  
The SPS projects relating to UNSCR 1325 which have been funded to date are: 
‘Gender Mainstreaming: Indicators for the Implementation of UNSCR 1325’ by the 
USA and Serbia, which resulted in the production of a UNSCR 1325 scorecard; 
‘Research Annual Gender National Reports: Policies, Recruitment, Retention & 
Operations - UNSCR1325 Reload’ by Spain and Australia; and ‘Sharing Good 
Practice on Handling of Gender-Related Complaints in Armed Forces’ by Switzerland 
(DCAF) and Norway (NATO, 2014k). These projects brought together unlikely 
partners and in this way reinforced the utility of UNSCR 1325 as a public diplomacy 
tool for NATO.  In addition, the SPS programme has supported NATO’s role as a 
‘teaching machine’ in respect of WPS through funding the UNSCR 1325 scorecard 
and through the UNSCR 1325 Reload project (results pending). The resulting 
scorecard of the former sought to rank NATO member and partners states 
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implementation of UNSCR 1325 in their militaries according to a number of criteria, 
with the explicit intention of functioning ‘as an educational tool that allows NATO 
member and partner countries to learn from the experiences of other nations’ (Oudraat 
et al. 2015). 
The involvement of NATO’s SPS programme in the implementation of UNSCR 1325 
has supported NATO’s role as a ‘teaching machine’ in respect of UNSCR 1325, 
bringing together partners to learn lessons identified as useful by NATO member 
states on WPS. The SPS itself acts as a public diplomacy tool more broadly and is a 
salient way of engaging NATO partners on issues of value to the Alliance, UNSCR 
1325 has proved a useful way of bringing in partners to cooperate with NATO within 
the programme. 
 
(6.2) Institutionalising or Exceptionalising the Women, Peace and 
Security agenda? 
This section examines whether NATO has institutionalised, or exceptionalised the 
Women, Peace and Security agenda. The starting point for this analysis is a claim by 
the Global Study on UNSCR 1325 (2015: 258), commissioned by UN Women, that 
NATO’s efforts to implement UNSCR 1325 had ‘led to considerable strengthening of 
gender expertise and capacity within the organization’23. The first part of this section 
finds that while this is certainly the case at present, with a significant number of 
Gender Advisors and Gender Focal Points situated throughout NATO’s structures, 
                                                
23 It should be noted that the Global Study based this finding on interviews with NATO 
Officials, who are unlikely to have wanted to undermine NATO’s efforts on UNSCR 1325 by 
presenting a more critical picture.  
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they are far from an institutionalised core of NATO’s organisational structure, with 
many filled by temporary, Voluntary National Contributions (VNCs). The section then 
goes onto examine the provision of gender expertise more widely within the Alliance, 
before moving to look at the provision of NATO’s gender training, finding it 
externalised and in this sense exceptionalised by the Alliance, with NATO’s 
‘Department Head’ for gender training situated in Sweden.  
 
(6.2.1) Voluntary National Contributions 
NATO’s implementation of UNSCR 1325 has been supported by a network of 
Voluntary National Contributions (VNC) positions providing gender expertise within 
NATO HQ and in NATO-led operations. This has framed the WPS agenda as a 
separate (temporary) project, rather than a core part of institutional activities and in 
line with NATO’s values. VNCs are short, fixed term positions (usually for 2-3 years), 
located outside of the NATO permanent staff and rely upon member or partner 
countries to fund them and therefore fall outside of the already overstretched NATO 
budget, there is no commitment to keep the position on when the VNC term ends, 
usually after two years.  This makes their position precarious and indicates that the 
role they perform is not considered important enough by the allies to warrant inclusion 
in the permanent staff. VNCs are often contributed at the beginning of a new initiative 
to create a post and can then be converted into permanent positions if the allies agree. 
As a result of the staffing constraints on the International Staff 2011 (Dijkstra, 2014: 
5), VNCs are an easy way for NATO to quickly expand expertise to respond to a 
particular issue at both NATO HQ and on an operational level. In the case of UNSCR 
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1325, VNCs were specified within Bi-Strategic Command 40-1 as an ‘interim 
measure’ to provide gender expertise (NATO, 2009a).  
The centrality of VNCs to NATO’s implementation of UNSCR 1325 has reinforced 
the symbolic separation of gender expertise from NATO’s ‘everyday’ activities. 
Moreover, this separation has been reinforced by the fact that many of these VNC are 
provided by partner states. For example, Australia, Finland and Japan (NATO Official,  
2014). This reflects the centrality of partners to NATO’s adoption and implementation 
of UNSCR 1325 (see discussion in Chapter Five) and reinforces the perception that 
NATO’s gender expertise is located externally to the alliance, also demonstrated by 
Sweden’s role in hosting NATO’s ‘Department Head’ for gender training (see 
discussion in following section). On a practical level this has two implications for 
NATO’s implementation of UNSCR 1325. The first relates to the ability of the VNC 
to conduct their role effectively and separates gender expertise from issues deemed 
sensitive to the alliance, or the core functioning of NATO as a defence organisation. 
VNCs contributed by partner countries have restrictions placed upon the access they 
have to NATO documents and also physically, with certain areas of NATO’s HQ 
outside of their clearance. The second, relates to the value of the VNC for the 
contributing state, that is that VNCs will return to their contributing state with 
enhanced expertise in the particular area they have been working on. In respect of 
UNSCR 1325 this means that it is partner, rather than NATO member states, who are 
benefiting from this ‘learning’ on WPS. The expertise the VNCs develop on WPS will 
not form part of NATO’s institutional memory, nor will member states benefit 
directly. Moreover, they have served a diplomatic purpose as a means for partners to 
demonstrate their commitment to NATO. In this respect, the use of VNCs from partner 
states to fill WPS positions within NATO is reflective of the outward facing nature of 
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NATO’s implementation of UNSCR 1325. In this sense, NATO is teaching its partners 
how to understand WPS, rather than member states learning lessons these lessons. 
At NATO HQ between 2012 and 2014, chief among these VNCs was the position of 
the Secretary General’s Special Representative on Women, Peace and Security. This 
high level positon was initially created as a VNC post at the Chicago Summit in 2012 
and filled by a NATO member, Norway (see discussion below). Mari Skåre - who 
filled the post - took office without any of the administrative or practical support which 
would be expected of a position at such a seniority level. It was not until halfway 
through her two-year term that another NATO member, Italy contributed a Gender 
Advisor as a VNC to support the office. It was then another year before the office was 
completed with an additional VNC from the Netherlands. The Special Representative 
and her office act as a focal point for the implementation of UNSCR 1325 at NATO 
and have been effective at supporting the WPS agenda internally, and championing 
NATO’s work on UNSCR 1325 outside the Alliance. The transference of the Special 
Representative to a permanent position was a WPS headline outcome of the NATO 
Summit in Wales. This was a significant move given that it was done at a time when 
the IS faces considerable budgetary pressures, having only expanded by 17.1 full-time 
equivalent posts since the end of the Cold War, from 1228 to 1245.1 in 2011 (Dijkstra, 
2014: 5). 
At an operational level the impact of having Gender Advisors as VNCs is felt most 
acutely. For example, the areas in which Gender Advisors (GENADs) can operate and 
offer expertise are limited depending on their security clearance. For example, 
GENADs may be prevented from advising on ‘kinetic’ operational issues, including 
dynamic targeting, because they are not from a NATO member state (Prescott, 2013: 
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30). Although, as Prescott notes, this issue is not limited to gender issues, it is 
particularly acute for GENADs given that a significant number are provided by NATO 
partner states as VNCs (Prescott, 2013b: 30). The situating of GENADs as an addition 
to the existing operational structure (rather than as a core part of it), reflects the 
undervaluing of gender expertise, and indicates that a gender perspective on kinetic 
operational issues is not seen as an operational imperative. 
(6.2.2) Gender Advisors and focal points 
In addition to the symbolic separation of WPS from NATO’s core activities through 
the preponderance of VNCs within roles responsible for WPS, three other factors 
undermine the provision of gender expertise and opportunities for mainstreaming the 
key objectives of the WPS agenda within NATO structures. The first is that positions 
within the International Staff are on a 3 year fixed term basis (subject to limited 
extension) (NATO, 2014n), limiting the opportunities for creating institutional 
memory. This makes a new agenda, such as WPS, and one outside of NATO’s usual 
remit and expertise, particularly vulnerable and presents a salient obstacle to 
mainstreaming gender within the Alliance. To some extent the International Staff is 
constantly (re)learning the value of UNSCR 1325. 
The second factor is the preponderance of women within roles responsible for 
delivering on WPS or providing gender expertise (NATO Official, 2014). This makes 
such individuals particularly visible in an organisation dominated by male bodies (see 
discussion in Chapter Three). In part, this is reflected in the first iteration of Bi-
Strategic Command 40-1 (NATO, 2009a), which conflates ‘manning principles’ (or 
the representation of women within NATO) with the appointment of Gender Advisors 
(see discussion in Chapter Five). The significance of this is to reinforce the notion that 
241 
 
gender (and the women, peace and security agenda) only concern women. The third 
factor, which is related to the second, is that a number of the individuals responsible 
for WPS within their wider roles, have no previous experience of working on gender 
issues, or the WPS agenda specifically (NATO Official, 2014) 24. Given that women 
predominate in roles responsible for WPS and gender, this again reinforces the notion 
that gender is about women, and women by extension of their gender should be experts 
on gender. Moreover, it means these individuals are not best positioned to further 
support the mainstreaming of the WPS agenda. This indicates - given that NATO is 
an organisation dominated by men - that women are perceived by extension of their 
gender to be a natural fit for a role working on gender. This performative reproduction 
of gender (Zalewski, 2010: 24) serves to reinforce, rather than challenge existing 
gender relations (an essential strategy for transformative change within organisations) 
(Cockburn, 2010: 143). In part, this is a reflection of a weakness within UNSCR 1325 
itself, which has framed gender as synonymous with women (Shepherd, 2008a: 171). 
However, it is to be expected that NATO would not challenge the essentialised logic 
embodied in UNSCR 1325 and this demonstrates a hindrance to realising 
transformative agendas in international security institutions (Wright, 2016). 
 
(6.2.3) Gender training 
‘The most challenging part of my job is the lack of knowledge about what [a] gender 
perspective is’ 
                                                
24 This is not to say that these women did not go onto become experts on the issue and 
femocrats in their own right. 
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This quote from French Army Major Stephanie Nicol, Gender Advisor to NATO ACT 
is indicative of the not only the challenges to providing gender training but the very 
importance of its provision. The training must start by providing the most basic 
understanding of what gender and a gender perspective is before it can build up to a 
more sophisticated understanding of how and why gender should be integrated into 
military operations in line with the provisions of UNSCR 1325.  An analysis of the 
provision of NATO’s gender training is critical to NATO’s role as a ‘teaching 
machine’ in respect of UNSCR 1325. It is through such training that NATO Officials 
and NATO troops learn the value of WPS that will inform how they approach and 
value gender in their everyday positions. NATO’s particular provision of gender 
training is significant in two respects: 1) it is situated externally to the Alliance through 
its provision by the Swedish Armed forces, and 2) its provision has emphasised the 
‘added value’ of UNSCR 1325. In both respects this has served to reinforce the notion 
that gender is outside NATO’s core identity and function as a defence institution. This 
is reinforced by the lack of transparency on which nations and individuals have 
undertaken gender training. 
In February 2013, NATO Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT) and 
Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding with the Swedish Armed Forces, for the provision of gender training 
at the Nordic Centre for Gender in Military Operations (NCGM) (NATO, 2015h). This 
designated the NCGM as NATO’s ‘Department Head’ for gender training and 
education and in doing so Sweden became the first non-NATO member to be 
accredited ‘Department Head’ status. The NCGM provides gender training for NATO 
commanders, leaders, gender advisers and trainers, with a focus on operations (Nordic 
Center for Gender in Military Operations, 2014). The NCGM hosts four courses on 
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gender training run by the Swedish armed forces. They are the Gender Field Advisor 
course, Gender Training of Trainers course, Key Leaders Seminar on Gender and the 
Commanding Officer Seminar on Gender (SWEDINT, 2015). It is a join initiative by 
the Nordic states (Norway, Denmark, Finland, Sweden and Iceland) but is hosted by 
Sweden. As a partner nation’s asset, the NCGM was not eligible to become a ‘Centre 
for Excellence’ (COEs). This is a distinction given to institutions offering ‘recognized 
expertise and experience. of benefit to the Alliance and ..[supporting] the 
transformation of NATO’ (NATO 2012a). It is symbolic that NATO’s gender 
expertise is positioned externally to the alliance and that this expertise cannot be 
recognised as comparable to NATO expertise on more ‘hard’ security issues. 
Moreover, Sweden’s status as a partner nation is by its very nature precarious and 
there is no guarantee that without Sweden’s contribution that the NATO allies would 
continue to support the provision of gender training.  
The NCGM’s role in providing gender training for NATO has also supported the 
‘added value’ approach to gender because this forms the basis of Sweden’s approach 
to integrating UNSCR 1325 into the military and the Nordic states more broadly 
(Bergman Rosamond, 2014). The Swedish Military Representative to the EU and 
NATO, Major General Karl Engelbrektson, articulated the Swedish understanding of 
the ‘added value’ of gender in an address to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly in 
2011. In this address Engelbrektson stressed the importance of including a gender 
perspective because of the ‘strategic’ and ‘operational effect’ incorporating diverse 
perspectives can have (Engelbrektson, 2011). The ‘added value’ of WPS to the 
military therefore forms a core part of the training NATO forces receive on WPS both 
symbolically in its separation from the Alliance and in the value Sweden and the 
Nordic states ascribe to UNSCR 1325. 
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A UN Security Council Report recognised that the NCGM had ‘strengthened the 
gender training delivered’ delivered to NATO (NATO ACT, 2015). In addition to the 
NCGM, SHAPE and ACT also contribute some of NATO’s gender training provision. 
ACT provides introductory e-learning courses on the role of gender advisors and the 
value of integrating a gender perspective to increase operational effectiveness (NATO, 
2015b). However, gender training is ultimately a national responsibility, NATO can 
encourage but not mandate gender training (NATO Official, 2014). There is also no 
publicly available list of those who have attended NATO approved gender training 
courses. This lack of transparency makes it difficult both to comprehend the reality of 
the reach of NATO’s gender training provisions and to hold NATO and states account. 
Although, it should be noted that the NATO/EAPC Action Plan does call for reporting 
on the percentage of national troops that undergone training on UNSCR 1325 
(NATO/EAPC, 2014), it is not clear whether this data will be made public, nor if it 
will provide a breakdown of the seniority and service within national forces of those 
undertaking the training and, perhaps most importantly, the training course they 
undertook. This something to look out for when the term of the NATO/EAPC Plan 
comes to an end in June 2016, if it is reported on. 
Nevertheless, there is some evidence that gender training has supported the provision 
of a gender perspective into NATO operations. For example, the Review of the 
Practical Implications of UNSCR 1325 for the Conduct of NATO-led Operations and 
Missions recommended that NATO operations ‘ensure every Commander’s initial 
mission analysis is informed by UNSCR 1325’ (Lackenbauer and Langlais, 2013: 8). 
NATO’s report to the Global Study on UNSCR 1325 (2015: 259) demonstrated that 
this recommendation had been taken into consideration with the Resolute Support 
Mission in Afghanistan, with gender perspectives part of the entire planning cycle 
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from the political decision-making to the creation of the operational plan. In addition, 
NATO’s Crisis Management Exercise in 2015 included, for the first time, the 
incorporation of a gender perspective as an objective. The exercise is designed to test 
the strategic political level during crisis, drawing upon civilian and military staffs in 
member states, NATO HQ and both Strategic Commands (Coomaraswamy, 2015). 
This would have necessitated participants to have undergone gender training. 
 
(6.3) Institutional Support: Critical Actors 
NATO’s adoption and implementation of UNSCR 1325 has relied upon a network of 
individuals supportive of the WPS agenda positioned within the organisation, in 
addition to leadership on the issue. This section examines the roles of femocrats, the 
Special Representative on Women, Peace and Security and the role of the NATO 
Secretary General in supporting the WPS agenda. In doing so, this section finds that 
individual commitment to the agenda has been key to realising the progress NATO 
has made on UNSCR 1325 and that the role of the Special Representative proved 
particularly crucial between 2012 and 2014. However, the resistant institutional setting 
(or silo) in which femocrats operate means their agenda is easily side-lined as a 
personal one, even when it is also part of an institutional mandate. It also concludes 
that without at least tacit support for the WPS agenda from the Secretary General, the 
WPS agenda would have stalled or met far greater resistance within the organisation. 
(6.3.1) Feminists and femocrats: advancing feminist agendas at NATO 
Feminist agendas are not new to NATO and there is evidence that femocrats (feminist 
bureaucrats) have been active within NATO for over 50 years, particularly in the 
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military structures. It is femocrats who were instrumental in bringing the status of 
women in the military to the attention of NATO allies and whose actions supported 
the creation of NATO’s gender machinery, first in the military and then the 
political/civilian structure (see discussion in Chapter Three). For example, through the 
Committee on Women in NATO Forces, later the NATO Committee on Gender 
Perspective and the office of the Special Representative on Women, Peace and 
Security. This gender machinery has provided the locus for advancing women’s 
interests within the Alliance, and now for the integration of UNSCR 1325 within the 
institution. 
At the organisational level, the pursuit of a feminist agenda at NATO has drawn 
attention to Enloe’s (1989: 196) premise that ‘the personal is international’ and ‘the 
international is personal’ because, as Kronsell (2011: 286) argues, transformative 
change within organisations occurs at the site of ‘everyday routines and practices’, 
which serve to reproduce dominant norms. Femocrats (feminist bureaucrats) are 
crucial to instigating such change. The term ‘femocrat’ has been used in a number of 
different ways. It has been a pejorative term used by conservatives who perceive these 
women as representing select interests; others have used it as a term of derision, with 
femocrats benefiting from women’s disadvantage (Chappell, 2002: 86). For the 
purpose of this thesis, the term femocrat is used to describe individuals who act on 
their own, often in the context of a resistant institutional setting, to initiate or support 
policy initiatives, which benefit women and support feminist goals (Prugl, 2004: 64; 
Wright, 2016). It also important to note, particularly in relation to NATO, that these 
individuals do not necessarily have to be women. This section is based directly on 
interviews with NATO Officials, who could be identified as femocrats. 
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The agenda of femocrats is both ‘emotional and personal’ (Rao, 2013: location 248), 
forcing individuals to re-examine their own beliefs and behaviours against the largely 
hostile backdrop of the organisation they are working to change (Rao, 2013: location 
248). As a result femocrats are isolated from finding support in colleagues and from 
outside the organisation, because they operate in a separate sphere from feminist 
activists, who are often resistant to engaging with them (Manuh et al., 2013: location 
1322-1355). The WPS agenda at NATO exemplified this and a number of NATO 
Officials interviewed commented on the personal nature of the WPS agenda, with one 
commenting that ‘UNSCR 1325 tends to stoke strange feelings… [and it] becomes 
emotional’ (NATO Official, 2014). For this individual, it seemed that almost everyone 
they encountered had a pre-formed opinion on the WPS agenda or a personal 
experience they could relate in relation to gender, regardless of whether they were 
supportive of or resistant to the WPS agenda. UNSCR 1325 was not perceived as a 
‘neutral’ issue, even if it was - as a different NATO Official put it - a difficult issue to 
openly oppose (NATO Official, 2014), this still left open the possibility for tacit 
resistance. As Acker (1990: 154) argues, gender processes, which serve to reinforce 
gender hierarchies within  organisations include the management and manipulation of 
women and men’s emotions. Another NATO Official highlighted how easy it was to 
right off the agenda because it was perceived as a personal agenda affecting women, 
rather than ‘an official view’ (even though it remains an institutional imperative). In 
the organisational context, women’s bodies are stigmatised in organisations because 
of their ‘mythic “emotionality”’ and this is the basis for controlling and excluding 
them (Acker, 1990: 152). In addition, penalising (or rewarding) the management of 
emotions serves to reinforce the gender hierarchy of organisations (Acker, 1990: 152). 
In this setting hegemonic masculinity, is exemplified by the ‘strong, technically 
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competent, authoritative leader who is sexually potent and attractive, has a family, and 
[crucially] has his emotions under control’ (Acker, 1990: 153). 
A further difficulty confronting femocrats and a problem with women occupying 
many of the positions with responsibility for WPS, is that the difficulties women face 
operating within an institution of hegemonic masculinity serve as a hindrance to 
advancing the WPS agenda more broadly. For example, one (female) NATO Official 
interviewed expressed a frustration that her seniority was not recognised by others and 
that even her own staff did not challenge this (NATO Official, 2014). This supports 
Heilman et al.'s (2004: 416) contention that agential qualities traditionally associated 
with leadership, such as assertiveness and authority, tend to be read very differently 
depending on whether they are displayed by men or women (Heilman et al. 2004: 
416). Individuals ‘doing gender appropriately’, support institutions by helping to 
‘sustain, reproduce and render legitimate’ institutional structures based on sex 
categories (West and Zimmerman, 1987: 146). It therefore falls to women to find an 
acceptable balance between masculine and feminine traits; of both ambition and more 
caring qualities in order to perform their role ‘acceptably’. However, should the 
individual fail to do gender ‘appropriately’, it is the individual and not the institution 
who will be held accountable (West and Zimmerman, 1987: 146). This is perhaps most 
visible outside the organisational context and in relation to women in senior political 
positions, such as former Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard (Wright and Holland, 
2014). 
A personal drive underpinned many individuals’ commitment to the WPS agenda at 
NATO. Many women identified with the agenda because of their own gendered 
experiences working at NATO and in their personal lives, and a number of men 
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because ‘they have daughters’ (NATO Official, 2014). The problem with the agenda 
being a personal one is that it is then confined to personal time and there is then a 
danger (particularly in operations) that when the security situation changes, it falls 
from the agenda (NATO Official, 2014). It is also problematic because ‘soft’ work 
associated with emotional labour tends to be undervalued by organisation compared 
to ‘hard’ work, defined as part of ‘core business’ (Haslam and Ryan, 2008: 532). This 
serves to reinforce the notion that UNSCR 1325 is somewhat external to the Alliance. 
It also supports the concern of one femocrat, who had been instrumental in supporting 
UNSCR 1325 at NATO, that the agenda was not institutionalised and that it was ‘very 
reversible’ [paraphrased] (NATO Official, 2014). 
In addition to their gender, one women expressed a concern that the challenges women 
faced in their roles were exacerbated (or mitigated) by their nationality and the 
portfolio they were working on (NATO Official, 2014). This meant that women in 
leadership roles from newer and/or smaller NATO member states and with portfolios 
outside of NATO’s core military tasks faced an additional challenge to their authority. 
It also draws attention to the importance of taking into consideration NATO’s 
organisational culture when seeking to understand the implementation of UNSCR 
1325, particularly when partner states have been so instrumental in supporting the 
WPS agenda at NATO. 
 
(6.3.2) A Special Representative on Women, Peace and Security 
The creation of the post of Secretary General’s Special Representative for Women, 
Peace and Security in 2012 was approved at NATO’s Chicago Summit in 2012 (WIIS, 
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2012) and marked a watershed moment in the implementation of UNSCR 1325 at 
NATO. The move to appoint an individual to support NATO’s implementation of 
UNSCR 1325 stemmed from the 2007 NATO/EAPC policy, which called for 
consideration to be given to the appointment of a gender adviser at NATO HQ (NATO, 
2007b). However, a Special Representative was a far more senior role, whose position 
has the potential to support the advancement of the WPS agenda at NATO. In 
considering the significance of the appointment of a Special Representative on 
Women, Peace and Security it is important to distinguish such a role from that of a 
gender adviser. A gender adviser acts as a means through which to incorporate a 
gender perspective and in this sense can come to represent an institution’s gender 
expertise. In operational situations and organisational departments, a gender adviser 
can provide a useful means for incorporating a gender perspective, in particular where 
specialised knowledge is required. Nevertheless, at a wider organisational level, a 
gender adviser would symbolise an institution’s gender expertise and this would be 
likely to hinder attempts to mainstream a gender perspective throughout the 
organisational structure, particularly where they lack the seniority to report directly to 
the top of the organisational command. For example, the appointment of a gender 
advisor within the EU External Action Service has been criticised because the position 
does not report directly to the High-Representative and as such lacks sufficient 
authority (Guerrina and Wright, 2016). A high-level Special Representative on the 
other hand provides institutional leadership and is able to hold the organisation 
account for the implementation of UNSCR 1325. This is why NATO’s creation of the 
post of Secretary General’s Special Representative on WPS has been recognised as an 
example of best practice for regional organisations. The Global Review of UNSCR 
1325 recommended that regional organisations follow NATO’s best practice and 
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appoint high-level women, peace and security representatives in order to drive the 
implementation of the agenda (Coomaraswamy, 2015: 409). 
The considerable momentum gained on the implementation of UNSCR 1325 at NATO 
between 2012 and 2014 can be attributed to both the creation of the position of 
Secretary General’s Special Representative and the appointment of Skåre to the role. 
During her two years in office, Skåre proved to be a critical actor in NATO’s 
implementation of UNSCR 1325. Her background as a Norwegian diplomat who had 
worked at NATO and her experience of working on issues related to women and 
security (NATO, 2012d), meant she had the necessary institutional knowledge and 
expertise to act as an effective champion to advance the WPS agenda at NATO, 
navigating internal politics and acquiring external support (NATO Official, 2014). She 
overcame the obstacles associated with the role being a VNC funded by Norway and 
was successful in lobbying for a support office for her role (see discussion above). 
The most visible contribution Skåre made to the WPS agenda at NATO was to engage 
civil society organisations in NATO’s work on the agenda. As discussed in Chapter 
Five, the first iteration of the NATO/EAPC policy on UNSCR 1325 adopted in 2007 
called for NATO to engage with civil society in the development of a broader policy 
on UNSCR 1325 (NATO, 2007b). This made sense because civil society have played 
a critical role in bringing about and supporting the Women, Peace and Security agenda 
at the UN and in supporting the implementation of the agenda at a national level (see 
discussion in Chapter One). However, this goal was not realised until seven years after 
NATO’s initial adoption of UNSCR 1325, and the Special Representative had a 
pivotal role in bringing this about. Skåre understood the importance of involving civil 
society in NATO’s implementation of UNSCR 1325 in order to generate external 
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pressure on NATO to implement UNSCR 1325 effectively (NATO Official, 2014). In 
order to do so, Skåre had to navigate NATO’s difficult relationship with (feminist) 
civil society, which perceived  NATO as a militarist organisation working counter to 
feminist goals (Cockburn, 2011). To this end, Skåre met, at every opportunity, with 
civil society organisations across the globe during her two years in post (NATO 
Official 2014). These efforts were largely successful and contributed to fostering an 
engaged group of civil society actors monitoring NATO’s implementation of UNSCR 
1325. This culminated in NATO’s first ever formal consultations with civil society 
(on any policy issue) in June 2014 to review the NATO Action Plan on UNSCR 1325 
(see discussion in Chapter Five) held in June 2014 (European Network of NGOs in 
Afghanistan (ENNA), 2014). 
Skåre’s term in post ended at the NATO Wales Summit in 2014, her legacy as Special 
Representative is threefold. First, the transformation of her post from a VNC into a 
permanent position within the International Staff (IS) which was announced at the 
NATO Wales Summit 2014 (see discussion above). Second, facilitating NATO’s first 
ever formal policy consultations with civil society (on the NATO/EAPC Action Plan 
on UNSCR 1325) and third,  the revised on NATO/EAPC Action Plan on UNSCR 
1325 held in June 2014 (European Network of NGOs in Afghanistan (ENNA), 2014). 
It remains to be seen whether Skåre’s replacement, Ambassador Marriët Schuurman, 
will have the institutional knowledge and subject expertise to support the momentum 
garnered on UNSCR 1325 at NATO in the last two years. However, the appointment 
of an Ambassador, suggests she will certainly have more clout and indicates that the 
Netherlands who appointed her to the role values WPS. 
253 
 
(6.3.3) The Secretary General and his Annual Report on the Implementation 
of UNSCR 1325 
NATO member states may dictate NATO’s agenda but it is the Secretary General who 
is responsible for the day-to-day administration of this agenda as head of the 
International Staff. He25 therefore has an important role to play in providing leadership 
on key issues, including WPS, both as the external face of the alliance and as the head 
of the International Staff. Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Secretary General from 2009-
2014, oversaw the elevation of WPS to a priority issue for the Alliance. As a result, 
his role in supporting UNSCR 1325 during this time therefore warrants examination. 
During Rasmussen’s time in office, he released a Secretary General’s Annual Report 
to provide an overview of ‘NATO’s principal achievements and challenges’ 
(Rasmussen, 2012). The reports released during Rasmussen’s time as Secretary 
General make no mention of NATO’s implementation of UNSCR 1325 (NATO, 
2012g; Rasmussen, 2013; Rasmussen, 2014). Rather, reporting on UNSCR 1325 by 
the Secretary General was completed in a separate report. This served to side-line 
UNSCR 1325 as an issue not of strategic importance for the Alliance and was 
reflective of the separation of UNSCR 1325 from NATO’s ‘day-to-day’ priorities as 
a defence organisation. 
The Secretary General’s Annual Public Report on Implementing UNSCR 1325 
represents one mechanism through which NATO’s progress on UNSCR 1325 is 
                                                
25 I use ‘he’ deliberately here to draw attention to the gendered nature of the role and 
NATO’s gender hierarchy. There have to-date been no female Secretary Generals and 
it looks extremely unlikely that there will be in the foreseeable future (see discussion 
in Chapter Three). 
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disseminated to the wider public. It is also outlined as one of the monitoring and 
accountability mechanisms within the 2011 NATO/EAPC policy (NATO, 2011c). 
Therefore, this outward facing articulation of NATO’s progress in implementing 
UNSCR 1325 for the Alliance is revealing, in that exposes the value of the Resolution 
for the Alliance. From 2010 to 2014 the then Secretary General, Anders Fogh 
Rasmussen, released four annual reports. Content analysis of these reports indicates 
the priorities of the Alliance in respect of WPS and the value placed upon UNSCR 
1325 and their evolution during Rasmussen’s time in office. I ran a word frequency 
analysis of the reports reports released during Rasmussen’s time in office (see Table 
16, below). Two core themes emerge here which are worthy of further examination, 
1) the focus on NATO operations (but notably, not in respect of Afghanistan) and 2) 
the association of UNSCR 1325 with women. 
The focus on operations in the Secretary General’s Annual Reports (see Table 16, 
below) is reflective of NATO policy on UNSCR 1325 and the value placed on the 
Resolution as a tool to increase operational effectiveness (see discussion in Chapter 
Five). Despite this, the most prominent NATO-led operation - the International 
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan – only features in the second and 
third reports from 2011 and 2013. In the 2011 report, Afghanistan is mentioned in 
relation to the NATO-Afghanistan Enduring Partnership and information programmes 
run by the Public Diplomacy Division. ISAF is referred to in reference to more than 
ten gender-related positions created within in the ISAF command structure. In 2013, 
the focus in relation to Afghanistan and ISAF shifts to the participation of Afghan 
women in the reconstruction and reconciliation processes in Afghanistan. However, 
the 2014 Annual Report on UNSCR 1325 makes no mention of either Afghanistan or 
ISAF. The absence of Afghanistan from the 2014 Annual Report is particularly 
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perplexing given that a significant focus of the NATO Summit Wales 2014 was 
Afghanistan (NATO, 2014b). However, it may indicate that there was little to report 
of progress on UNSCR 1325 in respect of NATO’s commitments there. 
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Table 16
 
Word Count
Weighted 
Percentage 
(%)
Word Count
Weighted 
Percentage 
(%)
Word Count
Weighted 
Percentage 
(%)
NATO 4 4.04 NATO 4 3.97 NATO 4 5.11
security 8 2 UNSCR 5 2.14 1325 4 3.07
1325 4 1.97 1325 4 2.02 UNSCR 5 3.07
UNSCR 5 1.97 implementing 12 1.83 implementing 12 2.04
women 5 1.82 women 5 1.45 gender 6 1.75
gender 6 1.66 policy 6 1.39 nations 7 1.75
implementing 12 1.66 operations 10 1.2 related 7 1.31
operations 10 1.38 nations 7 1.13 security 8 1.31
nations 7 1.25 security 8 1.07 women 5 1.31
resolutions 11 1.2 gender 6 0.88 peace 5 1.17
peace 5 1.18 resolution 11 0.88 resolution 10 1.17
policy 6 0.92 peace 5 0.76 2011 4 0.88
related 7 0.82 international 13 0.69 cooperation 11 0.88
international 13 0.77 military 8 0.69 initial 7 0.88
plan 4 0.74 report 6 0.69 mainstreaming 13 0.88
training 8 0.74 committee 9 0.63 operations 10 0.88
partners 8 0.72 eapc 4 0.63 plan 4 0.88
missions 8 0.64 perspectives 12 0.63 policy 6 0.88
report 6 0.64 work 4 0.63 report 6 0.88
cooperative 11 0.61 2010 4 0.57 training 8 0.88
Word Count
Weighted 
Percentage 
(%)
Word Count
Weighted 
Percentage 
(%)
NATO 4 3.11 NATO 4 4.46
security 8 2.9 security 8 3.57
gender 6 2.59 women 5 2.23
women 5 2.49 gender 6 2.08
resolutions 11 1.87 operations 10 2.08
1325 4 1.56 peace 5 1.64
operations 10 1.56 UNSCR 5 1.49
peace 5 1.56 1325 4 1.34
implementing 12 1.35 implementation 14 1.34
2012 4 1.24 nations 7 1.34
related 7 1.24 training 8 1.34
UNSCR 5 1.24 cooperation 11 1.19
nations 7 1.04 missions 8 1.19
partners 8 1.04 2013 4 1.04
Afghanistan 11 0.93 resolutions 11 1.04
council 7 0.93 international 13 0.89
ISAF 4 0.93 led 3 0.89
perspective 11 0.93 plan 4 0.89
planning 8 0.93 review 6 0.89
training 8 0.93 united 6 0.89
ALL 2010 2011
2013 2014
Word frequency analysis of NATO Secretary General's Annual Reports on the implementation of UNSCR 
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The second key theme to emerge is the association of UNSCR 1325 with women, 
rather than men or gender within the Annual Reports. The four reports released 
between 2010 and 2014 make only 2 references in total to men or boys (see Table 17). 
This is in line with both the NATO/EAPC policy and Bi-Strategic Command 40-1 (see 
discussion in Chapter Five). However, it is interesting to note that the 2014 Annual 
Report makes fewer references to gender than previous reports. If a more nuanced 
understanding of UNSCR 1325 was being incorporated into NATO policies, it would 
be expected that references to gender would increase (and those to women would 
decrease). However, that this is not the case suggests that UNSCR 1325 continues to 
be understood as about women, and as an organisation dominated by male bodies (see 
discussion in Chapter Three), as outside NATO’s core business as a defence 
organisation.  
Table 17  
 
Word frequency analysis of NATO Secretary General's Annual Reports
References Coverage References Coverage References Coverage
2010, November 13 3.15 20 4.88 0 0.00%
2011, November 11 6.6 8 4.01 0 0.00%
2013, January 20 7.77 23 7.7 1 0.42%
2014, January 9 5.93 15 7.42 1 0.50%
Total/Average 53 5.86 66 6 2 0.46%
Gender' .'women' or 'girls' .'men' or 'boys'
Report
258 
 
The reports put relatively little focus on women as victims or women as agents, as 
Table 18 and Table 19 demonstrate, and both frames are mentioned equitable times 
across the reports. This indicates a consistency in the focus of the reports and again is 
reflective of the contradiction inherent in the WPS agenda (discussed in Chapter One) 
between framing women as victims and women as agents. 
Table 18  
 
Table 19  
 
The current Secretary General, Jens Stoltenberg, who took office in autumn 2014 has 
integrated UNSCR 1325 into his main Annual Report and does not release a secondary 
report focusing on UNSCR 1325. This is significant and suggests Stoltenberg remains 
committed to UNSCR 1325, although it should be noted that WPS is the last item 
discussed in the report and is not given its own section but integrated into discussion 
on NATO partnerships, somewhat limiting the value of the report for external scrutiny 
(Stoltenberg, 2014). This also supports the argument that UNSCR 1325 is of value to 
Framings of women as 'decision-makers' in the NATO Secretary General's Annual Reports
Report References Coverage
2010, November 3 1.78%
2011, November 0 0.00%
2013, January 2 1.75%
2014, January 0 0.00%
Total/Average 5 0.88%
Report References Coverage
2010, November 3 1.78%
2011, November 0 0.00%
2013, January 2 1.75%
2014, January 1 1.22%
Total/Average 6 1.19%
Framing of women as 'victims' in the NATO Secretary General's Annual Reports
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NATO as a ‘diplomatic tool’ to enhance relationships with partner states (see 
discussion above). 
 
(6.4) Conclusion 
This Chapter has examined the rapid expansion of NATO’s engagement with the 
Women, Peace and Security agenda between 2012 and 2014. In doing so, the Chapter 
has identified that NATO’s implementation of UNSCR 1325 has to a certain extent 
situated the WPS agenda as external to, and of ‘added value’ to the Alliance, rather 
than as a core part of NATO’s purpose as a defence organisation. It has drawn attention 
to the value of UNSCR 1325 as a ‘diplomatic tool’ and the importance of institutional 
actors, including femocrats but also those within leadership positions supporting the 
WPS agenda. The Chapter has also drawn attention to the significant progress made 
in committing to and working towards the implementation of UNSCR 1325 by NATO.  
In respect of the research questions, this Chapter has demonstrated that NATO’s 
implementation of UNSCR 1325 does not represent a transformative moment for the 
organisation. Rather than challenging NATO’s core values and tasks, UNSCR 1325 
has been position to be of ‘added value’ to the Alliance. However, in respect of 
NATO’s approach to international peace and security it is evident that even if UNSCR 
1325 has not yet transformed NATO’s approach, the WPS agenda has provided an 
additional tool for NATO to utilise, in particular as a means to engage a disparate 
group of partner states. The key actors and drivers of the implementation of UNSCR 
1325 by NATO have been identified as the femocrats operating within the IMS and 
IS, but also the leadership from the NATO Secretary General’s Special Representative 
on Women, Peace and Security and the Secretary General himself. The former having 
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a key role in shaping NATO’s implementation of UNSCR 1325 and the latter in 
supporting the agenda.  
The first section focused on the value of UNSCR 1325 as a ‘diplomatic tool’. 
However, it also demonstrated the progress NATO has made on UNSCR 1325, which 
has been most visible in the elevation of WPS on the agenda and outcome documents 
of the biennial NATO Summits. The significant commitments made at the Summits 
to UNSCR 1325, such as the commissioning of the Review of the Practical 
Implications of UNSCR 1325 for the Conduct of NATO-led Operations and Missions, 
have demonstrated that NATO Summits are not (just) symbolic affairs, with pre-
agreed outcomes. The NATO Wales Summit drew attention to the disjuncture between 
the rhetoric of Alliance commitment to WPS, in particular the UK’s PSVI initiative, 
and the reality of the absence of decision makers from the room when they understood 
more pressing issues were being discussed elsewhere. In this sense, the PSVI meeting 
served primarily as a ‘good news story’ for the UK hosts of the NATO Summit. 
NATO’s implementation of UNSCR 1325 has continued to focus on the external 
dimension, in particular NATO partnerships. As a result, a diverse range of NATO 
partnerships across the globe, and a number outside of formal cooperation forums, 
have included UNSCR 1325 as a particular focal point, signifying the value of UNSCR 
1325 as a ‘diplomatic tool’ for the Alliance. This has facilitated lesson sharing on the 
value of the WPS agenda as a strategic tool to support military operations and in 
respect of the status of women in the military. This supports Wagnsson’s (2011) 
contention that UNSCR 1325 is an issue which can bring together diverging security 
communities. In one respect, this positions UNSCR 1325 within a silo, where the 
immediate value for all partnerships (or of the partnerships themselves) may not be 
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apparent but it serves as a tool to maintain relations with a diverse set of partners. It 
also represents the widening of NATO’s role as a ‘teaching machine’ in respect of 
gender and UNSCR 1325. 
The section concluded by examining the Science for Peace programme, this is another 
means through which NATO can bring together a set of partners to learn lessons on 
UNSCR 1325. In effect operating as a silo, whereby the immediate benefit of 
cooperation with partners (and on UNSCR 1325) is kept for future use in the event 
that they may be need to support a NATO operation or activity. If this was to happen, 
NATO and partners would have a shared (and non-contentious) starting point for 
cooperation in order to bridge diverse and diverging approaches to security. 
The Chapter then turned to examine whether UNSCR 1325 was being institutionalised 
or externalised by NATO. In this respect, it was necessary to look at the role of gender 
focal points and Gender Advisors. This analysis found that while their creation within 
the NATO structure is an important step to support the implementation of UNSCR 
1325 there were a number of issues limiting the role they could play. For example, the 
positioning of a significant number of these roles outside of NATO’s structure, as 
VNCs, represents an obstacle to mainstreaming WPS as a core part of NATO’s 
identity and as part of NATO’s values. Gender expertise is further undermined by the 
preponderance of women within roles responsible for WPS, associating WPS as a 
women’s issue and, related to this, their lack of previous experience or expertise on 
WPS or gender mainstreaming more broadly.  
The next issue examined was gender training, which should form a crucial component 
of any attempt to institutionalise UNSCR 1325 within NATO. Indeed, the provision 
of gender training for NATO, in part provided by the NCGM, has been praised the UN 
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Security Council (NATO ACT, 2015). The NCGM has also been recognised as 
‘Department Head’ for NATO’s gender training, with ACT and ACO contributing 
additional and supplementary gender training. However, the symbolic separation of 
NATO’s gender training from the institution is symbolised in the fact that it is a NATO 
partner, Sweden, who hosts the NCGM. This serves to externalise NATO’s gender 
expertise, and indicates that gender is seen as outside of NATO’s ‘more salient core 
business’ as a defence organisation. It seems unlikely that such recognition of 
expertise, integral to the Alliance, would be recognised in a partner country for a hard 
security issue. Sweden’s centrality to NATO’s gender training represents a widening 
of NATO’s role as a ‘teaching machine’, with NATO troops and officials learning the 
value of UNSCR 1325 from a Swedish perspective, with a focus on the ‘added value’ 
of the Resolution for operational effectiveness. In addition, the lack of transparency 
on who has attended the training makes it difficult to gauge the reach of these 
provisions or to hold NATO and member states to account. Reporting on the 2014 
NATO/EAPC Action Plan in June 2016 may provide answers to these questions, 
however, the loose focus on ‘percentages’, rather than more specific measures 
suggests it may not.  
This section then turned to examine the role of femocrats within NATO, in particular 
focusing on the obstacles they face in their work advancing feminist agendas drawn 
from interview data. This drew attention to the perception that WPS was a personal 
agenda, even when it was a defined institutional imperative. In addition, it drew 
attention to the difficulty of operating as a woman within an institution of hegemonic 
masculinity, particularly when individuals fail to live up to gendered expectations of 
how they should act. This adds an additional challenge to both the work of femocrats 
and those working as gender focal points. 
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Finally, the Chapter examined the role of the Special Representative on WPS and 
Secretary General in supporting the agenda, highlighting in particular, the Special 
Representative’s role in advancing the agenda during her time in office from autumn 
2012 to the 2014 NATO Wales Summit. The NATO Wales Summit also marked the 
end of term for Anders Fogh Rasmussen as NATO Secretary General, his replacement 
the Norwegian Jens Stoltenberg has no proven track record on supporting UNSCR 
1325. Rasmussen’s, at least tacit, support was crucial for ensuring UNSCR 1325 
remained on the agenda. In addition, Mari Skåre stepped down as Special 
Representative and has been replaced by Dutch diplomat Ambassador Marriët 
Schuurman. Skåre proved particularly adept at navigating NATO’s institutional 
politics and in garnering external pressure on NATO to implement UNSCR 1325 to 
best effect. It therefore remains to be seen if there will remain the same level of drive 
behind the implementation of UNSCR 1325 at NATO. Although initial indications 
suggest there will be, with the Secretary General’s first annual report addressing WPS 
for the first time, rather than in a separate report specifically on UNSCR 1325 
(Stoltenberg, 2014). 
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Return to Hope: Where are the Women in NATO’s Story of 
Afghanistan? 
(7.0) Introduction 
This Chapter examines the role of NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division in the 
implementation of UNSCR 1325. In doing so, it will argue that far from challenging 
NATO’s moral legitimacy, UNSCR 1325 has provided NATO with a platform from 
which to strengthen the existing dominant understanding of international peace and 
security and reinforce NATO’s position as an institution of hegemonic masculinity, 
necessitating a role for NATO as a ‘protector’. NATO’s use of UNSCR 1325 as a 
moral instrument is most evident in the primary role given to the Public Diplomacy 
Division in supporting NATO’s implementation of the Resolution. 
This Chapter is split into two sections. The first introduces NATO’s Public Diplomacy 
Division, outlining the importance not only of public diplomacy but also strategic 
communication for the Alliance. The section then turns to examine the organisational 
structure of the Public Diplomacy Division, contextualising it within NATO as an 
organisation to find it undervalued and as a result under resourced. Against this 
backdrop the Public Diplomacy Division’s role in implementing UNSCR 1325 is 
outlined, focusing in particular on the provisions within the NATO/EAPC Action Plan 
(NATO/EAPC, 2014).  
The final section in the Chapter examines NATO’s Return to Hope web-documentary, 
released in 2014 to coincide with the drawdown of NATO-led forces from 
Afghanistan. This section situates Afghan women as central to the Western narrative 
surrounding the intervention in Afghanistan, first as part of the justificatory narrative 
for the intervention and then as instrumental assets on the ground. It then introduces 
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the Return to Hope web-documentary, linking its purpose as a public diplomacy tool 
to the wider narrative surrounding Afghan women. Finally, this section interrogates 
the implementation of UNSCR 1325 in respect of Return to Hope, examining the 
positon of Afghan women within the documentary. 
 
(7.1) NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division 
(7.1.1) Public diplomacy and strategic communication: one and the same? 
‘The operation of cameras, not only in the recording and distribution of images of 
torture, but as part of the very apparatus of bombing, make it clear that media 
representations have already become modes of military conduct’  
This quote from Butler (2009: 29) draws attention to the importance of taking seriously 
communication strategies as constitutive parts of international security institutions, 
both in relation to operations but, also, in their day-to-day activities as a means to 
legitimise their purpose and role. NATO’s communications fall into two distinct but 
interrelated strategies, these are public diplomacy and strategy communication. This 
is because the success of international interventions is premised on the support they 
receive from both foreign and domestic publics, or those on the receiving-end of 
interventions and those within the intervening state. This also relies on a favourable 
public opinion of NATO within member state and contributing countries. Without 
public support, or acceptance, of an intervention the ability of NATO forces to engage 
in and, see an operation through to the end is compromised. In the same way, strategic 
communications serves a vital role in the operation itself. The definition of strategic 
communication is much disputed, including its very purpose. For Paul (2011: 3), 
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strategic communication is ‘the coordinated actions, messages, images, and other 
forms of singling or engagement intended to inform, influence, or persuade selected 
audiences in support of national objectives’. This thesis will treat strategic 
communication as efforts to engage those on the receiving end of intervention or 
publics back home for operational benefit. In contrast, public diplomacy efforts are 
those intended to promote the interests of NATO abroad to foreign publics and in 
NATO’s case they are also used to engage publics back home to tell a ‘good news’ 
story about NATO. Public diplomacy initiatives take the form of providing 
information through broadcast, the internet and conducting cultural initiatives such as 
art exhibitions (Paul, 2011: 35).  
Both strategic communication and public diplomacy are crucial to support operational 
success and for this reason to some extent their remits overlap. For example, as the 
following statement leaked from a CIA (2010) briefing on the ISAF mission 
demonstrates, the possibility for action and the scope and nature of the operation are 
dependent on the support of publics back home: 
 ‘A consistent and iterative strategic communication program across NATO 
troop contributors that taps into the key concerns of specific Western 
European audiences could provide a buffer if today’s apathy becomes 
tomorrow’s opposition to ISAF, giving politicians greater scope to support 
deployments to Afghanistan’  
This statement demonstrates how an issue previously falling within the remit of Public 
Diplomacy (public opinion of NATO, and by extension NATO operations) can 
become of strategic importance. There remains, however, a reason for making the 
distinction between the two concepts and that is that they can also come into tension 
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with each other, in particular where a different message is needed to succeed on the 
ground to the one which will be palatable to publics back home. This tension is 
reflected in the literature on the topic, where for some the terms strategic 
communication and public diplomacy are one and the same thing, while to others one 
or the other is subordinate to the other (Paul, 2011: 3). At the same time as 
acknowledging the distinction between the two concepts, it is also important to note 
that in an increasingly interconnected world the two are difficult to separate in practice 
and messages can and do run counter to each other, both strategies should therefore be 
conducted with some awareness of the other. 
The interconnectedness of strategic communication and public diplomacy is further 
illustrated in an examination of the militarism which underpins NATO and the source 
of NATO’s power. The military has a monopoly on the legitimate use of force in 
international relations, however, this relies on a ‘consensual understanding that this is 
the way things should be done’ (Kronsell, 2012: 44). According to Kuus (2007: 271), 
this entails the constitution of NATO and military power as ‘good’ in line with what 
Hardt and Negri (2000: 7) term the new inscription of power. Hardt and Negri (2007: 
35) challenge dominant understandings of power in global politics, shifting from 
understanding power as emanating from the ability to use lethal force, to privilege the 
role of ‘moral instruments’ in presenting the use of force as the only way to secure 
peace and security. In using this framework NATO’s ‘moral instruments’ are 
identified as the starting point of the institution’s legitimacy, rather than the capacity 
to use lethal force. It is this moral element which enables NATO to be viewed 
uncritically by mainstream scholars as ‘in essence a uniquely privileged group 
providing a relatively pure public good’ (Oneal, 1990: 401). An examination of 
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NATO’s communications strategy more broadly is therefore warranted in order to 
understand NATO’s pervasiveness as a key actor in global politics post-Cold War. 
 
(7.1.2) NATO’s public diplomacy 
NATO is about communication -- left, right and centre’ 
Former NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson (2001)   
This quote from former NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson (2001) draws 
attention to the importance of communication for the organisation, not only for internal 
politics but also to communicate with the outside world and in operations. Robertson 
is in effect arguing that everything NATO does is communicating a message to the 
outside world. As Robertson goes on to state ‘this outside world wants – and needs – 
to know what NATO is doing, and why’ (2001). Communication has only become 
more important for NATO in an increasingly connected world and with the expansion 
of social media. 
In line with other policy areas, it is NATO member states which retain responsibility 
for communicating defence and security policies and informing their publics about the 
role of NATO (Public Diplomacy Divison, 2006: 333). NATO does, however, have a 
Public Diplomacy Division whose role is to complement the information activities 
within each member state and is tasked with addressing issues relating to the public 
perception of the alliance. (Public Diplomacy Divison, 2006: 333). The Public 
Diplomacy Division is situated within the International Staff and takes command from 
the Secretary General. The International Staff, since the end of the Cold War, has seen 
significant staffing restraints with full-time equivalent posts in the International Staff 
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having increased by just 17.1, from 1,228 to 1,245.1 in 2011 (Dijkstra, 2014: 5). This 
is in spite of the fact that the alliance’s membership has more than doubled from 12 to 
28 members in this period and NATO’s reach has expanded globally through 
partnerships (see discussion in Chapter Three). For further comparison, in 1954, 596 
were working in the Secretariat (Ismay, 1954). The already overstretched Public 
Diplomacy Division faced further cuts with the end of the Afghanistan mission in 
2014, when public diplomacy became less of a priority for the alliance (Dijkstra, 2014: 
6). This inevitably places considerable constraint on the work the Public Diplomacy 
Division can do to address the challenges facing the public perception of the Alliance. 
Moreover, it is a further hindrance to NATO’s implementation of UNSCR 1325 given 
the central role assigned to the Public Diplomacy Division (see discussion below). It 
is also salient to note that the Public Diplomacy Division is the first (and to-date only) 
division to be assigned a woman as Assistant Secretary General (see discussion in 
Chapter Three). These were Ambassador Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović from 2011 to 2014 
and her predecessor Stephanie Babst (acting) 2010 to 2011, with Grabar-Kitarović 
playing a role in championing NATO’s implementation of the WPS agenda.  
NATO was late to develop a digital communications strategy and found itself, as then 
NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer (2007) phrased it, ‘in the stone age’. 
This has changed, and today NATO is pioneering the way among international 
organisations in digital communication (Engage Prague 2015, 2015). In part, this can 
be attributed to NATO’s involvement in Afghanistan, which found NATO confronting 
an enemy, the Taliban, who were adept at their own information campaign (Betz, 
2011: 622). NATO now effectively engages across multiple social media platforms, 
including twitter and Facebook and has launched an online TV channel, NATO.TV. 
The creation of a communications team within the Public Diplomacy Division in 2010 
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has been key to this transition (Engage Prague 2015, 2015). This team has focused on 
public awareness and information building, and on building support for NATO in 
member states (Engage Prague 2015, 2015). Steven Mehringer, Head of 
Communications, has drawn lessons from corporate brands to enhance NATO’s 
communications strategy (Engage Prague 2015, 2015). For example, NATO has 
sought to engage with consumers on an emotional level in order to ‘uncover the story 
about.. [the] organization that people will care about’ (Media Post, 2015). This 
highlights the role of narratives and storytelling as a key part of NATO’s 
communication. 
The Public Diplomacy Division is in part concerned with the public opinion of the 
Alliance. In NATO member states this has remained favourable at above 60%, with 
the exceptions of Turkey and Greece, with the former having a favourability rating of 
just 25% (Wolff, 2014:80). NATO faces a number of challenges in this respect, 
outlined by Wolff (2014), 1) as weak support for the alliance and its operations; 2); 
the intersection of domestic politics and interests with NATO’s agenda 3) diverging 
opinions on NATO’s role in global security; 4) and a public with little awareness of 
the institution. For example, The Independent published an article in the run up to the 
2014 NATO Wales Summit outlining what NATO is and what it does (Gander, 2015). 
That the newspaper felt the need to publish such an article is indicative of the level of 
knowledge of the Alliance among the general public. Moreover, the article contained 
a significant factual error because it stated that Sweden is a NATO member (Gander, 
2015). 
On specific issues, however, public opinion was significantly lower than the general 
approval of NATO. For example, on the commitment to upholding the Article 5 
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guarantee in the (hypothetical) event of a Russian attack on a Baltic state and on troop 
presence in Afghanistan (Wolff, 2014:80). Notwithstanding public scepticism of the 
intervention in Afghanistan, an elite consensus emerged in support of the intervention 
in ISAF contributing states and this served to limit the impact of public opinion on 
electoral politics (Kreps, 2010: 192). The incentives for states to cooperate within 
NATO’s formal structure and the costs of not doing so contributes to explaining why 
NATO participation in Afghanistan grew despite high casualty rates, low public 
opinion and questions over the eventual success of the intervention (Kreps, 2010: 211). 
This is supported by the observations of the CIA, who in a leaked memo, describe how 
the ‘Afghanistan mission’s low public salience has allowed French and German 
leaders to disregard popular opposition and steadily increase their troop contributions’ 
(CIA [Wikileaks], 2010). This is not to say that NATO members (and the USA in 
particular) were complacent about public opinion, the leaked memo highlights concern 
that a spike in ‘casualties or in Afghan civilian casualties could become a tipping point 
to converting passive opposition into active calls for immediate withdrawal’ (CIA 
[Wikileaks], 2010). The NATO-led ISAF mission therefore required a public 
diplomacy strategy to counter this threat and NATO had a role in providing one 
through the production of the Return to Hope documentary in 2014. 
 
(7.1.3) The Public Diplomacy Division and UNSCR 1325 
The Public Diplomacy Division’s role in NATO’s implementation of UNSCR 1325, 
at least on the surface, appears to hold some of the most radical potential for realising 
the transformative potential of NATO’s implementation of UNSCR 1325. The Public 
Diplomacy Division could play a role in helping to shape public perceptions of women 
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and men in conflict, through supporting gender-sensitive reporting by the media. This 
would help support one of the key recommendations of the Global Study, which called 
on the media to commit to gender-sensitive reporting (Coomaraswamy, 2015: 297). 
However, in reality the Public Diplomacy Division’s role has been limited, in part due 
to the structural constraints, discussed above, on the Division. 
NATO’s implementation of UNSCR 1325 has been an outward facing one, with the 
Public Diplomacy Division coming to occupy a central role. The original 2007 
NATO/EAPC policy contained no provision for the involvement of the Public 
Diplomacy Division. However, that changed with the 2011 revision where a specific 
role was outlined for the Public Diplomacy Division. This included utilising the 
NATO TV Channel, website and ‘digital outreach tools’, in addition to engaging with 
directly on the issue through arranging visits to NATO HQ (it is not clear by whom) 
(NATO, 2011c). The 2011 and 2014 NATO/EAPC policy on UNSCR 1325 outlines 
the following purpose for the involvement of the Public Diplomacy Division: 
‘Taking into account the strong influence of the media on the perception of the 
role of women in society, in culture, in the military and in public life, NATO 
and its partners are committed to include Women, Peace and Security in their 
respective public diplomacy strategies and efforts with the purpose of raising 
awareness among a broad audience, including decision makers, and of 
reinforcing NATO’s and its partners’ messages.’ 
This indicates that NATO understands UNSCR 1325 as a public diplomacy tool to 
create a positive image of the Alliance. The instrumental use of the WPS agenda serves 
to undermine its transformative potential and overlooks the role the Public Diplomacy 
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Division could have in challenging essentalised gender stereotypes by mainstreaming 
UNSCR 1325 throughout its work.  
The instrumentalisation of UNSCR 1325 as a ‘good news story’ for NATO can 
overlook the reality of the Alliance’s implementation of the Resolution. For example, 
at the time of the review into NATO’s implementation of UNSCR 1325, the internal 
reality of the commitment to UNSCR 1325 and the external perception did not tally 
(NATO Official, 2014). In meetings on the review, few were in attendance and there 
was a sense that the exercise was one of ‘preaching to the converted [paraphrased]’, 
with the same faces around the table (NATO Official, 2014). The Review of the 
Practical Implications of UNSCR 1325 for the Conduct of NATO-led Operations and 
Missions (2013) was presented to NATO Defence Ministers and became a cornerstone 
of Public Diplomacy Division communication on NATO’s implementation of UNSCR 
1325 (NATO, 2013d). 
The 2014 revision of the NATO/EAPC policy states that ‘public diplomacy will form 
an integral part of the overall strategies and plans’ for the integration of a gender 
perspective (NATO, 2014c). And while this policy does not go into the same detail as 
the 2011 revision, specific actions are listed in the NATO/EAPC Action Plan. The role 
of the Public Diplomacy Division in the implementation of UNSCR 1325 is 
categorised as a ‘Cross-Cutting Enabler’, again highlighting the overlap between 
public diplomacy and strategic communication. The actions on the Public Diplomacy 
Division include: 1) systematically integrating WPS into public diplomacy efforts; 2) 
specific (and targeted) diplomatic and media events to promote NATO’s commitment 
to WPS; and 3) to utilise the ‘full range of communication tools’ in order to regularly 
inform the media and public of NATO’s efforts to implement UNSCR 1325 
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(NATO/EAPC 2014). However, the only indicator for these actions is the ‘number 
and scope of public diplomacy efforts including website and NATO TV Channel 
stories’ (NATO/EAPC, 2014). This make it difficult to evaluate the extent to which 
the actions have been met, given that the indicator does not relate to all of them and 
provides very narrow data (see discussion in Chapter Five). 
In support of the implementation of the NATO/EAPC policy the Public Diplomacy 
Division programmes fall into two areas. First, their own initiatives including inviting 
groups drawn from the media, academia and think thanks to NATO in order to brief 
them on NATO’s work on UNSCR 1325. In addition to sponsoring international 
conferences and inviting key opinion formers. Second, supporting the Special 
Representative on Women, Peace and Security in her initiatives (NATO Official, 
2014). The considerable political constraints under which the Public Diplomacy 
Division operates have curtailed the agency of the Public Diplomacy Division to move 
beyond NATO’s adoption of UNSCR 1325 as just a ‘good news story’ for NATO. 
This contributes to a wider discussion on the gendered contradictions which underpin 
and support militarism. 
The inclusion of the Public Diplomacy Division in the revised NATO/EAPC policy 
on UNSCR 1325 is likely to be attributable, at least in part, to the then Assistant 
Secretary General for Public Diplomacy, Ambassador Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović, who 
was in office from 2011 to 2014. Grabar-Kitarović had an active role in NATO’s 
implementation of UNSCR 1325 and while this later reflected her portfolio, it was 
also linked to her own personal agenda on the issue. For example, her persona as a 
champion of UNSCR 1325 at NATO would later prove instrumental in the domestic 
arena when she successful ran for President of Croatia, allowing her to enact ‘a 
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cosmopolitan post-UNSCR-1325 subjectivity’ (Baker, 2015). It should also be noted 
here that Grabar-Kitarović had no previous record of championing UNSCR 1325 
before her appointment and has actively distanced herself from feminism (Baker, 
2015). Prior to the appointment of the Secretary General’s Special Representative on 
Women, Peace and Security (see discussion in Chapter Six), Grabar-Kitarović acted 
as NATO’s unofficial spokesperson on UNSCR 1325. For example, she spoke on 
International Women’s Day 2012 (NATO, 2012h) and at a meeting on WPS in 
Georgia (NATO, 2012b).  
The following statement by Assistant Secretary General of Executive Management, 
Ambassador William Eaton, at an event to showcase female leadership at NATO 
indicates part of the role Grabar-Kitarović had at NATO and demonstrates the 
symbolism attached to Grabar-Kitarović as the most senior (female) NATO official: 
‘Role models such as Ambassador Grabar[-Kitarović] send a powerful 
message to those who might consider working for NATO that women can 
aspire to senior posts. It also sends a message to our current staff to raise their 
expectations and aspirations about their own potential within NATO’ (NATO, 
2013c). 
However, the statement overlooks the fact that Grabar-Kitarović is the only woman to 
be appointed to such a senior position and that she was more visible then many of her 
peers given that she headed the Public Diplomacy Division, belying the reality of the 
absence of women from senior positions within NATO. Moreover, it overlooks the 
structural constraints preventing women from reaching senior positions, putting the 
onus on women to raise their own expectations. This is itself is reflective of NATO’s 
initial implementation of UNSCR 1325, which separated out Human Resource 
276 
 
concerns from the implementation of WPS (see discussion in Chapter Three). Grabar-
Kitarović’s visibility as the most senior female official at NATO led to her becoming 
in and of herself a ‘good news story’ for the Alliance. 
In addition to public diplomacy, the integration of a gender perspective in operations 
is just as a salient in respect of strategic communications but often relies upon the 
positioning of a Gender Advisor with the relevant skills and expertise (Colao, 2013: 
21). In operations, Gender Advisors are required to be subject matter experts on a 
range of issues relevant to the operation from planning, to execution, to evaluation. A 
core part of their role should be in coordinating strategic communication and public 
diplomacy and understanding the gender dimension to this (Colao, 2013: 21). For 
Lieutenant Dr Elizabeth Schleicher and Major Andy Young (2013: 36) who have 
served in Kosovo as a Gender Advisor and a Gender Focal Point respectively, the 
integration of UNSCR 1325 and a gender perspective are key to operational 
effectiveness in Afghanistan. In particular, they focus on the benefits of effective 
strategic communication for enabling forces to engage local women in order to garner 
knowledge to support the most efficient use of knowledge (Schleicher and Young, 
2013: 37). This positions the integration of a gender perspective into Strategic 
Communication as both a tool and a force multiplier, facilitating information gathering 
and dissemination (Schleicher and Young, 2013: 36). 
 
(7.2) Where are the women in NATO’s story of Afghanistan? 
This section seeks to evaluate the implementation of UNSCR 1325 in NATO’s public 
diplomacy efforts in respect of Afghanistan. This case study has been chosen for two 
reasons. First, because Afghan women have been central to the narrative surrounding 
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the Western intervention in Afghanistan. Second, the International Security Assistance 
Force (ISAF) mission is NATO’s largest to date and shaped NATO’s understanding 
of the value of UNSCR 1325 (see discussion in Chapter Five). It could therefore be 
expected that if the Public Diplomacy Division was to implement UNSCR 1325 
anywhere, it would be in relation to NATO’s involvement in Afghanistan.  
In order to assess the extent to which UNSCR 1325 has been integrated into Public 
Diplomacy efforts, this section will examine NATO’s Return to Hope web-
documentary released in 2014 to coincide with the drawdown of NATO troops from 
Afghanistan and to tell NATO’s story of Afghanistan. While Afghanistan features 
frequently on the NATO TV YouTube channel. Return to Hope was an award winning 
showcase documentary for the Public Diplomacy Division and as such warrants 
examination in its own right. It is also indicative that NATO’s ‘story of Afghanistan’ 
showcases NATO’s efforts to support Afghan women.  First, before examining Return 
to Hope, this section will contextualise the documentary against the 
instrumentalisation of Afghan women to support the 2001 US-led intervention. In 
doing so, it will unpack the narrative of ‘saving Afghan women’, to demonstrate that 
the Return to Hope documentary represents an extension of this, rather than a more 
transformative effort to implement UNSCR 1325 effectively. The section then turns 
to examine Return to Hope, linking the justification provided by NATO’s Public 
Diplomacy Division to a similar call by the CIA for Afghan women to be used to 
bolster public opinion of the operation. 
 
(7.2.1) The (continued) instrumentalisation of Afghan women 
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Afghan women have been central to Western involvement in Afghanistan, far 
predating the 2001 intervention. Efforts to ‘modernise’ women’s status in Afghanistan 
go as far back as the early twentieth century (Kabeer and Khan, 2014: 5). However, 
this is not to say that the Western approach to Afghan women was consistent. During 
the rise to power of the Soviet-backed regime in Kabul and the subsequent Soviet 
occupation (1979-1989) efforts were made to emancipate women (Kabeer and Khan, 
2014: 1). At this time, the US conveniently left women’s rights off the agenda in 
formulating its opposition. This is not to say that the US was not drawing upon 
women’s rights to oppose other regimes at that time, for example, it drew on the 
Kohemini regime’s ill treatment of women in Iran to support a hostile foreign policy 
stance (Enloe, 1989). The selective and instrumental use of women’s rights in US 
foreign policy, was reinforced when the US-backed mujahidin came to power in 
Afghanistan in 1992 and ushered in one of the worst periods of human rights abuses 
the country had seen (Kabeer and Khan, 2014: 2). The overthrow of the mujahidin in 
1994 by the Taliban led to severe restrictions on women’s rights, including to 
movement, work and education (Kabeer and Khan, 2014: 2). As Kandiyoti (2007: 505) 
argues, women’s rights have ‘become implicated in the geopolitical manoeuvrings of 
powerful global actors’ and this makes the invocation of the ‘principled politics 
solidarity’, which has emerged in the War on Terror, extremely problematic. 
In November 2001, Laura Bush made history when she became the first First Lady to 
give the President’s Saturday morning radio address (Young, 2003: 230). The address 
came shortly after the start of the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan 
and she drew heavily on the experiences of Afghan women in making her case in 
support for the intervention (Bush, 2001): 
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‘Civilized people throughout the world are speaking out in horror -- not only 
because our hearts break for the women and children in Afghanistan, but also 
because in Afghanistan we see the world the terrorists would like to impose on 
the rest of us.’ 
The address invoked the emancipation of Afghan women as central to the justificatory 
narrative underpinning the intervention. This served to supplement the initial 
justification of the war as a necessary defensive action to protect American people 
following the attacks of 9/11 (Young, 2003: 3). In particular, when this defensive 
narrative proved weak in as much as it rested on a bold claim that the state of 
Afghanistan actively support al-Qaeda (Young, 2003: 17). 
Following the 2001 intervention in Afghanistan, women became beneficial not just in 
rhetoric but in both doctrine and practice to population centric counter-insurgency 
(Dyvikm 2013:412). In particular, through serving in Female Engagement Teams 
(FETs) intended to engage local populations. FETs both mirrored essentalised notions 
of women as peaceful and instrumentalised gender as a ‘new strategic asset’, enabling 
women to engage in the post-9/11 masculinist protectionist narrative (Pratt, 2013:778). 
The gendering of counterinsurgency also served to demonstrate that the US was ‘no 
longer fighting its new battles with outmoded methods’ (Mcbride and Wibben, 2012: 
200). FETs were a new initiative but as one member of a FET reflected ‘we were 
tourists, unable to solve problems with units that changed every 12 months. Everything 
was temporary, except Afghanistan’ (Pope, 2016).  
The preoccupation of the Western interveners with ‘rescuing’ Afghan women has both 
an imperialist and political implications (Khan, 2013: 105). The centrality of Afghan 
women to the NATO-led ISAF mission in Afghanistan have pervaded every element 
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of the intervention, with strategic communication being no exception. This is 
exemplified in a CIA document released through Wikileaks (2010) which notes:  
‘Afghan women could serve as ideal messengers in humanizing the ISAF role 
in combating the Taliban because of women's ability to speak personally and 
credibly about their experiences under the Taliban, their aspirations for the 
future, and their fears of a Taliban victory. Outreach initiatives that create 
media opportunities for Afghan women to share their stories with French, 
German, and other European women could help to overcome pervasive 
scepticism among women in Western Europe toward the ISAF’ 
The document drew upon a gendered assumption that women in NATO contributing 
states (specifically Germany and France) would be more likely to identify with Afghan 
women and that such outreach activities would seek to address the short fall in support 
among women for the ISAF mission as compared to men (CIA [Wikileaks], 2010). 
The statement also exemplifies the strategy pursued in NATO’s Return to Hope 
documentary, which as discussed below shared the stories of Afghan women who 
joined the Afghan armed forces.   
Daulatzai (2008:428) outlines a paradox in approaches to Afghanistan, this is that ‘the 
over-determination of gender in addressing the suffering of Afghans has led to an 
impasse, thereby creating the conditions of impossibility for acknowledging this very 
suffering’ over the preceding decades. The cost of focusing on Afghan women to 
explain Afghanistan, means that they can only perceived as women in Afghanistan 
and are denied agency. Khan (2013) examines the front cover of Time Magazine from 
July 2010 which features a picture of Biba Aisha, she is a mutilated Afghan woman 
with a hole in her head where her nose should be. The article accompanying the picture 
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explains how she is an eighteen-year old mutilated by the Taliban and rescued by US 
forces. The focus on Afghan women as victims of their culture makes a spectacle of 
them, intensifies stereotypes about the Third World and in particular, Islam (Khan, 
2013: 107). Mackie’s (2012: 118) study of media images of Afghan women finds that 
the icon of the veiled Afghan woman has come to stand ‘for the people, the land, and 
the nation-state of Afghanistan.’ In using Afghan women as a metonym for the Afghan 
nation, and with a preponderance of Western images focusing on unveiling Afghan 
women, the veiled woman comes to symbolise the mystery of the middle East and her 
unveiling an attempt to understand that nation (Mackie, 2012: 118). In so doing first-
world a dichotomy is constructed between first-world masculinity and third-world 
feminity (Mackie, 2012: 118). In essence this masculinity is also militarised, because 
war photographers are imagined as similar to soldier in popular imagery (Mackie, 
2012: 118). In response to pictures of ‘unveiled’ Afghan women published in the New 
York Times, Butler (2004:143) questions just what we see when we see their faces, 
whether it is possible to see what is really there and ‘what scenes of pain and grief do 
these images cover and realize.' It is necessary, she argues, to demonstrate caution 
before championing the ‘liberated’ faces of these Afghan women and ‘to ask in what 
narrative function these images are mobilised’ (Butler, 2004:143). In doing so it is 
possible to uncover the contradiction between the apparent humanisation of these 
women, while they are simultaneously dehumanised through the denial of their 
experience of decades of suffering in conflict. 
(7.2.2) Return to Hope (2014) 
The Return to Hope web documentary sought to tell NATO’s story of Afghanistan and 
as such an interrogation of the position of (Afghan) women within the documentary 
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contributes to  establising whether NATO’s narrative is a continuation of the 
instrumentatisation of (Afghan) women identified in previous inventions or a 
challenge, in line with a transformative implementation of UNSCR 1325.  This section 
will argue that the release of the documentary in Autumn 2014, as ISAF troops drew 
down from Afghanistan, provides an insight into whether the central role of the Public 
Diplomacy Division’s in NATO’s implementation of UNSCR 1325 has 
transformative potential.  
 
As Pudrovska and Ferree (2004: 118) argue, websites provide a valuable insight into 
feminist practices because they provide ‘an open space for self-presentation to the rest 
of the world’. They must also be taken in context and acknowledged as only a partial 
indicator of the organisation’s values and how it operates. Nevertheless, websites and 
web-documentaries in particular are important to examine because visual 
representations of war, particularly through the media have become in and of 
themselves ‘modes of military conduct’ (Butler, 2009: 29). For Butler (2009: 29), 
‘there is no way to separate, under present historical conditions, the material reality of 
war from those representational regimes through which it operates and which 
rationalize its own operation’ (Butler, 2009: 29). Further, given the central role of 
NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division in the implementation of UNSCR 1325, NATO’s 
web presence represents an important indicator of the value placed upon UNSCR 1325 
by the organisation. 
The Return to Hope documentary was intended to inform publics in ISAF contributing 
states and therefore exemplifies NATO’s  
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‘NATO has sought to engage with consumers on an emotional level in order 
to ‘uncover the story about.. [NATO] that people will care about’  
This quote by NATO Head of Communications, Steve Mehringer, highlights both the 
role of narratives in NATO’s intervention in Afghanistan and the role of NATO’s 
Public Diplomacy Division in shaping these.  One noteworthy example of PDD 
storytelling is the Return to Hope web-documentary launched in September 2014 to 
coincide with the NATO Summit in Wales, and as NATO and ISAF forces began to 
withdraw from Afghanistan. An examination of the documentary and the story NATO 
tells of Afghanistan is particularly relevant for understanding NATO’s 
implementation of UNSCR 1325 given both the central role assigned to the PDD 
within the NATO/EAPC Policy and the intertwined nature of NATO’s intervention in 
Afghanistan and adoption of UNSCR 1325 (see discussion in Chapter Five). 
Return to Hope epitomises NATO’s storytelling capabilities. The Communications 
team were tasked with telling the story of NATO’s most challenging and drawn out 
combat mission to date (McCulloch, 2016).  They also had to capture the attention of 
‘an indifferent and easily distracted audience’ (Engage Prague 2015, 2015). They 
worked with an external web design company, Boondoggle, to produce the project. 
Return to Hope was awarded a ‘Webby Award’ in 2015 for the category ‘Best Visual 
Design’ and was a nominee for the ‘Best Use of Photography’ (NATO, 2015g). This 
represented seismic progress from the early days of NATO’s communication strategy. 
Return to Hope is hosted on an interactive website utilising sound, images, video and 
text through which viewers experience a narrative of heroism, transformation, and 
grief. The documentary focuses on the experiences of six individuals, who had either 
lived in or served in Afghanistan – in the nature of all good storytelling there is as 
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much fiction as fact. The first three individuals featured are: Nancy Dupree, the 
‘Grandmother of Kabul’, an American who moved to Afghanistan with her husband 
in the 1970s; Josh Pitcher, ‘The Wounded Warrior’, An American hero who made a 
miraculous recovery after being injured in service; and Roya Mahboob, ‘The 
Entrepreneur’, who returned to Afghanistan after her family fled Taliban rule.  The 
next three are: Ahmad Sarmast, ‘The Music Maker’, an Afghan who left the country 
in the 1980s to pursue his studies and was unable to return when the Taliban took 
power; Mohammad Ali, ‘The Commando’, part of an elite unit in the Afghan army; 
and Mujeeb Arez, ‘The TV Star’, who had lived in Kabul under the Taliban.  
In addition to the six narratives the project website features interactive elements and 
identifies and examines the critical issues for Afghanistan through nine thematic 
chapters. These chapters are Afghanistan’s timeline, NATO in Afghanistan, Building 
up Afghan Forces, The Fight, The Human Cost, Rebuilding Afghanistan, Looking 
Forward, The Human Cost, Discover Afghanistan and Women’s Struggle.  The 
chapters, feature interviews with key individuals involved in each aspect of the ISAF 
mission. Alongside the website, Return to Hope features on NATO’s YouTube 
channel, and has been highlighted through Facebook and Twitter (in particular through 
the hashtag #ReturnToHope) to enable the documentary to reach a wider audience.  
The communications team have also sought to engage a wider audience through 
hosting elements of the documentary on an array of social media platforms, including 
NATO.TV, YouTube, and on Facebook and Twitter using the hashtag 
‘#ReturnToHope’. This allows the documentary to reach a wider audience. However, 
Afghanistan is not the target audience for the documentary. Rather, it is aimed at the 
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publics within NATO member and ISAF contributing states. As Chris Riley, Principal 
Editor in the Public Diplomacy Division explains the intended audience is: 
‘not Afghanistan followers, they’re not experts, and they’re not people who are 
necessarily politically active. They [the intended audience] are those people 
who may have seen that Afghanistan has been on the news over the last few 
years and maybe have a vague view but are interested in personal compelling 
stories and that through that storytelling we interest them in the subject.’  
The focus on using individual stories to engage publics back home draws parallels 
with the leaked CIA memo which called for a strategic communication programme to 
engage publics back home, in particular through drawing on the stories of Afghan 
women (CIA [Wikileaks], 2010) (see discussion above). 
 
(7.2.3) Implementing UNSCR 1325 in Return to Hope 
In line with the NATO/EAPC Action Plan (2014), NATO’s Public Diplomacy 
Division is tasked with ensuring that WPS priorities are ‘systematically integrated in 
public diplomacy efforts’. This section now turns to examine the extent to which the 
Public Diplomacy Division has lived up to this commitment in one of its most 
successful initiatives, the Return to Hope web-documentary.  
The first point of analysis is the six individuals showcased on the opening page of 
Return to Hope. Of these six individuals, just two are women and only one is an 
Afghan woman. This seems surprising given the Public Diplomacy Division’s role in 
implementing UNSCR 1325 and the centrality of the narrative of ‘saving’ Afghan 
women to the intervention in Afghanistan. In part, it reflects the very real dangers 
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women in Afghanistan face if they are seen to be working with the intervening forces, 
this is likely to have led NATO to avoid using videos or images of Afghan women in 
order to protect their security. Of the two women featured one is Nancy Dupree, an 
American who moved to Afghanistan in the 1970s and has since become a strong 
advocate for the country. The other, Roya Mahboob is an Afghan but was not brought 
up in the country as her family fled when the Taliban took power. The viewer is 
therefore left wondering just how reflective the experiences of those portrayed in the 
documentary are (particularly for women). 
The next point of analysis is the nine thematic chapters, specifically the chapter 
examining the status of Afghan women, entitled ‘women’s struggle’ (NATO, 2014e). 
This ties in with the Public Diplomacy Divisions’ role in implementing UNSCR 1325, 
which requires it to ensure WPS priorities are integrated into its work. It is also 
reflective of the focus on ‘saving’ Afghan women in the narrative surrounding the 
Western intervention in Afghanistan. The first part of the ‘women’s struggle’ section 
focuses on telling the story of how bad life was for Afghan women under the Taliban, 
it then turns to examine the ‘winds of change’, which swept through Afghanistan after 
the 2001 international intervention. In particular, focusing on the role of the 2001 Bonn 
Conference for laying the foundations of women’s rights in Afghanistan. The 
penultimate section focuses on the gains made since then in support of Afghan women, 
focusing in part on NATO’s role. The final section details the challenges left to 
achieving women’s full participation in Afghan society, specifying the particular 
difficulties of instigating change within a ‘patriarchal society’ (NATO, 2014e). 
The ‘Women’s Struggle’ Chapter features interviews with a number of individuals 
who contribute to telling Afghan women’s story (see Table 20). In addition to the final 
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short film, which is an interview with several Afghan women, the Chapter showcases 
interviews with a number of individuals as part of telling the story of ‘Women’s 
Struggle’ in Afghanistan. It is significant to note that 5 of the 9 individuals featured 
separately are Afghan women, although only two (both MPs) are named, with the other 
three left nameless. We learn that one is a School Principle and the other two are local 
women outlining the struggle in their day-to-day lives. The omission of their names is 
unlikely to be for security reasons, given that the film features their faces very 
prominently. This is particularly striking as these individuals, as Afghan women, are 
likely to not only understand but embody the experience of living as an Afghan 
woman, yet their experience is rendered less important when contrasted with the 
‘expert’ commentary of the other contributors. This juxtaposition is particularly 
evident in relation to the School Principle, with the viewer left wondering why she is 
not given a name. The two Afghan women who are named are both MPs (and one a 
Government Minister), the first, Amina Afzali is interviewed about the significance of 
the 2001 Bonn Conference for Afghan women, having been one of the delegates. The 
other speaks about the 2014 Afghan elections (see Table 20). 
The other contributors to the ‘Women’s Struggle’ Chapter include the Swedish 
Ambassador and Croatian Gender Advisor to ISAF. We also hear from an Afghan 
man, Wadood Pedram, in three separate film clips, where he addresses his role as a 
women’s rights activist, the patriarchal nature of Afghan society and the progress for 
Afghan women over the previous 13 years (see Table 20). In contrast to two of the 
three unnamed Afghan women, Pedram is allowed to address broader substantive 
issues, whereas the story we hear from the two women in Herat is of their lived 
experience. He is also given a name (and job title). The other individual we hear from 
is Samina Ahmed, who works for an international NGO. She is featured three times, 
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first talking about life for Afghan women under Taliban rule, then on the changes for 
Afghan women in society and finally detailing what progress is needed. It is therefore 
a man and a international observer who are given the most central role in telling 
NATO’s story of Afghan ‘Women’s Struggle’ and are positioned as experts on the 
topic. Although Afghan women are included in the documentary, the showcasing of 
these two individuals serves to side-line the contribution they make to the 
documentary. This highlights the importance of asking not just whose voices are heard 
but whose voices are silenced (and side-lined).    
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Table 20 Interviews in the 'Women's Struggle' chapter of 'Return to Hope' 
 
Name Affiliation Nationality Gender Detail of film clip
Wadood Pedram
CEO of Human Rights and 
Eradication of Violence 
Organisation
Afghan Man
Why he became a 
women's rights activist
Samina Ahmed International Crisis Group International Woman
Life for Afghan women 
under Taliban rule
Amina Afzali Minister in government Afghan Woman
The importance of the 
2001 Bonn conference for 
women's rights
Samina Ahmed International Crisis Group International Woman Changes for Afghan 
women in society
Veronika Wand-Daniellson Swedish Ambassador International Woman
Gordana Garašić ISAF Gender Advisor international/ NATO Woman
Unnamed School Principle Afghan Woman
On the importanc of 
educaton (speaking English 
but subtitled)
Unnamed Afghan Woman
Unnamed Afghan Woman
Wadood Pedram
CEO of Human Rights and 
Eradication of Violence 
Organisation
Afghan Man Detailing patriarchal society
Wadood Pedram
CEO of Human Rights and 
Eradication of Violence 
Organisation
Afghan Man Progress of women over 
the last 13 years
Fakunda Nadori MP Afghan Woman Voting in the 2014 election
Samina Ahmed International Crisis Group International Woman Progress is needed
Selection of Afghan 
women
Afghan Women Hopes for the future
Explain work carried out 
by NATO and partner 
countries
From Herat, telling their 
stories of living in poverty
Interviews in the 'Women's Struggle' chapter of 'Return to Hope'
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Another feature of Return to Hope, directly addressing the status of women in the 
Afghan National Forces, is featured on NATO’s YouTube channel and NATO TV. 
This is a short film (3.43 minutes) entitled ‘Women in Uniform: a first for 
Afghanistan’ (NATO, 2014m). The clip is likely to reach a wider audience than just 
those visiting the Return to Hope website because it features on YouTube and will 
return for related online searches. The short film ties in with one of the indicators for 
the implementation of UNSCR 1325, that is ‘targeted public diplomacy and media 
events aimed at promoting NATO’s efforts and progress in meeting commitments set 
out in UNSCR 1325 and related Resolutions’ (NATO/EAPC, 2014).  
‘Women in Uniform’ tells the story of women in the Afghan National Forces (ANF) 
through interviews with four individuals involved in the International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF) mission and/or their training (NATO, 2014m). However, 
despite being the topic of the film, female Afghan soldiers are not interviewed and as 
such their experiences are silenced. They also barely feature in the film itself, where 
we only see them marching at distance and being lectured to by a (male) trainer. This 
film would be recorded as part of the indicator in the NATO/EAPC Action Plan on 
the number of public diplomacy initiatives on UNSCR 1325 (NATO/EAPC 2014), a 
more substantive look at its content reveals its fails to adequately address the issue of 
women’s participation and reinforces the notion that UNSCR 1325 is situated 
externally to NATO. 
Another interesting area of analysis of the ‘Women in Uniform’ film is identifying just 
who speaks within the film, as detailed in Table 21, below. The first person to speak 
on NATO’s work in supporting Afghan military women is the Swedish Ambassador 
to NATO. She is given a subtitle with her name and position. Although Sweden is an 
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ISAF contributing state, this is a NATO documentary on NATO’s role in supporting 
Afghan women. It is therefore surprising to find that the most senior official within 
the documentary is not drawn from a NATO member states. This serves to reinforce 
the external nature to NATO’s implementation of UNSCR 1325, with a central role 
being given to partners in supporting the WPS agenda at NATO, most pertinently 
symbolised through Sweden hosting the ‘Department Head’ for NATO’s gender 
training (see discussion in Chapter Five). It also undermines the message that WPS is 
valued by NATO and NATO member states, given that the Public Diplomacy Division 
was seemingly unable to find a senior NATO civilian to address the topic. 
Table 21  
 
The next individual we hear from is a Croatian Gender Advisor to ISAF, Gordana 
Garašić. Garašić is the only person from a NATO member state to speak, she is also 
given a name and job title. The next person we hear from is not given a name, nor a 
job title. It is left to the viewer to determine who is and what his role is. It is likely he 
is an Afghan trainer within the armed forces, although it is not possible to be certain. 
That he is not given a name or job title renders him less important than the previous 
two contributors, yet his experience working directly with female ANF renders his 
expertise and knowledge superior to their high-level commentary. The final individual 
we hear from is also not given a name or job title. It seems plausible that she is 
Australian, given Australia’s role in ISAF and in supporting UNSCR 1325 at NATO 
Name Title Nationality Gender
Veronica Wand-Daniellson Swedish Ambassador Swedish Woman
Gordana Grašić ISAF Gender Advisor Croation/NATO Woman
No name No title (trainer? Afghan(?) Man
No name No title (trainer? Australian(?) Woman
Speakers in the 'Women in uniform: a first for Afghanistan (from Return to Hope documentary)
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(see discussion in Chapter Six), but again it is not possible to be sure. The two 
individuals it can be presumed who work most closely with Afghan military women 
day-to-day, are side-lined.  
Another noteworthy aspect of the film is that, despite being the topic, the film does 
not show female ANF soldiers in the field ‘in action’. We see the female ANF soldiers 
at their training camp being directed by a male soldier and one female ANF soldier in 
a classroom of male soldiers. Further, the closest the film comes to showing ‘women 
doing war’ is a clip of female ISAF soldiers interacting with civilians. The silencing 
of female ANF troops supports the idea that support is given to increasing the 
representation of women in the military not for what they can contribute but to serve 
an ideological purpose (Mathers, 2013: 133) or become ‘a marker of civilizational 
difference and superiority’ (McBride and Wibben, 2012:207). In the case of NATO’s 
involvement in Afghanistan, the focus on Afghan (military) women is used to 
demonstrate that Afghanistan has made ‘progress’ during (and because of) the NATO-
led intervention. 
‘Women in Uniform’ presents a positive picture of the status of women in Afghan 
National Forces, however, it is important to contextualise the ‘good news story’ the 
film presents with the reality of the situation on the ground. As  
Table 22 demonstrates, women compose close to, or under 1% of Afghan National 
Forces, suggesting even for military women there is a long way to go before they are 
emancipated.  
Table 22 
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The emancipatory narrative surrounding the intervention in Afghanistan has had to 
shift from civilian women to focus on military women because civilian Afghan women 
have not been emancipated. The (few) military women fit the Western emancipatory 
narrative, however, their instrumental value for NATO is underlined by the superficial 
nature in which NATO presents this story. The focus on Afghan military women also 
ties in with NATO’s own understanding of the value of UNSCR 1325 as a tool to 
supports the Alliance’s existing agenda to increase the representation of women in 
NATO forces. The narrative is still deeply gendered and indicative of the lack of 
emancipation.  
 
(7.3) Conclusion 
This Chapter has drawn attention to the contradictions underpinning NATO’s 
implementation of UNSCR 1325. This Chapter identified that NATO’s ‘moral 
instruments’ are the starting point for the Alliance’s legitimacy as an actor in 
international relations, rather than its capacity to use lethal force. This is significant 
given that the Public Diplomacy Division is now a key actor in NATO’s 
implementation of UNSCR 1325. It also has implications for the transformative 
potential of NATO’s implementation of the WPS agenda, when the WPS agenda is 
Total Women % Men %
Afghan National Army (ANA) 183,000 416.00 0.23 182,584 99.77
Afghan National Police (ANP 151,000 1,531.00 1.01 149,469 98.99
Afghan Air Force (AAF) 6,700 33.00 0.49 6,667 99.51
Total 340,700 1,980.00 0.58 338,720 99.42
Source: (NATO 2013a)
Composition of Afghan National Forces in 2012. Source (NATO 2013a)
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used instrumentally as a ‘good news story’ for the Alliance, rather than as a starting 
point to challenge gendered conceptions of women and men in conflict. 
The first section in this Chapter introduced NATO’s communication strategy. 
Communication is central to NATO’s role as an international security institution, 
whether that is strategic communication in operations or public diplomacy initiatives 
to bolster public support for the Alliance. As this Chapter noted, the remit of public 
diplomacy and strategic communication overlap to an extent, with the former 
legitimising the actor (in this case NATO) and the latter used for direct operational 
affect. Public opinion is therefore crucial for NATO and while this has remained 
favourable overall, there have been exceptions. The primary example is the NATO-
led ISAF mission in Afghanistan. This led onto discussion in the second part of the 
Chapter of the Public Diplomacy Division’s Return to Hope documentary, which 
utilised gendered narratives of Afghan women in order to sell a ‘good news story’ 
about the Alliance’s involvement there. Rather than challenging NATO’s approach to 
peace and security, UNSCR 1325 served as an additional tool to bolster the Alliance’s 
pre-existing agenda.  
The Chapter identified a key actor in NATO’s implementation of UNSCR 1325, 
Ambassador Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović The centrality of the Public Diplomacy 
Division in NATO’s implementation of UNSCR 1325 can, in part, be attributed to her 
position as the first female Assistant Secretary General. For Grabar-Kitarović her 
association with the WPS agenda at NATO would prove instrumental in domestic 
politics, where she won election as President of Croatia in 2015. For NATO, such a 
senior women provided a visible confirmation that NATO was making progress on 
gender equality and eclipsed the reality of the absence of women from senior positions 
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(as discussed in Chapter Three). Grabar-Kitarović can be identified as a femocrat, even 
if this is complicated by the instrumental value of this role for her own career 
advancement. 
The central role of NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division in the implementation of 
UNSCR 1325 could have supported a transformative moment for the Alliance. For 
example, through supporting gender-sensitive reporting by the media and helping to 
shape public attitudes of men and women in conflict. This, however, has not been the 
remit of the Public Diplomacy Division in supporting UNSCR 1325. Rather, the 
Public Diplomacy Division has utilised the Resolution as a ‘good news story’ to create 
a positive image of the Alliance and instrumentally to engage a number of stakeholders 
from the media, academia and think thanks. This is further undermined by the fact that 
the Public Diplomacy Division is an undervalued and under resourced department. 
Their central role in NATO’s implementation of UNSCR 1325 is therefore reflective 
of a broader undervaluing of UNSCR 1325 by NATO. 
Nevertheless, the Public Diplomacy Division is likely to meet the quantitative 
indicators outlined in the 2014 NATO/EAPC Action Plan. Again, indicating that 
NATO’s implementation of UNSCR 1325 is under ambitious but moreover, that this 
‘success’ will serve to support the ‘good news story’ that is NATO’s implementation 
of UNSCR 1325. Most pressingly, as this Chapter has demonstrated, beyond the 
surface the Public Diplomacy Division has failed to fully integrate UNSCR 1325. For 
example, the silencing of Afghan women in the YouTube film on women’s 
participation in Afghan forces did not conform with the aspirations of the WPS 
agenda. Moreover, the centrality of the Swedish Ambassador in the same film, as the 
high-level expert on NATO’s work on UNSCR 1325 in Afghanistan, draws attention 
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to the external nature of NATO’s implementation of UNSCR 1325. Sweden may head 
NATO’s gender training, but if WPS was an issue valued by the Alliance it would be 
expected that it would be a NATO official or NATO member state outlining NATO’s 
work, not a partner. In this sense, NATO’s engagement with the WPS agenda does not 
represent a transformative moment in NATO’s evolution as an organisation. 
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Conclusion: Implications for the WPS agenda 
(8.0) Introduction 
This thesis has examined NATO’s engagement with the WPS agenda, in order to the 
explore the transformative potential of UNSCR 1325. In doing so, the thesis has 
fulfilled its main aim to assess whether NATO’s adoption and implementation of 
UNSCR 1325 represents a transformative moment for NATO as an organisation. 
Ultimately, the thesis sought to unpack the complex relationship between NATO, as 
an international security institution, and the WPS agenda, which ultimately seeks to 
challenge dominant understandings of security. In order to evaluate the overarching 
research questions, the thesis explored the following: 1) Key institutional actors and 
drivers facilitating the implementation of UNSCR 1325; 2) NATO’s interpretation of 
the value of UNSCR 1325 and the implications of this for the transformative potential 
of the Resolution; and 3) the impact of NATO’s adoption of UNSCR 1325 on the 
Resolution itself. The Conclusion now turns to examine each of these points in turn, 
before concluding that NATO’s adoption of UNSCR 1325 has not transformed NATO 
as an organisation nor its approach to international peace and security but has been 
framed as of ‘added value’ to the Alliance. 
 
(8.1) Key institutional actors and drivers of WPS 
The identification of key institutional actors and drivers facilitating the 
implementation of UNSCR 1325 is the first stepping-stone in understanding the 
influence of the resolution, and associated policy agenda, on security organisations. 
These actors and drivers were found to be both internal and external to NATO. First, 
partner states, including Austria and Finland, but most significantly Sweden, have had 
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a pivotal role in supporting the inclusion and implementation of the WPS agenda at 
NATO. However, the reliance of non-members to push forward the agenda has 
positioned NATO’s implementation of UNSCR 1325 as external to the Alliance, both 
symbolically and practically. For example, it was the Swedish Ambassador who 
addressed the importance of NATO’s work to support Afghan military women in 
Return to Hope, rather than a representative from a NATO member state. On a 
practical level, Sweden and the Swedish military host the ‘Department Head’ for 
NATO’s gender training. The first partner state to hold such an accolade and 
suggestive that gender training is not seen as a critical issue which the Alliance should 
keep within the organisation. Sweden’s central role in supporting the WPS agenda has 
contributed to UNSCR 1325 being positioned as external to NATO, or in a silo, rather 
than an integral part of the organisation. It also challenges assumptions that NATO is 
an organisation whose agenda is (solely) dictated by the US. 
Second, member states working through the ‘friends of 1325’ have been been crucial 
to providing ‘insider’ support to advance WPS at NATO, notably the Netherlands, 
Norway and the UK.  This diverse and informal group of like-minded states supportive 
of the WPS agenda provided a critical forum for consultation to coordinate strategies 
prior to official negotiations. It is evident that the ‘friends of 1325’ have proved to be 
a cornerstone of NATO’s adoption and implementation of UNSCR 1325 but the 
limited engagement, particularly from the USA, is reflective of the comparatively low 
priority given to WPS within NATO as a whole. 
The draw down of NATO troops from Afghanistan in 2014 did not coincide with a 
slow down in NATO’s implementation of the WPS agenda. This could have been 
expected given that NATO’s initial engagement with UNSCR 1325 was shaped by the 
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Alliance’s gendered experiences there. Moreover, NATO’s engagement with the WPS 
agenda, in particular to support Afghan women, provided a useful story for the Public 
Diplomacy Division to use in their efforts to frame NATO’s intervention in 
Afghanistan as a ‘good news story’ and to document progress as a direct result of 
NATO’s involvement.  
Since 2011, as Chapter Seven outlined, the Public Diplomacy Division has had a 
central role in NATO’s implementation of UNSCR 1325. And while it is likely that 
the Public Diplomacy Division will meet the quantitative indicators outlines in the 
NATO/EAPC Action Plan, these are far from ambitious. Moreover, the underfunding 
and understaffing of the Public Diplomacy Division means its role in implementing 
UNSCR 1325 is limited out of necessity. The role of the Public Diplomacy Division 
has been for instrumental gain for NATO, with the WPS agenda providing a ‘good 
news story’ for the Alliance, rather than as a means to challenge gender essentialisms 
in conflict. This was exemplified in the production of the award winning Return to 
Hope documentary on Afghanistan, which did not live up to NATO’s commitment to 
UNSCR 1325. It not only silenced Afghan women but instrumentalised them, as the 
leaked CIA document demonstrated, they provided ‘ideal messengers in humanizing 
the ISAF role in combating the Taliban’ (CIA [Wikileaks], 2010) and selling NATO 
and ISAF to publics back home. 
Femocrats operating within NATO also had an important role in supporting the 
implementation of UNSCR 1325. In particular, their work ensured  that the agenda 
remained, and continues to remain, relevant to the institution. There most notable 
contribution being in supporting the establishment of the gender machinery in 
NATO’s military structure, in particular the office to support the CWINF/NCGP. They 
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have also worked within the International Staff, for example, in Gender Advisor roles 
and within national delegations. However, in supporting UNSCR 1325, they have 
faced a number of challenges, as Chapter Five discussed. For example, the perception 
that the WPS agenda was a personal one, even when it became part of an institutional 
mandate, made it difficult to champion and draws attention to a way in which feminist 
agendas can be side-lined within institutions.  
Chapter Seven identified not only identified the role of the Public Diplomacy Division 
in the implementation of UNSCR 1325, but also that of Ambassador Kolinda Grabar-
Kitarović, the first female Assistant Secretary General. Her position as the most senior 
women in NATO provided the organisation with a visible confirmation that NATO 
was making progress on gender equality, eclipsing the reality of the absence of women 
from senior positions within the organisation (as discussed in Chapter Three). Grabar-
Kitarović also benefited from her association with the WPS agenda, using it to bolster 
her (successful) campaign to be elected President of Croatia in 2015. The WPS agenda 
therefore proved instrumental not only for the organisation, but for the individual, 
complicating Grabar-Kitarović’s role as a femocrat. 
The creation of gender machinery in NATO’s military structure to support NATO’s 
concern with the status of women in the military has provided an invaluable platform 
to champion UNSCR 1325 from and for the WPS agenda to map onto. As Chapter 
Three outlines, the NCGP has provided an important platform for the sharing of best 
practice on UNSCR 1325, supporting NATO’s role as a ‘teaching machine’ in respect 
of gender and the WPS agenda. The replication of this in the political structure, with 
the creation of the post of Secretary General’s Special Representative on WPS has 
provided another valuable focal point for advancing the WPS agenda at NATO.  
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The other key driver supporting NATO’s implementation of UNSCR 1325 has been 
leadership and this was examined in Chapter Five. In part this has come from the 
Secretary General, who through his annual reports on the implementation of UNSCR 
1325 gave his backing to the WPS agenda at NATO. Most significant, however, has 
been the role of the NATO Secretary General’s Special Representative on Women, 
Peace and Security. The role created at the NATO Chicago Summit in 2012, and made 
possible by funding from Norway, supported the significant momentum behind the 
WPS agenda at NATO between 2012 and 2014. This was, in part, due to Mari Skåre’s 
exisiting institutional knowledge, which enabled her to navigate NATO politics. In 
addition, she was instrumental in creating external pressure on the Alliance to live up 
to its commitments on UNSCR 1325, meeting with civil society at every opportunity 
she could. This led, in June 2014, to the first ever formal consultations on any NATO 
policy with civil society. However, while this was groundbreaking, the organisations 
invited (or perhaps those willing or able to participate) were not reflective of the full 
breadth of women’s organisations within NATO and partner states, resulting in 
superficial oversight. It remains to be seen if these civil society groups will continue 
to monitor the NATO/EAPC Action Plan.  
The thesis has also demonstrated that civil society actors, although having a central 
role in supporting the WPS agenda, were not involved in NATO’s adoption of UNSCR 
1325 and have only very recently begun to engage with the organisation, with NATO 
facilitating the relationship. As discussed in Chapter One, civil society engagenment 
with the WPS agenda has been key to mitigating the weaknesses within its 
transformative potential. The lack of engagement of civil society actors with NATO, 
has left NATO’s interepretation of the value of UNSCR 1325 to be instrumental for 
the Alliance. More pressingly, NATO’s role as a ‘teaching machine’ has meant that 
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member and partner states across the globe are learning the value of UNSCR 1325 as 
of ‘added value’ as a diplomatic tool, as a public diplomacy tool and in operations, 
rather, than implementing UNSCR 1325 because it is the right thing to do. 
 
(8.2) The ‘added value’ of UNSCR 1325 for NATO 
NATO’s interpretation of UNSCR 1325’s core principles has important implications 
for the transformative potential of the Resolution. This thesis has demonstrated that 
NATO has come to value UNSCR 1325 as of ‘added value’ as a public diplomacy 
tool, a diplomatic tool to engage partner states and in operations. It has also come to 
be valued as of ‘added value’ for member and partner states as a diplomatic tool to 
provide influence incommensurate with status within the Alliance. The value NATO 
has placed upon UNSCR 1325 as of ‘added value’ to the Alliance limits the 
transformative potential of the Resolution. This has wider ramifications beyond 
NATO, given NATO’s role as a ‘teaching machine’ in respect of gender and UNSCR 
1325, with member and partner states learning the value of UNSCR 1325. On the 
military side, UNSCR 1325 has mapped onto NATO’s pre-existing concern with the 
representation of women in NATO forces. In this sense, UNSCR 1325 has been used 
as a tool to further this agenda, symbolised by the role of the NCGP in supporting and 
monitoring NATO and member states implementation of the Resolution. 
NATO’s involvement in Afghanistan contributed to shaping the particular 
understanding of UNSCR 1325 underpinning the NATO/EAPC Policy on UNSCR 
1325 and in Bi-Strategic Command 40-1. This again positioned the Resolution as of 
‘added value’ to the Alliance and as a tool to increase operational effectiveness. An 
understanding reinforced by Sweden’s continued role in supporting the WPS agenda 
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at NATO through the NCGM and in contributing to Bi-Strategic Command 40-1, 
given that this is the value placed upon UNSCR 1325 by the Nordic countries 
In NATO’s political structure, UNSCR 1325 has also proved to be of ‘added value’ to 
NATO in relation to public diplomacy and situates the WPS agenda as external facing. 
The WPS agenda has not been integrated for transformative effect in public diplomacy 
initiatives, rather the central role given to the most underfunded and under-resourced 
division with NATO suggests a wider neglect of the WPS agenda in terms of resource 
allocation. The Public Diplomacy Division has utilised NATO’s implementation of 
UNSCR 1325 as a ‘good news story’ to sell NATO and the NATO-led ISAF mission 
to publics back home. And its own engagements beyond its core commitments in the 
NATO/EAPC Action Plan on UNSCR 1325 fall short in respect of the WPS agenda. 
For example, the Return to Hope documentary silenced Afghan women and used their 
story for instrumental effect to bolster perceptions of the Alliance within member 
states.  
For certain member and partner states, UNSCR 1325 has provided a salient diplomatic 
tool, providing influence incommensurate with status. Sweden’s role, as outlined 
above, is a case in point here. However, Austria has also used the WPS agenda to its 
advantage at NATO, learning lessons from its support for the EU’s implementation of 
UNSCR 1325. Among member states, the UK utilised a meeting on PSVI (the 
initiative included adoption of UNSCR 2122, a WPS Resolution), as a showpiece for 
WPS at the NATO Wales Summit, when in reality few attended the meeting. 
NATO’s role as a ‘teaching machine’ in respect of gender and UNSCR 1325 has 
contributed to the emergence of a European understanding of UNSCR 1325 as of 
‘added value’, not only for the conduct of operations but as a (public) diplomacy tool. 
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This has been facilitated by the NCGP, training at the NCGM and the provision of 
VNCs. Further, the centrality of UNSCR 1325 to a number of NATO partnerships 
beyond EAPC, indicates that the ‘added value’ approach to WPS has the potential to 
reach across the globe. In situating the Resolution as of ‘added value’, the existing 
institution (whether NATO or the state) remains not only unchallenged, but is 
reinforced in its raison d’etre. This serves to deny the transformative potential of 
UNSCR 1325. 
(8.3) Implications for the WPS agenda 
Finally, it is important to ascertain the impact NATO’s adoption of UNSCR 1325 on 
the Resolution itself. This thesis identifies that the value NATO has placed upon 
UNSCR 1325, as of ‘added value’ to the Alliance, limits the transformative potential 
of the Resolution. This has wider ramifications beyond NATO, given NATO’s role as 
a ‘teaching machine’ in respect of gender and UNSCR 1325, with member and partner 
states learning the value of UNSCR 1325. 
On the military side, UNSCR 1325 has mapped onto NATO’s pre-existing concern 
with the representation of women in NATO forces. In this sense, UNSCR 1325 has 
been used as a tool to further this agenda, symbolised by the role of the NCGP in 
supporting and monitoring NATO and member states implementation of the 
Resolution. NATO’s role as a ‘teaching machine’ has been facilitated by the NCGP 
and this has resulted in member and partner states valuing UNSCR 1325 as part of the 
agenda to increase the representation of women in the military.  
NATO’s involvement in Afghanistan contributed to shaping the particular 
understanding of UNSCR 1325 underpinning the NATO/EAPC Policy on UNSCR 
1325 and in Bi-Strategic Command 40-1. This again positioned the Resolution as of 
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‘added value’ to the Alliance as a tool to increase operational effectiveness. An 
understanding reinforced by Sweden’s continued role in supporting the WPS agenda 
at NATO through the NCGM and in contributing to Bi-Strategic Command 40-1, 
given that this is the value placed upon UNSCR 1325 by the Nordic countries. The 
NCGM provides another focal point for NATO’s role as a ‘teaching machine’, 
providing training to NATO and partner states on the value of UNSCR 1325 as a 
means to increase operational effectiveness.  
The other sense in which UNSCR 1325 has proved to be of ‘added value’ to NATO, 
is in relation to public diplomacy. This has implications for the WPS agenda more 
broadly because it is an example of it being instrumentalised. The Public Diplomacy 
Division has utilised NATO’s implementation of UNSCR 1325 as a ‘good news story’ 
for NATO. In this sense, rather than challenging militarism as the feminist activists 
who supported UNSCR 1325 would have hoped (Cockburn, 2011), the Resolution has 
been used to bolster perceptions of a militarist organisation and provide it with 
legitimacy as a gender actor.   
For certain member and partner states, UNSCR 1325 has provided a salient diplomatic 
tool, providing influence incommensurate with status. Sweden’s role, as outlined 
above, is a case in point here. However, Austria has also used the WPS agenda to its 
advantage at NATO, learning lessons from its support for the EU’s implementation of 
UNSCR 1325. Both of these member states have taken steps to support their rhetorical 
commitment on UNSCR 1325. Among member states, the UK utilised a meeting on 
PSVI (the initiative included adoption of UNSCR 2122, a WPS Resolution), as a 
showpiece for WPS at the NATO Wales Summit, when in reality few attended the 
meeting on the issue. The implication for the WPS agenda, is that member states have 
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‘learned’ the value of UNSCR 1325 as a diplomatic tool, to advance their own agendas 
incommensurate with their status. More pressingly, UNSCR 1325 is an issue states 
must be seen to support at the international level, and within NATO (see discussion in 
Chapter Six) but this does not mean that the rhetoric has to translate into discernible 
actions on the issue. This supports the discussion in Chapter One and reflects issues 
with the WPS agenda more broadly, that is it discerning the difference between a state 
adopting a NAP or policy commitment on WPS and actually committing to taking 
action to implement UNSCR 1325. 
NATO’s role as a ‘teaching machine’ in respect of gender and UNSCR 1325 has 
contributed to the emergence of a European understanding of UNSCR 1325 as of 
‘added value’, not only for the conduct of operations but as a (public) diplomacy tool 
and this has implications for the WPS agenda beyond NATO. In particular, because 
European states have taken the lead in adopting NAPs (as discussed in Chapter One). 
Further, the centrality of UNSCR 1325 to a number of NATO partnerships beyond 
EAPC, indicates that the ‘added value’ approach to WPS has the potential to reach 
across the globe. In situating the Resolution as of ‘added value’, the existing institution 
(whether NATO or the state) remains not only unchallenged, but is reinforced in its 
raison d’etre. This serves to deny the transformative potential of UNSCR 1325. 
This analysis has found that NATO’s implementation of UNSCR 1325 does not 
represent a transformative moment for NATO as an organisation, however, it does to 
an extent for NATO’s approach to peace and security. This is because NATO has 
come to value UNSCR 1325 as of ‘added value’ to the organisation, in particular as a 
tool to increase operational effectiveness. This situates UNSCR 1325 within a silo as 
a tool, which may prove beneficial to the Alliance in the future. At the same time, 
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NATO’s gendered structures have remained untouched by the implementation of 
UNSCR 1325. In part, this is because Human Resources were initially separated from 
the implementation of UNSCR 1325 because the two were not perceived as mutually 
reinforcing. Most significant, however, is the perception of UNSCR 1325 as of ‘added 
value’ to NATO, not only for operational effectiveness but as a public diplomacy tool, 
a ‘good news story’ about the Alliance and NATO-led operations.  
 
(8.4) Contribution to Knowledge 
The primary contribution of this thesis is to expand and update Enloe’s (1983) 
conception of NATO as a ‘teaching machine’ in the realm of gender, in order to 
account for a twenty-first century NATO. This has meant looking beyond just the 
military structure, to include the political structure, in addition to NATO partnerships. 
In doing so, this thesis has accounted for NATO’s sustained engagement with the WPS 
agenda. It has also demonstrated that lesson sharing among member and partner states 
on WPS has been a multidirectional process within the alliance but one which is 
facilitated by the political community underpinning NATO. As a result, this thesis 
therefore makes a significant contribution not only to feminist security studies 
literature, by outlining an approach to theorising international security institutions but 
to NATO studies and understandings of how NATO as an organisation functions. 
In addition to this top level contribution to knowledge, the thesis makes three further 
supporting contributions. First, it contributes to understanding the implications for the 
WPS agenda when an international security institution seeks to engage with it relations 
and in doing so contributes to feminist IR and feminist security studies. This is 
important because despite the fact that UNSCR 1325 is seen as a ‘feminist’ 
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achievement and it is feminist security studies scholars who have analysed its 
implementation by the Security Council and at a national and local level, NATO and 
the apparent militarisation of the WPS agenda have been left underexamined. In part, 
this is because Feminist IR is grounded in pacifism, which has meant feminist IR 
scholars, such as Cockburn (2011), understand NATO’s adoption of UNSCR 1325 as 
only a co-option of the agenda, thus failing to account for the possibility of other 
outcomes. This omission is significant because, as Ringsmose and Rynning (2011: 7) 
note, NATO’s 2010 Strategic Concept marked the beginning of a NATO less 
restrained by regional and military considerations and more globally and politically 
engaged. It also overlooks the decades of feminist organising by military women 
within NATO throught the CWINF/NCGP and fails to account for the ways in which 
UNSCR 1325 maps onto to the pre-existing convern within the status of women in 
NATO forces. This thesis has demonstrated that the adoption of global gender norms 
(including UNSCR 1325) by international security institutions necessitates feminist 
engagement in order to understand the opportunities for - and constraints to - pursuing 
a feminist agenda through resistant organisations.  
Second, it conceptualises NATO’s role as a gender actor in international politics and 
in outlining NATO’s long engagement with gender issues and position as a gendered 
institution this thesis is a challenge to NATO studies to take seriously gender analysis 
of the institution. Through understanding NATO as a gendered institution it is possible 
to conceive of NATO’s engagement with UNSCR 1325, not as an aberration, but as 
of added value to the Alliance and its position. The promiment and outward facing 
position given to WPS by NATO, in particular through the appointment of the Special 
Representive, signals that this is an agenda that NATO wants to be seen to be engaging 
with and that in itself makes it worthy of interrogation. It also draws attention to the 
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engagement of NATO with civil society actors in formal policy making processes for 
the first time ever, challenging notion in NATO Studies that NATO is an exception 
among international organisations in this respect (Mayer, 2008 :118).  
Third, it has added to the expanding body of work on feminist institutionalism a study 
of an international security institution. This is important because feminist 
institutionalism has to date focused predominately on state institutions. The insights 
of feminist institutionalism, which takes the starting point of analysis as an 
acknowledgment that institutions are gendered and consequently prioritises the 
understanding of the interaction between informal and formal institutions provide an 
important lens through which to understand NATO and NATO’s engagement with 
UNSCR 1325. To do so it has provided a study of the way in which gender is integrated 
into decision and policy making processes by international security institutions. In the 
case of NATO, this relied not just on femocrats situated within institutional structures 
but on the support of engaged member and, crucially, partner states. Austria proved 
an effective lobbyist for the Resolution, learning lessons from its successful 
championing of UNSCR 1325 at the EU and supporting the ‘friends of 1325’ group to 
bring together like minded states. Sweden, which has held itself up as an expert on 
gender, was able to input into the drafting of Bi-Strategic Command 40-1 and host the 
‘Department Head’ for NATO’s gender training, the NCGM. This is not to discount 
the contribution of individuals within NATO, in particular those who worked to 
establish NATO’s gender machinery within the IMS. It is evident that the CWINF 
(later the NCGP) provided a way for NATO to map UNSCR 1325 onto its pre-existing 
concern with the status of women in NATO forces. NATO’s adoption of UNSCR 1325 
can thus be seen as a culmination of decades of feminist organising within NATO. 
This contributes to existing accounts of women’s policy machinery (Lombardo and 
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Verloo 2009; Childs and Krook 2009) an analysis of the OWINF/NOGP within 
NATO’s military structure. This is important because it indicates that such apparatus 
can emerge in a resistant militarist organisation if femocrats are positioned to support 
such a move. 
 
(8.5) Limitations 
The limitations of this thesis are twofold. The first is applicable to all research on 
international security institutions and relates to their propensity for secrecy, 
particularly in relation to more sensitive operational areas. To an extent this thesis 
relies upon publicly available policy documents and statements, even though it is 
likely that relevant classified documents exist. This was mitigated with the use of elite 
interviews but inevitably one of the difficulties of researching international security 
institutions is that the researcher does not have access to all the documents in 
existence. For example, in Chapter Six I discuss the existence of a NATO/EAPC 
Action Plan on UNSCR 1325 prior to the publicly released edition in 2014. Which 
was identified through an elite interview. These two documents would have made for 
a salient comparison, however, the document was classified for a reason and it was 
not possible to gain access to it. 
The second is the time period covered in the discussion of NATO’s implementation 
of UNSCR 1325 in Chapter Six. Here, it was necessary to limit the analysis of NATO’s 
implementation of UNSCR 1325 to the period from the appointment of the first NATO 
Special Representative on Women, Peace and Security in 2012 to the end of her term 
in Autumn 2014. This is because, the extent of the progress made during this period 
meant this focus was necessary in order to cover it in sufficient detail. The appointment 
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of the Special Representative itself, was ground-breaking. In addition, this period saw 
the first ever NATO-NGO consultations on any policy document. September 2014, 
also saw the UK host the NATO Wales Summit. This was worthy of examination 
given that the UK had been a key champion of the WPS agenda, through the PSVI and 
it was therefore to be expected that WPS would have a more prominent role on the 
agenda. This period also coincided with the draw down of NATO forces from 
Afghanistan, which had been a key driver of NATO’s engagement with the WPS 
agenda (as discussed in Chapter Five) and as such this period warranted particular 
scrutiny. Conversely, as Chapter Seven demonstrates, the Public Diplomacy 
Division’s role in implementing UNSCR 1325 provided a useful starting point for 
selling a ‘good news story’ about the Alliance’s involvement in Afghanistan in respect 
of the status of Afghan women. This was showcased in the release of the award 
winning ‘Return to Hope’ documentary. On the military side, this time period also saw 
the Nordic Centre for Gender in Military Operations in Sweden become the 
‘Department Head’ for NATO gender training. The first partner country to host such 
an asset.   
 
(8.6) Areas for future research 
This thesis has identified a number of areas for future research. First, as Chapter Five 
demonstrates, NATO’s adoption of the WPS agenda has served as a starting point for 
NATO to consult with civil society actors on the NATO/EAPC Action Plan. This 
NATO-NGO policy consultation was the first of its kind in the history of the Alliance, 
and in this respect NATO has been somewhat of a laggard compared to other 
international organisations. Although beyond the scope of this thesis, it would be 
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interesting to examine whether NATO’s engagement with the WPS agenda represents 
a transformative moment in NATO-NGO relations. This could be done through 
identifying how representative the civil society actors NATO consults with are of 
those NGOs working on WPS, the form the consultations take and what the 
perceptions of these NGOs are of NATO. It would also be valuable to identify whether 
this engagement with civil society is being replicated in other policy areas. 
A second area for future research, would be a comparison of other regional 
organisations engaged with the WPS agenda. This would be particularly useful at the 
European level, with a comparison of the EU and OSCE, because the EU remains 
somewhat of a laggard in the implementation of UNSCR 1325 (Guerrina and Wright 
2016). It would be useful to compare the institutional structures which make possible 
the effective championing of the WPS agenda, in particular the role of gender policy 
machinery. This would allow for a critical examination of the Global Study on 
UNSCR 1325’s claim that NATO’s appointment of a Special Representative on 
Women, Peace and Security is an example of best practice at the regional level 
(Coomaraswamy, 2015), as discussed in Chapters One and Six. Moreover it would 
provide lessons on whether the understanding of UNSCR 1325 perpetuated by NATO, 
as of ‘added value’, is shared within these institutions, or whether their particular 
organisational has produced different outcomes. 
An additional area of future research, beyond the scope of this thesis, would be an 
indepth study of the NATO military women activists who first organised in the 1960s 
to bring the issue of the status of women in NATO forces to the Alliance’s attention. 
As Chapter Three identified, they have been significant actors in supporting NATO’s 
evolving role as a gender actor. First, through establishing the Committee on Women 
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in NATO Forces in the 1970s; then through establishing the gender machinery to 
support this Committee in the 1990s; and finally through supporting the Committee’s 
transformation to support the Alliance’s implementation of UNSCR 1325. Their 
experiences therefore warrant examination in their own right. 
 
(8.7) Conclusion 
NATO’s position as the pre-eminent international security institution spanning Europe 
and the North Atlantic, and incorporating an increasing number of global partners, 
makes the Alliance’s adoption and implementation of UNSCR 1325 of particular 
salience to examine. As this conclusion has demonstrated, NATO’s role as a ‘teaching 
machine’ sharing lessons on best practice in respect of gender and UNSCR 1325 has 
meant that the value NATO places upon the Resolution has been learned not just by 
NATO members but by a range of global partners. This thesis concludes, that this has 
served to limit the transformative potential of the Resolution on NATO as an 
organisation and NATO’s approach to UNSCR 1325. Rather, the WPS agenda has 
been understood to be of added value to the Alliance, in respect of military operations 
(and relatedly, to increase the status of women in NATO forces) but also as a public 
diplomacy tool. 
Moreover, this conception of NATO allows for an understanding of how key partner 
states, primarily Sweden and Austria, have been so effective at championing the WPS 
agenda within an organisation they are not members of. Sweden, in particular, has 
proved to be a stalwart of NATO’s implementation of UNSCR 1325, through hosting 
the NCGM. These two states have contributed to a valuing of the championing of 
UNSCR 1325 as a means to increase influence incommensurate with status. This has 
314 
 
implications for the transformative potential of the Resolution, given that it does not 
necessarily correspond with a commitment to implement the Resolution in line with 
the spirit of the WPS agenda more broadly. 
The positioning of UNSCR 1325 as of ‘added value’, means that the existing 
institution (whether NATO or the state) remains not only unchallenged, but is 
reinforced in its raison d’etre. This serves to deny the transformative potential of 
UNSCR 1325 and has wider ramification for the WPS agenda, given that NATO 
members are among the most active in adopting NAPs. It also draws attention to the 
vulnerability of the WPS agenda, where without civil society engagement a militarist 
organisation has been left to adopt and implement UNSCR 1325 and as such has found 
the Resolution maps onto its own existing concern with the status of women in the 
military. Not only that, UNSCR 1325 has also served as a ‘good news story’ for the 
Alliance to promote its activities, leaving the agenda at a very real risk of being 
coopted to serve a purpose contrary to the intentions of the feminist activists who 
championed the Resolution’s adoption by the Security Council. NATO’s adoption and 
implementation of UNSCR 1325 is, therefore, an example of the dangers of 
unintended consequences.  
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